Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ.

Decision Date19 September 2016
Docket NumberCASE NO. 3:12-CV-2123
Citation207 F.Supp.3d 454
Parties Angela BORRELL, Plaintiff, v. BLOOMSBURG UNIVERSITY, Geisinger Medical Center, and Arthur F. Richer and Michelle Ficca in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Barry H. Dyller, Theron J. Solomon, Law Office of Barry H. Dyller, Wilkes-Barre, PA, for Plaintiff.

Jaime S. Tuite, Jeffrey F. Klamut, Thomas S. Giotto, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Keli M. Neary, Maryanne M. Lewis, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge

Presently before me are Defendant Dr. Michelle Ficca's ("Dr. Ficca") Post Trial Motions (Doc. 255) and Defendants Geisinger Medical Center ("GMC") and Arthur Richer's ("Mr. Richer") (collectively "Geisinger Defendants") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial or Remittitur. (Doc. 257) Because Dr. Ficca is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Borrell's due process claim and property interest claim and Dr. Ficca is not entitled to qualified immunity, her motion will be denied. Further, because Plaintiff Angela Borrell ("Ms. Borrell") provided sufficient evidence for an award of compensatory damages, Dr. Ficca's and the Geisinger Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied. And, because the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous or prejudicial, the Geisinger Defendants' request for a new trial will be denied. However, because the jury's compensatory and punitive damages awards were excessive in light of the evidence at trial, I will grant the defendants' motions for remittitur, but provide Ms. Borrell the option of a new trial if she does not accept the remittitur.

Also, before me are Ms. Borrell's Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees (Doc. 245) and Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Declaration and Exhibits Concerning Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees (Doc. 296). Because Ms. Borrell has not demonstrated her entitlement to all fees and costs as requested, her motion for attorneys' fees and costs will be granted in part and denied in part. Further, because the supplemental declaration Ms. Borrell seeks leave to file is not relevant to the motion for attorneys' fees and costs, I will deny Ms. Borrell's motion.

I. Background

As the parties have already been through a trial, only a brief summary of the facts necessary to the resolution of the instant motions will be provided. The factual background was also set forth in my two prior opinions. See (Docs. 49-50); Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ. , 955 F.Supp.2d 390 (M.D.Pa.2013) (hereinafter " Borrell I" ); (Docs. 151-152) Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ. , 63 F.Supp.3d 418 (M.D.Pa.2014) (hereinafter " Borrell II ")).

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. Borrell brought this action against Defendants Bloomsburg University1 , GMC, Mr. Richer, and Dr. Ficca alleging that her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 were violated when she was dismissed from the Bloomsburg University and Geisinger joint Nurse Anesthesia Program ("NAP"). On September 24, 2012, Ms. Borrell met with Mr. Richer and GMC's Director of Human Relations, Brion Lieberman ("Mr. Lieberman"), and was asked to take a drug test. She refused and the following day she was sent a letter indicating that she was dismissed from the NAP for refusing the drug test.

Prior to trial, it was determined that the defendants were acting under color of state law when Ms. Borrell was dismissed from the NAP. I also decided that Ms. Borrell had a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause in the continuation of her course of study in the NAP. In other words, before Ms. Borrell was dismissed from the NAP for disciplinary purposes, she was entitled to the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. I granted summary judgment as to liability in Ms. Borrell's favor finding that her dismissal from the NAP occurred without due process of law and that Ms. Borrell had established a violation of her constitutional rights.

On June 22, 2015, a trial on damages commenced. Ms. Borrell sought compensatory as well as punitive damages. On June 30, 2015, a jury found Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed from the NAP regardless of whether or not she received due process (Doc. 236, 1), but also found that Ms. Borrell suffered an injury based on the denial of procedural due process itself and awarded her compensatory damages against Dr. Ficca, Mr. Richer, and GMC in the amount of $ 415,000.00. (Id. at 2.) The jury also found that GMC acted maliciously or wantonly in violating Ms. Borrell's rights and awarded $ 1,100,000.00 in punitive damages. (Id. at 3.) Thereafter, Dr. Ficca filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law; alteration or amendment of the judgment; or, in the alternative, for a new trial (Doc. 255), and the Geisinger Defendants3 also filed a post-trial motions requesting judgment as a matter of law, a new trial or remittitur (Doc. 257). Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

Ms. Borrell also filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, an affidavit, and a brief in support (Docs. 245; 246; 247), and a motion for leave to file a supplemental declaration and a brief in support. (Docs. 296-297). The motion for attorneys' fees and costs has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. Ms. Borrell's motion for leave to file a supplemental declaration and exhibits (Doc. 296) has also been briefed and is ripe for disposition. Both motions will also be addressed herein.

II. Legal Standards
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

To prevail on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must establish that there was no "legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for [the prevailing party] on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 50(b) motion:

the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether the record contains "the minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief." The court may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury. The court may, however, enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict if upon review of the record, it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila. , 5 F.3d 685, 691–92 (3d Cir.1993), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington , 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the non-moving party, but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find for the non-moving party. See Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc. , 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Patzig v. O'Neil , 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978) ).

B. Motion for New Trial

"The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues...after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The decision whether to grant a new trial following a jury verdict is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc. , 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) ; Blancha v. Raymark Indus. , 972 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir.1992). Courts have granted motions for a new trial where: "(1) there is a significant error of law, to the prejudice of the moving party; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; (3) the size of the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; or (4) counsel engaged in improper conduct that had a prejudicial effect on the jury." Todd v. Luzerne Cnty. Children & Youth Servs. , No. 04–2637, 2011 WL 841429, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Maylie v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 791 F.Supp. 477, 480 (E.D.Pa.1992), aff'd 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.1992) ). A new trial may also be warranted based 'upon [a] showing that the jury verdict resulted from passion or prejudice.' " Evans v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey , 273 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir.2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted). But, "where the evidence is in conflict, and subject to two or more interpretations, the trial judge should be reluctant to grant a new trial."See Klein v. Hollings , 992 F.2d 1285, 1295 (3d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). "This limit upon the district court's power to grant a new trial seeks to ensure that a district court does not substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury." Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos. , 88 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. , 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir.1992) ). Thus, the Third Circuit has indicated that "a District Court reviewing a jury verdict has an 'obligation...to uphold the jury's award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so.' " Evans , 273 F.3d at 351–352 (quoting Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc. , 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir.1989) ).

C. Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment

Under Rule 59(e), a party may seek alteration or amendment of the verdict. "The rationalization for, and use of, the remittitur is well established as a device employed when the trial judge finds that a decision of the jury is clearly unsupported and/or excessive." Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist. , 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1986) (citing Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.1983) ; Keystone Floor Products Co., Inc. v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 432 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Pa.1977) ). "A...

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