Borough of Pitman v. Skokowski

Decision Date01 February 1984
Citation473 A.2d 100,193 N.J.Super. 215
PartiesBOROUGH OF PITMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry SKOKOWSKI, Director of the Division of Local Government Services, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Warren H. Carr, Woodbury, for plaintiff-appellant (Cresse, Carr, Peaslee & Thompson, Woodbury, attorneys; Warren H. Carr on the brief).

Daniel P. Reynolds, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendant-respondent (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen., attorney, Deborah T. Poritz, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel; Daniel P. Reynolds on the brief).

Before Judges BOTTER, PRESSLER and O'BRIEN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

O'BRIEN, J.A.D.

This case involves the effect of the transfer by a municipality to a lighting district of its expense in providing street lighting upon its "CAP base" under N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.2.

On January 26, 1981 plaintiff Borough of Pitman (Borough) created a lighting district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:91-1 et seq. to which it transferred responsibility for providing and paying for the Borough's street lighting services. Under that statute, the lighting district becomes a separate corporate entity with its budget to be approved annually by the voters. 1

The procedure adopted resulted in "freeing up" moneys in the municipal budget which were previously expended for street lighting services as a way of increasing the "CAP base" upon which the municipality calculates its permissible spending limit for the year pursuant to the "CAP law." 2 To address this problem the Legislature supplemented N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.2 by L.1981, c. 64, § 1, which added a paragraph providing:

In each budget year subsequent to 1981, whenever any municipality shall have transferred to any local public utility, any local public authority or any special purposes district, during the immediately preceding budget year, or at any time during the current budget year prior to the final adoption of the budget, any service or function funded during the immediately preceding budget year, either partially or wholly from appropriations in the municipal budget, the municipality shall deduct from its final appropriations upon which its permissible expenditures are calculated pursuant to this section the amount which the municipality expended for that service or function during the last full budget year throughout which the service or function so transferred was funded from appropriations in the municipal budget.

The act was approved on March 9, 1981 to "take effect immediately, and shall be retroactive, except as specifically provided therein, to August 18, 1976."

The introductory statement attached to this bill referred to the establishment of fire districts or garbage districts or other municipal authorities to furnish certain services as a "legal maneuver" which promotes the splintering of local government. The statement then describes the intent of the amendment to be that "... whenever a municipality transfers to a local public utility ... a service or function previously funded in the municipal budget ... [the municipality] shall subtract from its 'CAP base' in the next [budget] year the amount it previously expended on that service or function."

On May 4, 1982 defendant Director of the Division of Local Government Services (Director) disapproved the Borough's municipal budget for 1982. He ruled that the budget exceeded the CAP law spending limitation because the Borough had not deducted from its 1981 final appropriations total an amount equal to what it had expended to provide street lighting services in 1980. The Director concluded that such deduction for purposes of computing the Borough's 1982 spending limitation was mandated by the March 9, 1981 supplement to N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.2. The Director's decision was affirmed by the Local Finance Board of the Division of Local Finance (Board) on May 11, 1982. While the Board made no findings of fact nor conclusions of law in support of its resolution upholding the Director, at the hearing granted on the Borough's petition the Board indicated its understanding of the Borough's plight, but followed the advice of its counsel that the statute had to be applied as written.

The Borough concedes that the language of the statute requires retroactive application. Applying the statute, it is clear that in considering the Borough's budget for 1982 (a budget year subsequent to 1981) the Borough had transferred to a special purpose street lighting district during the immediately preceding budget year, i.e., on January 26, 1981, a service which had been partially funded during the immediately preceding budget year (1981) from appropriations in the municipality's budget. Accordingly, the statute mandates that the Borough deduct from its final appropriations upon which its permissible expenditures were to be calculated in the budget year of 1982 the amount which the municipality expended for street lighting "during the last full budget year throughout which the services or functions so transferred was funded from appropriations in the municipal budget." That last full budget year in this case was 1980. For the year 1980 the Borough had appropriated $53,125 for street lighting.

The Borough does not contend that the Director and the Board have improperly applied N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.2 to the Borough's 1982 budget. It concedes that the Legislative intent for the retroactive application of the statute is clear by its very wording. The Borough argues, however, that such retroactive application of the statute to its 1982 budget unconstitutionally divests it of a "vested right" in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and further results in "manifest injustice" to the Borough. The "vested right" alleged is the right to establish a lighting district as a means of creating a "valid legal exemption" to the "CAP" law. 3

A municipality is a creature of the state and thus necessarily subordinate to its creator and can exercise only such powers as may be granted to it by the Legislature. Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 157, 411 A.2d 462 (1980); Moyant v. Bor. of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 535, 154 A.2d 9 (1959). As a political subdivision of the State, a municipality owes its very existence to the State and the extent of its powers and its privileges is entirely subject to the ultimate authority of the legislative process. Smith v. Goldman, 159 N.J.Super. 297, 300-301, 387 A.2d 1239 (App.Div.1978), aff'd subnom. Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 411 A.2d 462 (1980). Thus a municipality's budgetary powers under the local budget law, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-1 et seq., and the local government CAP law, N.J.S.A. 40:4-45.1 et seq. are, like the budgetary process exercised by a county, clearly subject to the dominion of the Legislature. Clark v. Degnan, 83 N.J. 393, 399-400, 416 A.2d 816 (1980).

By virtue of being a political subdivision of the State, a municipality such as the Borough has no standing to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against the State. Trenton v. State, 262 U.S. 182, 188, 43 Sup.Ct. 534, 537, 67 L.Ed. 937, 941 (1923); aff'g 97 N.J.L. 241, 117 A. 158 (E. & A.1922); Newark v. State, 262 U.S. 192, 196, 43 Sup.Ct. 539, 540, 67 L.Ed. 943, 946 (1923); aff'g 97 N.J.L. 241, 117 A. 158 (E. & A.1922); Camden Cty. v. Pennsauken Sewer. Auth., 15 N.J. 456, 470, 105 A.2d 505 (1954). Since a municipality exercises only such powers and possesses such privileges as are vested in it by the Legislature, it possesses no powers or privileges which cannot be altered or withdrawn at the will of the Legislature. Trenton v. State, 262 U.S. at 187-188, 43 S.Ct. at 536-537.

In undertaking public functions a municipality possesses no rights which it may assert to prevent the Legislature from altering the municipal powers or ability to carry out these functions in whatever way the...

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3 cases
  • Cedar Grove Tp. v. Sheridan
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • April 15, 1986
    ...943 (1923); Bergen County v. Port of N.Y. Authority, et al., 32 N.J. 303, 160 A.2d 811 (1960), and Bor. of Pitman v. Skokowski, 193 N.J.Super. 215, 473 A.2d 100 (App.Div.1984). In opposition, Cedar Grove relies upon Tp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adj. of Tp. of Dover, 158 N.J.Super. 401, 386 A.2d 4......
  • Rock County v. Spire
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1990
    ...(8th Cir.1984) (political subdivision of state cannot invoke protection of 14th amendment against state); Bor. of Pitman v. Skokowski, 193 N.J.Super. 215, 473 A.2d 100 (1984) (borough lacks standing to invoke protection of 14th amendment against the state); Mtr Bowen v. State Comm., 104 A.D......
  • Property Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Town Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • May 12, 1993
    ...237 (1969) (holding that powers of a municipality are wholly derived from state statute); see also Borough of Pitman v. Skokowski, 193 N.J.Super. 215, 220, 473 A.2d 100 (App.Div.1984) ("A municipality is a creature of the state and thus necessarily subordinate to its creator and can exercis......

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