Boren v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 26 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | 15-911 |
| Parties | James E. BOREN v. Earl B. TAYLOR |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Jane Hogan, Hogan Attorneys, 309 East Church Street, Hammond, Louisiana 70401, (985) 542-7730, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR: James E. Boren
Earl B. Taylor, District Attorney—Twenty-Seventh Judicial District, Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux, Assistant District Attorney, Post Office Drawer 1968, Opelousas, Louisiana 70571-1968, (337) 948-0551, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Earl B. Taylor
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
This case comes before this court pursuant to remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Plaintiff/Relator, Attorney James E. Boren (Boren), initially applied for supervisory writs with this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court denying his Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Review following the denial of his public records request to the St. Landry Parish District Attorney's Office. After this court denied Boren's writ, he applied for a writ of review with the Louisiana Supreme Court. Boren's writ to the supreme court was granted, and the case was remanded to us for briefing, argument, and a full opinion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The instant civil action arises from an underlying criminal matter. Boren was retained by Mr. Stephan Bergeron (Bergeron) to challenge his criminal convictions by filing an application for post-conviction relief.
Boren made a written request for public records to the St. Landry Parish District Attorney's Office, asking to inspect and copy any public record pertaining to the 2013 convictions of Bergeron. Earl B. Taylor, made defendant herein and the District Attorney for St. Landry Parish (Taylor), responded to Boren's records request by asking him to state the nature of his relationship to Bergeron, the grounds for post-conviction relief, and to establish that such grounds were not raised on appeal. Boren's response to Taylor was that he was unable to determine whether any grounds for post-conviction relief existed without first being given access to the requested files. He did not list any of the information requested by Taylor. Taylor denied Boren's request on July 24, 2015.
Boren filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Review in the trial court on August 10, 2015, which was denied on August 13, 2015. He then filed a supervisory writ with this court seeking review of the trial court's ruling. This court denied Boren's writ, finding no error in the trial court's ruling. Boren v. Taylor , 15–911 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/18/15) (unpublished writ).1 Thereafter, Boren filed a writ of review with the supreme court, which granted the writ and remanded the matter for briefing, oral argument, and a full opinion. Boren v. Taylor , 15–2322 (La. 3/14/16) (unpublished writ).
Boren contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for writ of mandamus and in denying his requests for costs, attorney fees, and damages.
Louisiana Constitution Article 12, § 3, provides, "No person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by law." To effect this constitutional provision, La.R.S. 44:31 was enacted and provides:
The foregoing provisions recognize the public's right of access to public records. This constitutional and statutory right is, however, not absolute. Both provisions expressly acknowledge that there are exceptions to the right of access. The issue before this court is whether Boren's request falls within the exception to the public records act found in La.R.S. 44:31.1. The trial court concluded that it did, and we agree.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 44:31.1 provides:
For the purposes of this Chapter, person does not include an individual in custody after sentence following a felony conviction who has exhausted his appellate remedies when the request for public records is not limited to grounds upon which the individual could file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in R.S. 44:32, the custodian may make an inquiry of any individual who applies for a public record to determine if such individual is in custody after sentence following a felony conviction who has exhausted his appellate remedies and the custodian may make any inquiry necessary to determine if the request of any such individual in custody for a felony conviction is limited to grounds upon which such individual may file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3.
This statutory provision, enacted subsequent to the general provisions of the public records law,2 is a more specific provision which was enacted to address matters of post conviction relief. To limit the "fishing expeditions" of individuals who had exhausted all other remedies, the statute set limiting parameters applicable to certain requests. The statute did so by limiting the definition of "person" so as to exclude "an individual in custody after sentence following a felony conviction who has exhausted his appellate remedies when the request for public records is not limited to grounds upon which the individual could file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3." La.R.S. 44:31.1.
Notably, the exclusion of certain "individual[s] in custody" does not provide a blanket prohibition against these individuals having access to public records; rather, such persons' request is limited to particular grounds for post conviction relief. Accordingly, when a public records request is made, La.R.S. 44:32(A)3 allows the custodian of the public record to make inquiry to determine if the restrictive parameters of La.R.S. 44:31 are satisfied.
In the instant matter, there is no dispute that the requested records are public records. Additionally, there is no dispute that the records being requested are for purposes of exploring post conviction relief. Admittedly, Boren is requesting the public records of Bergeron, whose conviction is final and was affirmed on appeal, to investigate potential remedies available to Bergeron by way of post conviction relief. Clearly, Bergeron is an individual whose public records requests would be limited by La.R.S. 44:31.1. What remains in dispute is whether the exception found in La.R.S 44:31.1 also applies to Boren. If applicable, Taylor had the authority to withhold the records due to Boren's failure to list the grounds for post conviction relief delineated in La.Code Crim.P. Art. 930.3.4 If inapplicable, Boren has the right of access, and Taylor's failure to produce the records may entitle Boren to costs, attorney fees, and damages, as he requested. La.R.S. 44:35.
Boren maintains that La.R.S. 44:31.1 does not apply to him as he is not an incarcerated individual, in prison with a felony conviction, who has exhausted his appellate remedies. Taylor counters that Boren, an attorney representing Bergeron, is acting in a representative capacity and is not allowed to "wear two hats." Narrowly stated, we must therefore decide whether La.R.S. 44:31.1 applies to an attorney seeking public records on behalf of his client who is not considered a "person" per La.R.S. 44:31.1.
In support of his position, Boren argued in the trial court that if Taylor's argument would prevail, it would produce the absurd consequence that an individual in custody who is seeking post conviction relief would not have the right to retain counsel and get full discovery. The trial court disagreed and recognized that such an interpretation did not preclude retained counsel from obtaining the records. Instead, the court explained that such an individual can retain counsel, "[i]t just means that they need to articulate what grounds they are seeking post-conviction on." In denying Boren's petition, the trial court reasoned:
[T]he statute was designed to stop a fishing expedition by people who are in custody. I think the statute is designed—I mean they could have clearly said it does not apply to an attorney representing such. It doesn't say that. I don't think there's any other way for me ... to understand how to interpret that, other than to say it applies, and I don't think it's burdensome for an attorney to set forth a ground for post-conviction relief that he's interested in. Now, to say, I don't know if there's any grounds until I look at the file, you have the entire record to determine whether or not there's potential grounds. It is clear that the June 30[th] letter of Mr. Boren, when he requested records, was that he was requesting on behalf of someone in custody. I believe [La.R.S.] 44:31.1 applies. I believe Mr. Boren should have set forth grounds for post-conviction relief once the District Attorney requested that he do so, and as a result, I am going to deny the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Review.
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court noted that there is no jurisprudence directly addressing this issue. We agree. This court has considered the jurisprudence cited by both parties and finds that none are dispositive of this issue.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Boren v. Taylor
...writ action). On remand, the appellate court affirmed the district court ruling. Boren v. Taylor, 15-0911 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/26/16), 206 So.3d 892. Thereafter, this court granted the plaintiff's writ application. Boren v. Taylor, 16-2078 (La. 1/23/17), 215 So.3d 262.Mr. Boren asks this cou......