Bost v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-15-3278 |
| Parties | SHARON BOST, individually and as the personal representative of the ESTATE OF FATIMA NEAL, Plaintiff, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This case, which has been fiercely contested for several years, arises from the tragic death of Fatima Neal in November 2012, at the age of 42, while she was detained at the Baltimore City Detention Center ("BCDC"). In 2015, plaintiff Sharon Bost, the mother of Ms. Neal, filed suit against multiple defendants, both individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Fatima Neal. ECF 1. All claims have been resolved, with the exception of one claim against defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford"), the health care provider at BCDC at the relevant time. That claim is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
This Memorandum Opinion resolves the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Wexford against plaintiff as to her claim filed in her individual capacity. ECF 518 (the "Motion"). The Motion does not concern the claim lodged by plaintiff in her capacity as the representative of Ms. Neal's estate. ECF 518 at 3, 10. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. ECF 522. Defendant has replied. ECF 526.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
The voluminous facts of this case were recounted in prior judicial opinions. See ECF 159; ECF 430; ECF 499. I shall incorporate here by reference the factual summaries previously set forth in those opinions. The facts recounted below are generally limited to those pertinent to the Motion.
BCDC is a State correctional facility located in Baltimore City, operated by the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS"). ECF 430 at 5. In July 2012, Wexford assumed the direct patient care contract for DPSCS, at which point it was responsible for all medical care at BCDC and other DPSCS facilities. ECF 477-27 (Inmate Medical Health Care and Utilization Services Contract), ¶ 6; see id. at 4-6. In its contract with the State, Wexford agreed that "[e]very effort will be made to render appropriate care to Inmates onsite for emergency events, so long as the onsite efforts are not contrary to the health and well being of the Inmate." Id. at 6. Further, the contract provided that Wexford was "fiscally responsible for emergency room services provided to Inmates." Id.
Beginning on November 1, 2012, Neal suffered a stroke or a series of strokes while detained at BCDC. ECF 430 at 32-36. According to plaintiff, over the following three days, while Neal was in the infirmary, she displayed acute stroke symptoms, yet Wexford's medical staff did not seek emergency medical assistance. See id. at 8-25. Neal was found unresponsive at 12:35 a.m. on November 4, 2012. Id. at 25. Nonetheless, a 911 crew did not arrive until 3:53 a.m. ECF 233-6 at 28. Ms. Neal was transported to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead. ECF 430 at 29-30.
In a First Amended Complaint (ECF 56) ("Amended Complaint"), Bost sued Wexford, the State of Maryland, BCDC, members of the medical staff employed by Wexford (the "Medical Defendants"), and various BCDC correctional officers (the "Custody Defendants"). Id. ¶¶ 40-48. The Amended Complaint asserted nine claims for relief, including, inter alia, denial of adequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; medical malpractice; negligence; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 28-43.
Of import here, the "Second Claim for Relief" (also referred to as the "Second Claim" or the Monell claim) lodges a Monell claim against Wexford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an unconstitutional policy and practice of denying adequate medical care. Id. ¶¶ 169-86; see Monell, 436 U.S. 658.1 The Second Claim for Relief also seeks "attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . . . ." ECF 56, ¶ 185. The "Seventh Claim for Relief" (i.e., the "Seventh Claim") lodges a "Wrongful Death" claim against all defendants. Id. at 45. That claim invokes Md. Code , § 3-902 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("C.J."), which concerns "Wrongful death actions" under Maryland law, as well as "Ms. Bost's constitutional right to due process . . . ." ECF 56, ¶¶ 241, 242. Notably, the Amended Complaint does not explicitly indicate whether each claim is asserted by plaintiff in her individual capacity, her representative capacity, or both.
Wexford and the Medical Defendants (ECF 130), as well as the Custody Defendants (ECF 135), moved to bifurcate plaintiff's Monell claim and to stay discovery as to that claim. By Memorandum Opinion (ECF 159) and Order (ECF 160) of May 8, 2017, I granted those motions.In my Memorandum Opinion, I concluded that bifurcation of the Monell claim was appropriate in order to conserve resources, promote judicial efficiency, and to avoid a significant risk of prejudice to the individual defendants. ECF 159 at 27.
After the close of discovery, the Custody Defendants (ECF 212) and the Medical Defendants (ECF 213) moved for summary judgment. In a Memorandum Opinion (ECF 430) and Order (ECF 431) of July 31, 2018, I entered summary judgment in favor of the Custody Defendants on all claims, dismissing them from the suit. See ECF 431. In addition, I granted the Medical Defendants' motion in part, dismissing Bost's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. But, I denied the motion as to Bost's § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care/deliberate indifference, as well as for the claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death. Id.
Bost and the Medical Defendants entered into a settlement agreement on November 6, 2018, about one month before trial was set to begin on the remaining claims, other than the Monell claim. ECF 443. Pursuant to Local Rule 111, the Court issued a Settlement Order. ECF 444. It stated: Id.; see also ECF 518-3 () at 1.
As a result, Bost's Monell claim against Wexford is the only remaining claim in the case. Plaintiff and Wexford have been actively engaged in discovery as to the Monell claim.2 The pending dispute as to the scope of the Monell claim emerged during the fall of 2020. See ECF 518-1 (); ECF 518-2 (same).
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); see also Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2020); Variety Stores, Inc. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018); Iraq Middle Mkt. Dev. Found v. Harmoosh, 848 F.3d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 2017). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact so as to preclude the award of summary judgment as a matter of law. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585-86 (2009); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); see also Gordon v. CIGNA Corp., 890 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir. 2018).
The Supreme Court has clarified that not every factual dispute will defeat a summary judgment motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248.
There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647, 658 (4th Cir. 2020); Variety Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d at 659; Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 2014 (4th Cir. 2016); Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. But, "the mere existence of a scintillaof evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id.
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. And, the court must view all of the facts, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585-86; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; accord Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2019); Variety Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d at 659; Gordon, 890 F.3d at 470; Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017); FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013).
The district court's "function" is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a...
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