Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co.
| Citation | 123 Utah 387,259 P.2d 885 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 7833,7833 |
| Parties | BOSKOVICH, v. UTAH CONST. CO. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Pugsley, Hayes & Rampton, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Edward G. Linsley and Scott M. Matheson, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
This case is here on appeal from a directed verdict for the defendant. A motion for a new trial was granted in the first hearing of the case after the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff, on the grounds of probable prejudice to the defendant through the wording of the instructions and verdict.
Plaintiff-appellant is the inventor and patent holder of a machine known as the Boskovich Mucher, used in hard-rock mining operations. Defendant-respondent is a Utah corporation, which has constructed, under the direction and license of appellant, two of these machines, one for use at Bingham, Utah, and the second for use at Carlsbad, New Mexico. The dispute here involves the terms of the oral contract entered into by the parties with respect to the company's use of the appellant's rights in his invention in the second instance. Both parties agree that the company was to pay Mr. Boskovich 50cents per cubic yard of material excavated by the machine at Carlsbad and further, that payment of $456.54 has been made on the amount actually taken from the shaft; however, appellant claims that the respondent guaranteed him payment on a total of 9,200 cubic yards.
The main question raised on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence of the guarantee to go to the jury and thus, whether the trial court erred in directing the verdict for the defendant.
It is fundamental that where there is no evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's claim, it is the court's duty to direct a verdict. In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and must resolve every controverted fact in his favor. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566; Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., Utah, 239 P.2d 163. The inquiry, then, must be directed toward whether reasonable minds could disagree in this case on the evidence presented so as to provide a question for the jury.
Appellant bases his claim of a guarantee upon a memorandum which reads as follows:
'The Utah Construction Company, Salt Lake City District
'Write it * * * Don't Say it
'To Mike Boskovich
'From George R. Putnam
'Subject Quantities of excavation in International Shaft No. 3
'Date July 5, 1950
Appellant testifies that this was part of the inducement and terms of the contract. Admittedly, there are some slight contradictions in his testimony, but appellant is a man of foreign extraction and evidently has some difficulty in the use of the language. George R. Putnam, vice president and district manager of the respondent corporation, admits that there was a contract between his company and appellant, but testifies that the above memo was written to give Mike Boskovich an estimate of the material which would be taken from the Carlsbad mine at a time when operations had already begun and the contract was complete. This memo, it is to be noted, is unsigned. Respondent has introduced into evidence a letter signed by Mr. Boskovich, which reads:
'Midvale, Utah
'Geo. Putnam
'June 21, 1950
'Salt Lake City, Utah
'Dear Mr. Putnam:
'I understand that the Boskovich Much Machine was built based on a 50cents royalty which I agreed to accept.
'If the company pays my expense to go to Carlsbad and supervise the installing of the machine for 15 days, I'll be very glad to do so.
'On a 60cents royalty basis, I would stand my own expenses.
'Yours truly,
'/s/ M. N. Boskovich
'(P.S. Enclosed please find contract)'
The contract in blank which was enclosed also makes no mention of a guarantee. Appellant admits that the signature is his and attempts no explanation of the date of this letter, contending rather that his contract with the company become effective on July 5, the date of the memo.
Since it is apparent upon uncontroverted evidence that the respondent had license to use the machine before July 5 and since the appellant did not present evidence of further consideration to support the agreement of July 5, if the memo is so viewed for the benefit of appellant, the question was one of law only and there was no issue to go to the jury. The trial court was under a duty to direct the verdict for the defendant as plaintiff did not make out a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Appellant further contends that the court erred in excluding certain evidence. He offers the court no argument in his brief as to what particular exclusions he considers error nor what bearing the evidence if admitted would have on the findings of the case. After a search of the record, we find that the evidence excluded pertained to the construction of the machine used at Bingham Canyon, which is not here in dispute; an admission by the contruction company's engineer that the machine was satisfactory; the royalty paid on a competitive machine; and an offer of proof that the Boskovich Mucker was replaced at Carlsbad by a competitive machine. The issues of the trial were limited to the terms of the contract and appellant does not claim that this evidence would have shown a prior course of conduct or custom in this type of business which would have given rise to an intent to contract with a yardage guarantee. The trial court was correct in refusing to admit this evidence which would merely prolong the trial.
Appellant now objects that the granting of a new trial was improper, although he did not raise the issue until after the second trial and for purposes of this appeal. He objects that the court's order did not show the grounds upon which the order was based as required by Rule 59(a) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;...
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...resolve controverted facts in his favor. Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, Utah, 604 P.2d 913 (1979); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Christiansen v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 77 Utah 85, 291 P. 926 (1930). If the evidence and its inferences would ......
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...must be accepted as true, and all conflicts and all evidence which tends to disprove it must be disregarded. Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Holland v. Brown, Therefore, the fundamental issue presented on this appeal is whether the evidence, viewed in the li......