Borough of Naugatuck v. AFSCME, Council No. 4, Local 1303

• Decision Date: 14 June 1983
• Citation: Borough of Naugatuck v. AFSCME, Council No. 4, Local 1303, 460 A.2d 1285, 190 Conn. 323 (Conn. 1983)
• Parties: BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK v. AFSCME, COUNCIL # 4, LOCAL 1303, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1285

460 A.2d 1285

190 Conn. 323

BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK v.AFSCME, COUNCIL # 4, LOCAL 1303, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 31, 1983.

Decided June 14, 1983.

N. Warren Hess III, Naugatuck, for appellant(plaintiff).

Michael J. Lombardo, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellee(defendant Connecticut state board of labor and arbitration).

J. William Gagne, Jr., Hartford, with whom, on brief, was David A. Swaine, Hartford, for appellee(named defendant).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and GRILLO, JJ.

GRILLO, Associate Justice.

The facts culminating in the present appeal are not in dispute.On September 30, 1979, the CETA (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) eligibility of the individual defendant, Richard Brown, having allegedly expired, his employment was terminated by the plaintiff Borough of Naugatuck (hereinafter the borough).Local 1303, Council # 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (hereinafter the union), formally protested the termination of Brown pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement in effect between the borough and the union.The grievance was rejected by the borough, and as a result the union filed a demand for arbitration with the Connecticut state board of labor and arbitration (hereinafter the board).The issue presented to the board was as follows: "Is the grievance of Mr. Richard Brown arbitrable?If so, what disposition shall be made of it?"A hearing was held.The borough appeared at the hearing and objected to the arbitrability of the grievance.On September 23, 1980, the board issued a decision which found the grievance arbitrable and scheduled a hearing on the merits to be held on November 14, 1980.

On October 14, 1980, the borough filed an application with the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury seeking an order to vacate the decision of arbitrability or for an injunction prohibiting a hearing on the merits by the board.The defendant board filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the application because the preliminary ruling on arbitrability by the board did not constitute an "award."¹Succinctly stated, the borough contends that the equitable power of the court encompasses a judicial determination on the issue of arbitrability prior to a hearing on the merits of the grievance even though the board has made only a preliminary ruling on arbitrability.

The trial court concluded that there was no award rendered which was subject to review since the second question submitted to the board simultaneously with the question of arbitrability had not been answered.The application to vacate was therefore premature, thus precluding relief via §§ 52-418and52-420 of the General Statutes.²We agree.

In determining the propriety of an arbitration decision, the cardinal inquiry of the court is an examination of the submission and the award to ensure that the award conforms with the submission.Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 21, 453 A.2d 1158(1983);Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Ass'n, 173 Conn. 287, 291, 377 A.2d 323[190 Conn. 326](1977).The submission defines the scope of the entire arbitration proceeding by delineating the issues to be decided.

Having decided the question of arbitrability on September 23, 1980, the board, on October 7, 1980, set a hearing date.Thereafter, on October 14, 1980, the plaintiff instituted the present action.It is obvious that there was one submission, albeit divided into two questions.To view the affirmative answer to the first question as a final award in this case is without legal basis.That response did not resolve the gravamen of the grievance issue--the disposition of Brown's case.

Arbitration affords a contractual remedy with a view toward expediting disputes."Section 52-418 only authorizes a court to vacate an arbitrator's 'award' and then only under narrow circumstances.Unless an arbitration decision is an award, therefore, there is no right of appeal.This court has held that a finding on arbitrability is not an award until it becomes part of an award on the merits.Conte v. Norwalk, 173 Conn. 77, 79-80, 376 A.2d 412(1977).Therefore, a party must demonstrate that an 'award' on the merits has been rendered before any right to appeal attaches."State v. Connecticut Employees Union, 184 Conn. ---, ---, ---(43 CLJ 1, pp. 4A, 5A)440 A.2d 229(1981).In advocating that the court use its equitable powers to prevent further action by the board, the plaintiff insists that "the entire contract [the collective bargaining agreement] lacks any all inclusive language that could be construed in a manner...