Boss v. Polk County

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Citation19 N.W.2d 225,236 Iowa 384
Docket Number46677.
PartiesBOSS v. POLK COUNTY et al.
Decision Date19 June 1945

Stipp Perry, Bannister, Carpenter & Ahlers, of Des Moines, for appellant.

F T. Van Liew, Howard Hall, and Herrick, Sloan & Langdon all of Des Moines, for appellees.

WENNERSTRUM Justice.

The main issue involved in this appeal is whether property taken by the United States government for use during the war emergency of World War II, is exempt from taxation under the provisions of the Code of Iowa, as well as by virtue of one of the provisions of the constitution of the United States. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the county officials of Polk County, Iowa from collecting taxes for the year 1943, due in 1944, on the property involved in this litigation. The trial court held that the property, the record title of which during the year 1943 remained in the plaintiff, was not exempt from taxation. Plaintiff has appealed.

Edwin A Boss, the appellant, acquired ownership in 1941 of the Chamberlain Hotel in Des Moines, Iowa, the taxation of which has resulted in this litigation. By virtue of congressional authority (50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 632) the attorney general of the United States, on August 13, 1942, commenced a proceeding for condemnation of the hotel property for the use of the government. On this same date an order was entered by Honorable Charles A. Dewey, Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, wherein it was provided '* * * that the immediate possession and use of the following described lands (including the Chamberlain hotel property) * * * is hereby granted to the United States of America on August 15, 1942, at 12 noon.' On August 15, 1942, the United States government, pursuant to the order of the United States District Court, took possession of the hotel property. The government retained the possession of this property until June 15, 1944. During the time that the government was in possession of the hotel it was used for the housing of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, one of the branches of the military services of the United States. The property involved in this appeal is located on the northeast corner of 7th and Locust Streets in Des Moines. Subsequent to the order of possession the government determined that it had no use for the eight ground floor storerooms located on Locust and Seventh Streets. On April 1, 1943, by virtue of a stipulation and an order of the United States District Court relative to the matter, the appellant received back from the government all rentals which had been collected by it from the tenants of the storerooms covered by the stipulation between August 15, 1942 and April 1, 1943. The appellant does not claim exemption from taxation of that portion of the property represented by the rooms which had been rented for retail purposes during the year 1943. It is the appellant's contention, however, that an apportionment should be made between the exempt and non-exempt portions of the property. Testimony was presented on behalf of the appellant that 25% of the claimed tax should be levied against that portion of the building used for retail store purposes and that the remaining 75% of the claimed levy should not be collected.

The record shows that no appraisers were named in this condemnation proceeding and no formal order of appraisement was ever entered. During the time that the government was in possession of the property negotiations were had between the appellant and it seeking a settlement of the amount of an award for compensation due the appellant for the taking of the property. A final settlement was agreed upon on July 26, 1944, which was subsequent to the date the government gave up possession of the hotel property. It is shown that on March 26, 1943, the government deposited in the registry of the District Court the sum of $24,726.50, which was paid in to apply on account of just compensation for the taking of the use of the Chamberlain Hotel property for the period commencing August 15, 1942, and ending June 30, 1943. On March 26, 1943, the government petitioned the court for authority to distribute and pay the amount deposited to the parties entitled to it on the basis of not to exceed $2,354.90 for each completed month the government had occupied and used the hotel, and that said amount should be credited against any ultimate award which should be finally determined and adjudicated as just compensation due the owners of the property for the taking of the use of the real property and certain personal property. On March 29, 1943, a further stipulation was entered into wherein it was agreed that the deposited amount should be distributed to the appellant herein and a prior lessee of the hotel. This stipulation was confirmed by an order entered in the condemnation proceeding in the district court on this same date wherein it was provided and authorized that the appellant should receive a certain amount each month upon the filing of a receipt stating 'that said payment is made on account of rental accruing for the month in which payment is made * * *' and which receipt should also provide that 'said payment is received as credit on the amount of just compensation when so finally and judicially determined.' On July 26, 1944, a stipulation was entered into between the appellant and the government wherein the government agreed to pay into the registry of the court an additional sum of $25,190 and by which stipulation it was agreed 'that upon approval of the stipulation by the court judgment be entered against the United States of America in favor of Edwin A. Boss in the sum of $25,190 without interest, which when paid, together with the sums heretofore paid, shall constitute full, final and complete settlement for the taking of and use of the property. On this same date the court entered an order confirming the stipulation and determined the stipulated payment as just compensation.

I. Section 4, 1939 Code of Iowa, as amended by chapters 41 and 210 of the 50th General Assembly, provides as follows:

'The United States of America may acquire by condemnation or otherwise for any of its uses or purposes any real estate in this state, and may exercise jurisdiction thereover but not to the extent of limiting the provisions of the laws of this state.

* * *

* * *

'Such real estate shall be exempt from all taxation, including special assessments, while held by the United States except when taxation of such property is authorized by the United States.'

It is the claim of the appellant that by virtue of the last quoted statute the property in question was exempt from taxation while used by the government. It is the appellant's contention that ownership was not necessary to obtain the exemption and that when the United States of America acquired 'by condemnation or otherwise for any of its uses or purposes any real estate in this state, * * *. Such real estate shall be exempt from all taxation, * * *.'

Counsel for the appellant and appellee have presented elaborate briefs on the question involved and the appellant particularly claims that by virtue of the historical development of section 4 of the Iowa Code the necessity for the requirements of ownership has been dropped by the legislature. However, it is our conclusion that we can dispose of this contention by our interpretation of the words 'acquire' and 'held.'

In the case of Commissioner of Insurance v. Broad Street Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 261, 44 N.W.2d 683, 684, 143 A.L.R. 982, the question there considered was the liability of the receiver of an insurance company for unemployment compensation due under the laws of the state of Massachusetts. In that case the court considered whether the receiver was within the provisions of the unemployment compensation act of the state of Massachusetts because he had "acquired the organization, trade or business, or substantially all the assets thereof, of another employer (the company) who at the time of such acquisition was an employer subject to this chapter * * *." In the opinion in this case it is stated:

'* * * The word 'acquire' imports ownership, and is not satisfied by the mere custody or control that a receiver has. Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 297 U.S. 496, 499, 56 S.Ct. 569, 80 L.Ed. 824; Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 25, 35 P. 353, 40 Am.St.Rep. 17; In re Okahara, 191 Cal. 353, 362, 216 P. 614. Clarno v. Gamble-Robinson Co., 190 Minn. 256, 259, 251 N.W. 268; National Surety Co. v. McGreevy, 8 Cir., 64 F.2d 899, 901. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word 'acquire' as 'to get as one's own.' The Oxford New English Dictionary defines it as 'To gain, obtain, or get as one's own, to gain the ownership of.''

$tIn the case of Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So.2d 412, 414, the following statement is found:

'To 'acquire' is, in the law of contracts, to become the owner of property; to make property one's own. Wulzen v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353, 356, 40 Am.St.Rep. 17; Ex parte Okahara, 191 Cal. 353, 216 P. 614, 618.'

In the case of National Surety Company v. McGreevy, supra, 64 F.2d 899, 901, it is stated, in construing the word 'acquired,' used in a bond contract, as follows:

'The word 'acquired,' as used in this contract, means to become the owner of. The New Century Dictionary defines the word as follows: 'To get as one's own.' In Webster's New International Dictionary the word is defined as: 'To gain by any means; usually by one's own exertions; to get as one's own; as to acquire a title, riches, knowledge good or bad habits.' In 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 114, the word is defined...

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