Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., Docket Nos. 68327
| Decision Date | 28 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 68327,14,Nos. 13,70044,s. 13 |
| Parties | Irene M. BOSCAGLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Richard Bierwirth, Robert Koerber and Dale Wacker, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. Frederick PACHECO, Jr. and Cynthia Pacheco, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clayton CLIFTON, Bruce Jellison, and General Motors Corporation, a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellants. Calendar420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642, 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1155, 53 U.S.L.W. 2376 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Prather & Harrington, P.C., Kenneth E. Prather, John R. Foley, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant in No. 70044.
Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile, P.C. by Donald B. Miller, Detroit, for defendants-appellees, in No. 70044; Anthony A. Haisch, Gen. Atty., Michigan Bell Telephone Co., Detroit, of counsel.
Gary A. Colbert, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellees in No. 68327.
Edmond J. Dilworth, Jr., Detroit, for defendant-appellant, General Motors Corp.; Elmer W. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Daniel G. Galant, Nicholas J. Wittner, Detroit, of counsel.
Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Richard D. McLellan, William J. Perrone, Lansing, for Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, Amicus Curiae.
Clark, Klein & Beaumont by Dwight H. Vincent, Fred W. Batten, Morgan J.C. Scudi, Individually and for the Firm, Detroit, for Michigan, Manufacturers Assn., amicus curiae.
The principal question is whether the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act 1 bars an action seeking recovery for physical, mental, or emotional injury resulting from an employer's violation of the fair employment practices act (FEPA) 2 or the Michigan civil rights act. 3 We hold that it does not.
We further hold that an employee's spouse does not have a derivative cause of action for loss of consortium as a result of an employer's violation of the FEPA.
Irene M. Boscaglia worked for Michigan Bell Telephone Company from September 24, 1953, until August 11, 1977. By October 1, 1972, she had been promoted to the position of supply foreman. In May, 1976, Boscaglia refused to accept a lateral transfer to Detroit, and in June, 1976, she was demoted. Boscaglia alleges that her demotion was the result of sex discrimination.
Various employment problems allegedly arose after her demotion. On August 7, 1977, a male supervisor accused Boscaglia of coming to work late. Boscaglia broke down completely, leaving in tears and ultimately receiving psychiatric treatment. She has not returned to work for Michigan Bell.
On April 26, 1978, Boscaglia filed an action against Michigan Bell and three supervisors alleging violations of both the FEPA and the civil rights act. During the pendency of this action, on April 30, 1979, Boscaglia filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits; on April 29, 1981, she was awarded benefits of $127 per week for mental and emotional disability for a period beginning August 11, 1977, and continuing until further order of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation. 4
Frederick Pacheco, Jr., was hired as a security guard by General Motors Corporation on November 3, 1953. The complaint, which names General Motors and two supervisors as defendants, alleges various acts of discrimination, during 1974 and 1975, against Pacheco because of his Spanish-American heritage, including a suspension and demotion in late 1974, a discharge on April 29, 1975 (which was reversed on June 2, 1975), and various acts of derision and harassment.
The parties have stipulated that from November 29, 1974 through April 11, 1975, and again from July 8, 1975 through October 13, 1975, Pacheco was on approved medical disability leave for which he was paid sickness and accident benefits by a third-party insurance carrier under the General Motors Group Insurance Plan. 5 Pacheco alleges that he was disabled as a result of hypertension and anxiety caused by the discrimination against him. Pacheco did not file a workers' compensation claim in connection with the alleged acts of discrimination. 6
The exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act provides that "the right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer." 7
The FEPA, enacted in 1955, declared that the opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry is a civil right, 8 and stated a definition of an "unfair employment practice". 9 9] In Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 560, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971), this Court declared that an employee "can maintain a civil damage action for redress of his statutorily created right to be free from [racial] discrimination in private employment, and that this remedy may be pursued in addition to the remedial machinery provided by [the FEPA]".
