Borden v. CSX Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91V-901-N.
• Citation: 843 F. Supp. 1410
• Parties: Roberta BORDEN, etc., Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

843 F. Supp. 1410

Roberta BORDEN, etc., Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.; et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91V-901-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

November 29, 1993.

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J. McGowin Williamson, Williamson and Williamson, Greenville, AL, and John A. Taber, Taber and Dansby, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.

Walter A. Byars and William A. Shashy, Steiner, Crum and Baker, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

OPINION

VARNER, District Judge.

This cause is now before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment filed herein August 25, 1993, along with supporting briefs and materials; and on Plaintiff's opposition thereto filed herein September 9, 1993, as amended September 10, 1993, with supporting materials; and on the Motion to Strike filed herein September 17, 1993, by Defendants CSX, National Railroad and Cheatwood. The Court has jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1349, 1441, and 1446.

I. Background

On February 16, 1991, a train owned and operated by Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) struck an automobile on Butler County Road 30 in Butler County, Alabama. The collision killed the Plaintiff's intestate, Robert Day Lewis. Plaintiff is Administratrix of Mr. Lewis' estate. Defendant CSX owned and operated the railroad where the collision occurred. Defendant Cheatwood was the engineer of the train. Defendant Butler County Commission (Butler County) is the owner and the governing body with the authority to maintain Butler County Road 30 and all adjacent right-of-ways thereto and up to 50 feet on either side of the railroad track owned by CSX.

Plaintiff Borden, as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert Day Lewis, filed a two-count Complaint in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama, alleging that the negligence and wantonness of Defendants Amtrak, CSX and Cheatwood caused the death of Lewis.¹ Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Defendants Amtrak, CSX and Cheatwood previously moved for summary judgment on July 1, 1992. By Order dated November 20, 1992, the Court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment in all respects except on the issue of preemption. Later, by Order dated August 5, 1993, the Court denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the preemption issue as well. Defendant Butler County was named as a Defendant in this action by Plaintiff's Amended Complaint of July 24, 1992. All Defendants now move for summary judgment asserting, as in the previously filed summary judgment motion, that no genuine issues of material fact exist to establish Defendants' negligence or wantonness as alleged in Counts 1 and 2 of the Amended Complaint. Additionally, Defendants claim that Robert Day Lewis was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, thus entitling Defendants to summary judgment. Alternatively, Defendants argue that federal law preempts Plaintiff's State law claims, which would entitle Defendants to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. All claims in the Complaint appear to be based on the laws of the State of Alabama. Each of these grounds is discussed separately below.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court must refrain from deciding material factual issues but, rather, must decide whether such factual issues exist and, if not, whether the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dominick v. Dixie National Life Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir.1987). Furthermore, all inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir.1986). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment * * * against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); accord Kramer v. Unitas, 831 F.2d 994, 997 (11th Cir.1987). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact" emphasis in original. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party * * *. If the evidence is merely colorable * * * or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id., at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11; accord Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1988).

III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Defendants' initial argument for summary judgment is that Plaintiff's asserted State law claims are preempted by federal law. This issue is largely controlled by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). In Easterwood the Court addressed the preemptive effect of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-447 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).

The FRSA contains an express preemption clause which provides, in part:

"The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement." 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).

Thus, the main inquiry on the issue of preemption is whether the Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations covering the same subject matter as the State law pertaining to Plaintiff's claims.

A. GRADE CROSSING CLAIM

The Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by federal law. Defendants argue that, under the standards set forth in Easterwood, preemption has occurred because federal funds participated in the design and installation of warning devices at the crossing in question.

In Easterwood the Supreme Court specifically addressed preemption of claims based on inadequate warning devices at grade crossings. The Court held that when the provisions of 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) "are applicable, state tort law is preempted." Easterwood, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1740-41. In further discussing these provisions, the Court stated:

"Under §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), a project for the improvement of a grade crossing must either include an automatic gate or receive FHWA approval if federal funds `participate in the installation of the warning devices.' Thus, * * * §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) displace state and private decision-making authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained. Indeed, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings. * * * § 646.214(b)(4), which covers federally funded installations at crossings that do not feature multiple tracks, heavy traffic, or the like, explicitly notes that railroad participation in the initial determination of `the type of warning device to be installed' at particular crossings is subject to the Secretary's approval. * * * In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices,² the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. The Secretary's regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which * * * seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings." Id., at 1741.

The question in this case with respect to the grade crossing claim is whether Defendants have established the preconditions for the application of the above-stated regulations. Defendants rely on an affidavit from the State Traffic Engineer for the Alabama Highway Department, Paul Weldon. The affidavit indicates that the "signs and pavement markings on Butler County Road 30 were approved and authorized by the Federal Highway Administration, and federal funds were expended for the design, placement and payment of these signs and pavement markings." Affidavit of Paul Weldon attached to Motion for Summary Judgment of Amtrak, CSX and Cheatwood filed August 25, 1993. These undisputed facts establish that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices at the crossing in issue. Thus, Plaintiff's negligence and wantonness claims are preempted only insofar as such claims are based on the Defendants' failure to provide and maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue for Defendants is appropriate.

B. VEGETATION CLAIM

The issue of whether federal law preempts Plaintiff's claim based on the Defendants' alleged failure to remove vegetation from around the crossing was not briefed by either side. However, because the parties have raised the vegetation issue on other grounds, the Court is inclined to partially dispose of this issue.

Under 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 (1992), railroad track owners must keep vegetation on, or immediately adjacent to, the tracks under control. On this issue the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: "Because the Secretary has chosen to regulate vegetation, Congress explicitly has preempted all state regulation in this area." Easterwood v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). However,...