Borden-Vasallo v. Miami Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-02104-HLT-TJJ |
| Parties | RUBEN BORDEN-VASALLO (ID 108165), Plaintiff, v. MIAMI COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff Ruben Borden-Vasallo1 has sued various Miami County, Kansas officials and subordinate agencies because of an incident that occurred while sheriff's deputies were transporting him in a prisoner transport van. Defendants move for summary judgment on some claims and seek dismissal of other claims and parties. Doc. 15.
The Court finds that the only proper defendants in this case are the two individual deputies because Plaintiff is either not asserting claims against the other parties, or they are not entities capable of being sued. The two individual deputies being sued are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff has not shown the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Plaintiff's purported claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not valid and are dismissed. The only remaining claim is Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim, which this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and remands to state court.
Plaintiff is an inmate at Oswego Correctional Facility in El Dorado, Kansas. Doc. 16 at 2. The Miami County Sheriff's Department is a subdivision of Miami County. Id. The Kansas County Association Multiline Pool ("KCAMP") is a "group self-insured property/casualty plan formed under K.S.A. 12-2616, et. seq." Id. at 3. Deputy Ken Richardson and Deputy Andrea Zaman are Miami County Sheriff's Department deputies. Id.
On July 24, 2018, Zaman and Richardson were transporting Plaintiff from the Miami County jail to the Oswego Correctional Facility in a prisoner transport van. Id. The drive takes approximately two hours. Id. at 4. During the trip, Plaintiff's hands and feet were handcuffed, though the exact way in which his hands were shackled is somewhat disputed. Id.; see also Doc. 27 at 1; Doc. 43 at 3. Neither Zaman nor Richardson entered the back of the van when Plaintiff was inside for safety reasons. Doc. 16 at 4. There is a dispute about whether Plaintiff asked to have his seatbelt fastened, at least at some point in the trip, and whether Plaintiff's hands and the position of the seatbelts allowed him to fasten his own seatbelt. But it is undisputed that Plaintiff was unbuckled for the duration of the trip.
Richardson drove the van. Id. At some point during the trip, a car turned in front of the van, and Richardson had to brake quickly to avoid hitting the car. Id. This caused Plaintiff to slide from his seat and hit one of the van's walls. Id. Plaintiff says that his head "slammed" into the van wall. Doc. 28 at 1. The Court has reviewed video from inside the van. It shows Plaintiff, who was sitting by the back door, lean toward the front of the compartment before falling or sliding headfirsttoward the front wall of the passenger compartment. The velocity of any impact is difficult to gauge from the video.3
Zaman heard Plaintiff slide into the van wall and called back to him "to hold on and that they were stopping." Doc. 16 at 4. Just down the road from where the incident occurred, Richardson pulled into a parking lot so he and Zaman could check on Plaintiff. Id. at 5. When they opened the van door, Plaintiff had his pant legs rolled up, revealing rug burns or scrapes on his knees. Id. But there was no blood on Plaintiff or on the walls or floor of the van. Id. Richardson asked Plaintiff if he hit his head, and when Plaintiff said he had, Richardson examined Plaintiff's head but found no outward signs of a head injury. Id. Both Zaman and Richardson had first-aid training, which included the signs and symptoms of head trauma and how to handle serious medical injuries. Id. at 3. Both concluded that Plaintiff did not need immediate medical care. Id. at 5-6. Both also knew that the Oswego Correctional Facility had medical staff that could examine Plaintiff when they arrived. Id. at 6.
Zaman told Plaintiff to put on his seatbelt before they continued the trip, but neither Zaman nor Richardson climbed in the van to help Plaintiff buckle himself in because of safety concernsrelated to being in the small confines of the van with a prisoner. Id. at 4, 6. Zaman and Richardson continued to monitor Plaintiff through the van's video feed for the remainder of the trip. Id. at 6. Defendants claim that Plaintiff remained seated the rest of the trip and just looked out of the window and did not do or say anything that made them think he needed immediate medical attention. Id. Plaintiff claims he "moaned and groaned continuously" during the remainder of the drive. Doc. 28 at 2. The video of this portion of the trip, which does not include the entire duration of the trip, is generally inconclusive on this point because there is no sound.4
At the Oswego Correctional Facility, Plaintiff did not exhibit any need for immediate medical attention. Doc. 16 at 6. But Zaman and Richardson notified correctional officers about the incident in the van, who said that Plaintiff would be examined by medical staff. Id.
Plaintiff later sent a document titled "Written Notice of Claim Under the Kansas Tort Claims Act Pursuant to K.S.A. § 12-105b(d)" to the Miami County Court Clerk, which was filed as a state-court petition. See Doc. 1-2 (all caps omitted). The state-court filing only lists the Miami County Sheriff's Department, the Miami County Courthouse, and the "Kansas Association Multi Line Pool" as defendants in the case caption. Doc. 1-2 at 1. The body of the petition also includes allegations against Zaman and Richardson. At some point, Judge Steven Montgomery, who is only mentioned as the judge who ordered the transportation, was included as a defendant on the docket as well. Although the state-court filing does not explicitly identify any legal claims, it does allege negligence and deliberate indifference. Id. at 2-3. Defendants sent interrogatories to Plaintiff asking whether he was claiming that any constitutional rights were violated. Plaintiff answered that his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments were implicatedby the van incident. Doc. 1-1 at 3-4. Based on that, Defendants removed the case to federal court. Doc. 1.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In applying this standard, courts view the facts and any reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). "An issue of material fact is genuine if a 'reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Defendants argue that Judge Steven Montgomery is entitled to absolute immunity and should be dismissed. Doc. 16 at 8. "Except where a judge has acted 'in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,' the doctrine of judicial immunity shields that judge from liability for the judge's official adjudicative acts." Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Dunn v. Harper Cty., 520 F. App'x 723, 725 (10th Cir. 2013) (). Plaintiff has clarified in his response that heis not suing Judge Montgomery, and he was only listed in the petition because he was the judge who ordered the transportation. Doc. 27 at 4. Accordingly, Judge Montgomery is dismissed from this case.
Defendants argue that neither the Miami County Courthouse nor the Miami County Sheriff's Department are proper parties because they are entities that lack the capacity to be sued under Kansas law. Doc. 16 at 20-21. Specifically, Defendants argue that Kansas has not authorized suits against sheriff's departments, and the courthouse is a building, not an entity that can be sued. Id.
"Subordinate governmental agencies do not have the capacity to sue or be sued in the absence of a specific statute." Wright v. Wyandotte Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 963 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D. Kan. 1997). It is undisputed that both the sheriff's department and the courthouse are subdivisions of Miami County. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any statute specifically authorizing either the Miami County Courthouse or the Miami County Sheriff's Department to sue or be sued. Accordingly, neither are proper parties.
Plaintiff has clarified that he is not actually suing the Miami County Courthouse. Doc. 27 at 7. As for the Miami County Sheriff's Department, Plaintiff states that both Zaman and Richardson worked for that entity. Id. But Plaintiff points to no authority that permits him to sue the department, which is a subordinate agency of Miami County. Further, an entity is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because its employees took certain actions. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss claims against the Miami County Sheriff's Department and the Miami County Courthouse.
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