The civil rights act, enacted in 1976, prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. 10 The act extended "this Court's decision in Pompey by expressly providing for direct access to circuit court for an aggrieved party". Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 404 Mich. 36, 44, 272 N.W.2d 550 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring ). This "direct access" provision states that a person alleging a violation of the act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief "or damages, or both", and that the term "damages" means "damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney's fees." 11
The evils at which the civil rights acts are aimed are different from those at which the workers' compensation act is directed. The workers' compensation act guards against the victims of industrial injuries being "turned away empty handed" and "unrecompensed" as a result of common-law tort doctrines such as contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule. Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 307-308, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958). The civil rights acts are addressed to "the prejudices and biases" one race, sex or religion bears against another. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F.Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich.,1979).
In Mathis v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich. 164, 179, 289 N.W.2d 708 (1980), the Court noted that . In Perez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 418 Mich. 634, 650, 344 N.W.2d 773 (1984), the plurality opinion added that "neither [statutory] scheme should be permitted to frustrate the purposes and objectives of the other [statutory-scheme".] Just as the Court in Mathis, supra, 408 Mich. p. 183, 289 N.W.2d 708, held that an employee is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision from obtaining no-fault benefits for injuries sustained while occupying a motor vehicle owned by his employer, so too an employee is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision from invoking the civil rights acts to recover for injuries resulting from discrimination by his employer.
The question whether physical, mental and emotional injuries are compensable under the FEPA or the civil rights act has not been briefed or argued, and hence we intimate no opinion in that regard. We think it self-evident, however, assuming the Legislature in enacting the civil rights acts intended to provide compensation for physical, mental or emotional injury resulting from discrimination, that it did not intend that objective would be defeated by the bar of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act. 12 Whatever may have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act, if it intended in enacting civil rights legislation that workers discharged in violation of such legislation could recover for resulting physical, mental or emotional injury that intention would necessarily supersede or modify the scope of other legislation that otherwise would defeat the intent to permit such recovery.
Defendants in Pacheco argue that even if the exclusive remedy provision does not bar the express "direct access" cause of action statutorily created by the civil rights act, it should nevertheless apply to a civil action for violation of the FEPA recognized in Pompey.
We read Pompey as holding that the Legislature intended a cumulative judicial remedy for an employer's violation of the FEPA. "[T]he question whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately 'one of [legislative] intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that [the Legislature] enacted into law' ". Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2490, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 [1979] ). Thus the only difference in the legislative intent respecting a civil action for violations of the FEPA and the civil rights act is the specificity with which it was expressed. The source of the right to be free from employment discrimination under the FEPA is statutory, just as it is under the civil rights act. 13
We reject the distinction drawn in Stimson v. Bell Telephone Co., 77 Mich.App. 361, 258 N.W.2d 227 (1977), 14 between disabling and nondisabling injuries. The bar of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act does not depend on whether the worker suffered a compensable disabling injury. An injury may fall within the bar of the exclusive remedy provision, precluding a damage action, although the injury is not disabling and hence not compensable at all. See 2A Larson, Workmen's Compensation...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 17904
...... that she did only the "high" cleaning while a co-worker did the "low" cleaning. The memorandum ... E.g., Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420 Mich. 308, ......
-
Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., KELSEY-HAYES
...this independent cause of action. We believe that this question must be answered in the negative. In Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984), we considered a distinctly different question--whether Michigan's Fair Employment Practices Act, 1955 P.A. 251,......
-
Messer v. Huntington Anesthesia Group, Inc., 31739.
...him from performing the essential functions of his job with the help of reasonable accommodation. E.g. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wash.2d 563, 731 P.2d 497 (1987) (En Banc); cf. Jones v. Los Angeles Comm......
-
Pilon v. Saginaw Valley State University, 03-100006-BC.
...private parties, see Pacheco v. Clifton, 109 Mich.App. 563, 576, 311 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1981), modified on other grounds, 420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984), the Michigan courts have held that this section of the Michigan Constitution is self-implementing against governmental entities. See ......