Bosteder v. City of Renton, 74934-5.

Citation155 Wn.2d 18,117 P.3d 316
Decision Date28 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 74934-5.,74934-5.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesDarwin L. BOSTEDER, Appellant, v. The CITY OF RENTON, a municipal corporation; Robert L. Arthur and Jane Doe Arthur, husband and wife; James Gray and Jane Doe Gray, husband and wife; Charles J. Karlewicz and Jane Doe Karlewicz, husband and wife; Christine Paget and John Doe Paget, husband and wife; James D. Gould and Jane Doe Gould, husband and wife; Mark Klinke and Jane Doe Klinke, husband and wife; Terry Barclay and Jane Doe Barclay, husband and wife, Respondents.

Eric Rolf Stahlfeld, Seattle, for Appellant.

Zanetta Lehua Fontes, Warren Barber & Fontes PS, Renton, John William Cobb, Seattle, for Respondents.

FAIRHURST, J.

¶ 1 In a series of three decisions in 1994 and 1997, we determined that noncriminal administrative search warrants are invalid under the state constitution absent a court rule or statute that authorizes the issuance of such warrants. In those cases, we found no such authorizing statute or court rule and declared the warrants and searches purportedly conducted pursuant to those warrants void. We are now asked to determine whether the same type of warrant is also invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution absent an authorizing statute or court rule. We answer that question in the affirmative.

¶ 2 We also must determine whether the claim filing statute, RCW 4.96.010-.020, applies to suits against individual employees of local governments and whether the statute's procedural requirements mandate strict compliance. We hold that the statute does apply to suits against individuals for acts committed within the scope of their employment and requires strict compliance with its procedural requirements.

¶ 3 We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. FACTS

¶ 4 The Renton Police Department formed a Community Patrol Resource Team (CPR Team) to work in conjunction with the Renton Code Compliance Enforcement Team in an effort to clean up or abate properties constituting a nuisance. The CPR Team initiated an investigation of the Heritage House Apartment Building in Renton on April 3, 1999, after receiving several complaints from neighbors regarding drug activity and the condition of the building. At the time, appellant Darwin L. Bosteder owned this property. The CPR Team visited the property on April 9, 1999, taking several pictures and entering individual apartments with the tenants' permission. The CPR Team used the information gathered on this visit to obtain a search warrant from Renton District Court Judge Charles J. Delaurenti on April 21, 1999. The warrant was issued based upon a finding of probable cause that "violations of the Uniform Housing Code and of the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Building[s had] been committed and that evidence of those violations [was] located at certain premises." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 113.

¶ 5 Pursuant to that warrant, the CPR Team1 conducted a search of the property on April 27, 1999. The search revealed several violations of the 1997 Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings (Int'l Conference of Bldg. Officials) [hereinafter Code for Dangerous Buildings] (adopted by ordinance in Renton) and the owner and tenants were ordered to vacate the premises within three days.2 Bosteder claims that the CPR Team searched his property without authority of law under an invalid warrant, entered private areas without his permission, and "broke locks and pried open doors as part of their search." CP at 55.

¶ 6 On April 26, 2002, exactly three years after the claimed trespass, Bosteder filed a claim for damages with the city3 and served a copy of a summons and complaint on the city asserting state trespass and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The complaint named as defendants the city, the six members of the CPR Team who conducted the search, Terry Barclay, a King County inspector who was also present at the search by invitation of one of the members of the CPR Team, and respective spouses. Included in the complaint was a provision stating that "if a claim for damages must be filed as a prerequisite for bringing this action," Bosteder would "seek to amend this Complaint after the waiting period required under RCW 4.96.020." CP at 5. RCW 4.96.020(4) provides:

No action shall be commenced against any local governmental entity for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to and filed with the governing body thereof. The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty-day period.

¶ 7 Bosteder served an amended summons and complaint on the city on June 26, 2002 — 60 days after the claim for damages was filed and the original complaint served on the city. The amended complaint included a provision alleging that 60 days had passed following the filing of a claim for damages with the city as required by RCW 4.96.020.

¶ 8 The original and amended complaints were filed in King County Superior Court on July 24, 2002.

Renton Defendants

¶ 9 The superior court granted the city's motion on behalf of all Renton defendants4 for partial summary judgment on the § 1983 claim "on the sole ground that the warrant at issue was valid under the Fourth Amendment." CP at 221. The court later dismissed the trespass claim against the Renton defendants upon their second motion for partial summary judgment. Although not stated in the order granting summary judgment or in any transcripts provided in the record, the ruling presumably was made because Bosteder failed to wait 60 days after filing a claim for damages with the city before commencing a civil action for trespass.

King County Defendant

¶ 10 Barclay, the King County inspector, was not served with a summons and complaint until March 27, 2003-11 months after the city was originally served, and 8 months after the complaints were filed. At no time did Bosteder file a claim with King County for damages. All claims against Barclay were dismissed pursuant to her motion for summary judgment.5

¶ 11 Bosteder appeals all three of the superior court orders granting summary judgment and dismissal.

II. ANALYSIS
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

¶ 12 The superior court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all defendants because it found the warrant was valid under the Fourth Amendment. We hold that the warrant was invalid and that the search conducted was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against the individuals because they were qualifiedly immune, but reverse dismissal of the § 1983 claim against the city and remand for additional proceedings.

¶ 13 An individual claiming a violation of a federal constitutional right may seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: "There are only two essential elements in a § 1983 action: (1) the plaintiff must show that some person deprived it of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that person must have been acting under color of state law." Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765 (1992). The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search generally must be executed pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant based upon probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A search conducted without a valid warrant is per se unreasonable subject to narrowly defined exceptions. Id. Bosteder claims that the issuance of the administrative search warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the district court judge did not have authority to issue noncriminal administrative search warrants of the type in this case. Consequently, Bosteder argues that the search conducted purportedly pursuant to that warrant was actually warrantless and unreasonable and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

¶ 14 Initially, an examination must be made into whether the warrant was valid under federal law. If the warrant was valid, the search may not be problematic. However, if the warrant was invalid, the search was warrantless and an inquiry should be made into its reasonableness. Finally, we will determine if the individual respondents were qualifiedly immune and whether the city may be liable by reason of an official policy or pervasive custom.

1. Was the warrant valid?

¶ 15 The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement may not be violated simply because an issuing magistrate is neither a judge nor a lawyer. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). In Shadwick, the United States Supreme Court determined that the City of Tampa's procedure for allowing municipal court clerks to issue certain arrest warrants conformed with the basic constitutional requirements that "an issuing magistrate must . . . be neutral and detached, and . . . capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." Id. at 350. The City of Tampa gave the clerks direct authority to issue warrants; thus, the warrants were initially valid as long as the grant of authority was constitutionally permissible. Id.

¶ 16 In contrast, the Court has not dealt with a situation where an individual had no state authority to issue the warrant in question from the beginning. A couple of lower federal courts, however, have ruled on the issue and found such warrants void. In United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir.2001), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that "when a warrant is signed by someone who lacks the legal authority necessary to issue search warrants, the warrant is void ab initio." The Sixth Circuit held that a warrant issued by a retired judge was void and evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be excluded. Id. "[A]b initio...

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