Borman v. State
| Decision Date | 10 May 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 130,130 |
| Citation | 229 A.2d 440,1 Md.App. 276 |
| Parties | Ronald Allen BORMAN v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Roland Walker, Baltimore, for appellant.
Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Rice, Sp. Atty., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Atty. for Baltimore City, Baltimore, for appellee.
Before ANDERSON, MORTON and ORTH, JJ., and WALTER M. JENIFER and JAMES MACGILL, Special Judges.
Appellant was convicted on March 29, 1966 by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of uttering a forged instrument and false pretenses. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment on each count, commencing on March 29, 1966, the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant contends on this appeal from that judgment (a) that the court erred in refusing to sustain his challenge of certain prospective jurors for cause, (b) that the evidence was insufficient to enable the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (c) that the indictment upon which he was tried and convicted was constitutionally defective in that it had been returned by a grand jury required to swear a belief in a Supreme Being. We find no merit in any of these contentions.
The trial judge, at appellant's request, propounded the following question to prospective jurors on voir dire:
'Are any of you friendly, associated with or related to any one in the Police Department, or any law enforcement agency, either in civilian or military life?'
Four prospective jurors responded in the affirmative to this question, three of them being related by marriage to members of the Police Department, and one being friendly with several police officers. Appellant challenged each for cause. The trial judge, having ascertained that none of the police officers to whom the challenged jurors were related would testify in the case, denied the challenges. Appellant argues that the court erred in overruling each challenge since the jurors' relationship to, or association with police officers indicated 'a distinct probability of preconceived attitudes and feelings on the part of those jurors which would adversely affect their ability to be impartial triers of law and fact.'
The purpose of the voir dire examination is to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose. Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359 (1962). Neither mere acquaintance with an individual or group, nor mere relationship to witnesses, other than parties, is sufficient basis for challenging a prospective juror for cause. Goldstein v. State, 220 Md. 39, 150 A.2d 900 (1959). Bias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts, in addition to mere relationship or association, which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice. See Bristow v. State 242 Md. 283, 219 A.2d 33 (1966). We find no such proof of bias from the record in this case which would have required the trial judge to grant appellant's challenges for cause. On the contrary, the trial judge carefully questioned each of the challenged jurors with respect to their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence. In all, he propounded ten other questions on voir dire calculated to guard against biased jurors. We, therefore, conclude that the refusal to grant appellant's challenges were clearly correct.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's second contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The sole basis for his argument in this respect is that the testimony of the State's principal witness, Mrs. Eleanor Hughes, was too inconsistent and contradictory to constitute the necessary evidentiary foundation for conviction.
The evidence adduced at the trial showed that on July 1, 1965 the appellant cashed a National Brewing Company check for $97.60 at the cashier's window of the Hecht Company store in the Northwood shopping center. The payee was David F. Brunson and the drawee was the Maryland National Bank. Mrs Eleanor Hughes, who cashed...
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Davis v. State
...mere relationship or association, which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice." (Citations omitted). Borman v. State, 1 Md.App. 276, 279, 229 A.2d 440, 441-42 (1967). Davis next argues that, "[w]hile an affirmative answer to the proposed question may not, as a matter of law, resu......
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Dorsey v. State, 9
...622 (1968), cert. denied 252 Md. 730 (1969); Halstead v. State, 4 Md.App. 121, 123, 241 A.2d 439, 440 (1968); Borman v. State, 1 Md.App. 276, 279, 229 A.2d 440, 441-42 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court, citing 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 21 (3d ed. 1940) for the premises that 'the original......
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State v. Collins
...concerns the question of the weight of the evidence which the trier of facts, in this case the jury, must decide. Borman v. State, 1 Md.App. 276, 229 A.2d 440, Carroll v. State, 3 Md.App. 50, 237 A.2d 535, Thompson v. State, 4 Md.App. 31, 240 A.2d 780." 5 Md.App. at 236, 246 A.2d 302. The N......
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Bremer v. State
...of the voir dire examination is to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose. Borman v. State, 1 Md.App. 276, 279, 229 A.2d 440. We said in Phenious v. State, 11 Md.App. 385, 389, 274 A.2d 658, 'In Maryland, the extent of a voir dire examination rests wi......