Borgquist v. Ferris

• Decision Date: 02 February 1933
• Citation: 164 A. 38
• Parties: BORGQUIST et al. v. FERRIS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

164 A. 38

BORGQUIST et al.

v. FERRIS et al.^*

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Feb. 2, 1933.

Syllabus by the Court.

The word "purchased," as used in chapter 41, P. L. 1926 (Supplement to C. S. p. 454, § 57—13b), is used in its technical sense, and means the acquisition of lands by means other than descent or inheritance. The act does not operate upon an estate less than a fee simple "purchased" during coverture, as it is "an entire estate in fee simple" to which the husband or wife succeeds under its terms.

Suit by Elizabeth M. Borgquist and others against Margaret M. Ferris and others. On final hearing.

Decree in favor of the defendant James Tully.

Howe & Davis, of Orange, for complainants.

Brennan & Brown, of Orange, for defendant James Tully.

M. Harold Higgins, of Newark, for defendants Margaret and John Burke.

BERRY, Vice Chancellor.

The bill is by the heirs at law of Josephine Tully against her surviving husband and other heirs at law and seeks the partition of lands of which she died seized on July 20, 1931, and without issue.

On November 1, 1890, she contracted in writing to purchase a small house and lot in West Orange for $1,450, $250 down, $200 a year in $50 installments, until she paid $650, at which time deed was to be delivered and a purchase-money mortgage taken by the vendor for the balance of $800. She was unmarried on the date of the contract, but married James Tully, the defendant, on June 15, 1902. She took title to the premises by deed dated October 1, 1907 and recorded October 16, 1907. There is no record of any purchase-money mortgage. The contract did not say when the vendee should be entitled to possession; but the proof is that she occupied a room in the house before her marriage, and subsequent thereto lived there with her husband until some time after the delivery of the deed.

The rights of the complainants to a partition of the lands involved, and which are denied by the defendant husband, are dependent upon the proper construction of the word "purchased" as used in chapter 41, P. L. 1926 (Supplement to C. S. p. 454, § 57—13b), which reads as follows: "Hereafter, when any married person shall die seized of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, in his or her right in fee simple without devising the same in due form of law and without leaving lawful issue but leaving a husband or wife, him or her surviving, then and in that case the said person so surviving, whether it be husband or wife, shall take an entire estate in fee simple in the deceased's lands, tenements or hereditaments; provided, however, this act shall only apply to property of which husband or wife may die seized of, which had been purchased by husband or wife during coverture."

The complainants and the other heirs at law contend that Mrs. Tully purchased the property in 1890, when she entered into the contract; and that consequently it was not purchased during coverture. The husband replies that the purchase was made when the deed was delivered and title passed in 1907, which was five years after the marriage, and that therefore the property was purchased during coverture. Thus the issue is clear: Did the Legislature mean "acquired title" by its use of the word "purchased," or did it mean to include agreements to acquire title? If the former meaning was intended, the surviving husband will prevail, for it is a fact that the title was passed to Mrs. Tully during coverture. On the other hand, if it be held that a contract to purchase is a purchase, it follows that the property here was purchased before coverture, and the statute does not vest the fee in the husband.

It is a fundamental rule of construction of statutes that the court should endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Morris Canal & Banking Company v. Central Railroad Company, 16 N. J. Eq. 419; Thompson v. Egbert, 17 N. J. Law, 459; Commercial Trust Company of New Jersey v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, 80 N. J. Law, 424, 92 A. 263, affirmed 87 N. J. Law, 179, 92 A. 799; O'Neill v. Johnson, 99 N. J. Law, 317, 123 A. 538; State v. Cortese, 104 N. J. Law, 312, 140 A. 440; Clarkson v. Ley, 106 N. J. Law, 380, 148 A. 745.

Words in a statute should be given their ordinary and common meaning, Conover v. Public Service Railway Company, 80 N. J. Law, 681, 78 A. 187; Heston v. Atlantic City, 93 N. J. Law, 317, 107 A. 820, but the intention rather than the letter should prevail, Associates of Jersey Company v. Davison, 29 N. J. Law, 415; Rudderow v. West Jersey Ferry Company, 31 N. J. Law, 512.

Wherever possible the meaning in which the Legislature intended to use the words in a statute must be gathered from the entire context of the statute, and all parts of the statute should be read together. Morris Canal & Banking Company v. Central Railroad Company et al., supra; Koch v. Koch, 79 N. J. Eq. 24, 80 A. 113.

The complainants lay great stress upon the principle that, upon the execution of a contract for the sale of lands, the purchaser becomes the equitable owner of the lands, and the vendor the equitable owner of the purchase money; and that, after the contract, as the Court of Errors and Appeals said in Haughwout and Pomeroy v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq. 531, 546, the vendor is the trustee of the legal estate for the vendee. They deduce from that principle that Mrs. Tully became the purchaser, to all intents and purposes and within the meaning of this statute, when she signed the contract of sale.

The statute quoted refers to lands of which the married person "shall die seized" "in fee simple," and provides that the survivor "shall take an entire estate in fee simple." In order that the estate may pass under the provisions of this act, there must be an estate in fee simple...