Bortel v. State, 99-2091.
Decision Date | 29 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 99-2091.,99-2091. |
Parties | Bernard BORTEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bernard Bortel, Lowell, pro se.
No appearance required for appellee.
In 1997, appellant pled nolo contendere to various counts of burglary of a dwelling, attempted burglary of an occupied dwelling, and grand theft. He committed these offenses between October 26, 1996 and November 24, 1996. He was sentenced to nine years in prison pursuant to the 1995 sentencing guidelines.
In his sworn motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, appellant argues that his sentence is illegal because the enacting legislation for the 1995 sentencing guidelines, Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, violated the single subject rule of Article III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution. The trial court denied relief.
The case relied upon by the circuit court, Valdes v. State, 728 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), rejected a constitutional challenge to the 1995 sentencing guidelines based on the single subject rule. Valdes acknowledged conflict with Heggs v. State, 718 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 720 So.2d 518 (Fla.1998), and rev. granted, 729 So.2d 391 (Fla.1999), on this issue. The second district based its holding in Heggs on its earlier decision in Thompson v. State, 708 So.2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 717 So.2d 538 (Fla.1998), in which it held that another portion of the 1995 sentencing scheme—Chapter 95-182, which addressed violent career criminal sentencing—was unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule.
Id. at n. 1. In Thompson, the second district identified the same window period with respect to Chapter 95-182.
In Salters v. State, 731 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this court identified a different window period, holding that a defendant's opportunity to challenge his sentence as a violent career criminal ended on October 1, 1996, because Chapter 95-182 was reenacted on that date. We certified conflict with Thompson regarding the applicable window of opportunity.
Applying Salters, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to any relief because the sentencing guidelines at issue here were reenacted in 1996 pursuant to Chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of October 1, 1996, thereby curing the constitutional defect raised in this case. See Scott v. State, 721 So.2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Appellant's offenses occurred in October and November,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Heggs v. State
...Statutes. See Heggs, 718 So.2d at 264 n. 1 (relying on State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993)). However, in Bortel v. State, 743 So.2d 595, 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Fourth District certified conflict with the Second District's determination in Heggs regarding the close of the wind......
-
Trapp v. State
...Second District's decision in Heggs v. State, 718 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and the Fourth District's decision in Bortel v. State, 743 So.2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), as to when the window period closed for persons claiming a guidelines sentence to be invalid due to the amendments made b......
-
Paz v. State, 3D98-2499.
...he committed the crime within the window period that closed on May 24, 1997. As in Diaz, we certify conflict with Bortel v. State, 743 So.2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that window period closed on Oct. 1, 1996). Accordingly, we remand for resentencing under the guidelines in effect bef......
-
Valdes v. State
...for raising such a challenge closed on October 1, 1996, as determined by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Bortel v. State, 743 So.2d 595, 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Further, even though Valdes failed to raise a single subject rule challenge in the trial court, we find that such challeng......