Bostelman v. People

• Decision Date: 25 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06SC70.,06SC70.
• Parties: Deitrich BOSTELMAN, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

162 P.3d 686

Deitrich BOSTELMAN, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 06SC70.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 25, 2007.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 30, 2007.^*

Jonathan D. Reppucci, LLC, Jonathan D. Reppucci, Denver, CO, Attorney for Petitioner.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in People v. Bostelman, 141 P.3d 891 (Colo.App.2005) to determine whether the direct filing statute¹ authorizes the prosecution to file charges in district court based on the juvenile's age at the time the delinquent act is charged, rather than the juvenile's age when the delinquent act occurred.² Petitioner, Deitrich Bostelman was charged by direct filing in district court with second degree burglary and theft.³ Bostelman was thirteen years old when he committed the delinquent acts and fourteen years old when the prosecution charged him in district court with a delinquent act that constitutes a felony. Relying on the plain language of the direct filing statute, section 19-2-517(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (2005),⁴ the district court and the court of appeals concluded that the prosecution had the discretionary authority to charge Bostelman as an adult because he was fourteen when the charges were filed. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

We conclude that the plain language of the direct filing statute, as it existed when Bostelman was charged, was ambiguous as to whether a juvenile must be fourteen when the charged delinquent act occurred or when the prosecution filed the charge. Given the stated purpose of the juvenile justice system and the legislature's intent in enacting the Children's Code, we hold that a juvenile must have been fourteen years old at the time the delinquent act occurred in order for the prosecution to file directly. Because Bostelman was thirteen when the alleged burglary and thefts took place, the prosecution did not have authority under the direct filing statute to charge him as an adult in district court for burglary, and the district court did not have authority to sentence him as an adult for that offense. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court with directions to return it to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts & Procedural History

On December 22, 1998, the prosecution charged Bostelman with sexual assault as a crime of violence by direct filing in the Mesa County District Court based on an alleged assault that occurred on December 17.⁵ Bostelman was fourteen years old when the alleged sexual assault occurred.⁶ Section 19-2-517(1)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. (2005) allowed the prosecution to directly file charges against Bostelman for the sexual assault charge because he was fourteen when the alleged act occurred and the alleged act constitutes a felony enumerated as a crime of violence in section 18-1.3-406(2)(II)(a)(E), C.R.S (1998).

On February 2, 1999, the prosecution charged Bostelman with second degree burglary and theft,⁷ also by direct filing in the Mesa County District Court. The burglaries and thefts were committed between October 18 and November 20, 1998 when Bostelman was thirteen years old. The sexual assault charge became the prosecution's predicate for direct filing the burglary and theft charges in district court, pursuant to section 19-2-517(a)(IV), C.R.S. (2005). In addition, on February 5, 1999, the prosecution charged Bostelman with robbery⁸ by direct filing in the district court based on an incident that occurred on December 1, 1998, when Bostelman was fourteen.

Bostelman entered into a plea agreement that consolidated the burglary and theft charges with the pending robbery and sexual assault charges. The agreement provided that the sexual assault charge would be treated as a juvenile case. As part of the plea agreement, the theft and robbery charges were dismissed, Bostelman was treated as a youthful offender for the sexual assault charge, and he was treated as an adult for the remaining burglary charge.

The district court sentenced Bostelman to the Department of Corrections for twelve years on the burglary charge. The court suspended the twelve year sentence on the condition that Bostelman successfully complete a six year sentence in the Youth Offender System.⁹ On the sexual assault charge, the court sentenced Bostelman to an indeterminate sentence (up to five years) in the Department of Youth Corrections to run consecutively with the burglary sentence. All the other charges against Bostelman were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

Bostelman successfully completed his five year sentence for the sexual assault and was transferred to the Youth Offender System for the six year suspended burglary sentence. However, based on its finding that Bostelman failed to successfully comply with the terms of his Youth Offender sentence, the district court revoked that sentence and imposed the twelve year suspended Department of Corrections sentence. Subsequently, Bostelman filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in which he contended that the district court lacked authority to sentence him as an adult offender for the burglary charge because he was under the age of fourteen when that act was committed.

The district court rejected Bostelman's argument and concluded that "the plain language of the [direct filing] statute states that a juvenile may be charged by the direct filing of an information in the district court or by indictment when the juvenile is fourteen years of age or older." The court also stated that, by pleading guilty to the burglary charge, Bostelman conceded to the court's authority to treat him as an adult.

The court of appeals agreed with the district court's construction of the statute and affirmed denial of Bostelman's Crim. P. 35(c) motion. Upon Bostelman's petition, we granted certiorari to determine whether the direct filing statute required a juvenile to be fourteen at the time of the delinquent act or at the time the information is filed.

First, we analyze the plain language of the direct filing statute. Because the statutory language creates an ambiguity regarding the juvenile's age, we next turn to the legislature's intent in enacting the juvenile justice system provisions of the Children's Code and the overarching objectives of that system. For comparison, we then consider the goals and objectives of the adult justice system. We conclude that the child's age at the time of the delinquent act determines whether the prosecution may file directly in district court.

II.

We conclude that the plain language of the direct filing statute, as it existed when Bostelman was charged, was ambiguous as to whether a juvenile must be fourteen when the charged delinquent act occurred or when the prosecution filed the charge. Given the stated purpose of the juvenile justice system and the legislature's intent in enacting the Children's Code, we hold that a juvenile must have been fourteen years old at the time the delinquent act occurred in order for the prosecution to file directly. Because Bostelman was thirteen when the alleged burglary and thefts took place, the prosecution did not have authority under the direct filing statute to charge him as an adult in district court for burglary, and the district court did not have authority to sentence him as an adult for that offense.

A. Standard of Review

Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. Klinger v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). Our primary task when construing a statute is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Id.; see also C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627, 634 (Colo.2004). To determine the legislature's intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute. C.S., 83 P.3d at 634. When reviewing the language of a statute, we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to their common usage. Klinger, 130 P.3d at 1031 (citing People v. Yascavage, 101 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo.2004)). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we do not engage in further statutory analysis. Klinger, 130 P.3d at 1031. However, where the language is ambiguous we may consider other aids to statutory construction, such as the consequences of a given construction, the end to be achieved by the statute, and legislative history. Id.

Generally, we construe the provisions of the Children's Code liberally in order to accomplish the purpose of the Code and to effectuate the legislature's intent. C.S., 83 P.3d at 635. We must avoid a technical reading of that would disregard the child's best interests and the legislature's intent. See id.

B. Direct Filing Statute

As applicable to this case, the legislature provided in the direct filing statute that:

(1)(a) A juvenile may be charged by direct filing of an information in the district court or by indictment only when: (IV) The juvenile is fourteen years of age or older, has allegedly committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony, and has previously been subject to proceedings in district court as a result of a direct filing pursuant to this section or a transfer pursuant to section 19-2-518; except that, if a juvenile is found not guilty in the district court of the prior felony or any lesser included offense, the subsequent charge shall be remanded back to the juvenile court.

§ 19-2-517(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (2005); 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 44, § 6, 649 (emphasis added).

The plain language of the direct filing statute does not expressly state whether a juvenile must be fourteen when the charges are filed or when the delinquent act occurred. Other provisions of the Children's Code addressing juvenile sentencing expressly require that a juvenile be a certain...