Boston Metals Company v. O'Hearne, 9163.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1964
• Docket Number: No. 9163.,9163.
• Citation: 329 F.2d 504
• Parties: BOSTON METALS COMPANY, and Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Stephen O'HEARNE, Deputy Commissioner, Fourth Compensation District, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

329 F.2d 504 (1964)

BOSTON METALS COMPANY, and Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Stephen O'HEARNE, Deputy Commissioner, Fourth Compensation District, Appellee.

No. 9163.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued November 18, 1963.

Decided March 9, 1964.

Richard C. Whiteford, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.

Leavenworth Colby, Atty. Dept. of Justice (John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morton Hollander and Allan J. Weiss, Attys. Dept. of Justice, Joseph D. Tydings, U. S. Atty., and Daniel F. McMullen, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH and BRYAN, Circuit Judges, and FIELD, District Judge.

FIELD, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court affirming a decision and order of the Deputy Commissioner awarding to the widow of Richard Henry Harris, deceased, compensation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. Here, as they did in the Court below, appellants challenge the jurisdiction of the Commission on the ground that the claim for compensation was exclusively within the province of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Maryland.

Harris, employed as a welder by The Boston Metals Company, died as the result of injuries received while engaged in dismantling a gun turret on the U.S.S. Guam. The Guam, a decommissioned battle cruiser, had been sold by the Navy to The Boston Metals Company by a contract which provided that the vessel should be broken down for scrap. The contract further provided that certain equipment should be removed and returned to the Navy, and the ship could not be remodeled or remade into another type of vessel.

For the purpose of carrying out the scrapping operations, the Guam was towed by tugs from Bayonne, New Jersey, to Baltimore, and was deliberately run aground alongside the main pier of Boston Metals in the Patapsco River. At the time of sale and continuously thereafter, the engines of the Guam were disconnected and inoperable and the propellers had been secured. Harris received his fatal injuries shortly after dismantling operations had commenced.

Section 2(4)¹ of the Act provides that "The term `employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock.)" Section 3(a)² provides that "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law."

The questions incident to the permissive scope and jurisdictional limits of the states and the federal government with respect to the compensation coverage of amphibious workers have plagued the courts since the landmark case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1916), which recognized the constitutional restrictions³ upon the power of the states in this field. While the Longshoremen's Act was designed to ameliorate the situation of the employees by providing for federal compensation in those areas which the Court had held to be beyond the reach of the states, the provisory language of Section 3(a) left the jurisdictional controversy unresolved since Congress thereby accepted the Jensen line of demarcation between state and federal jurisdiction. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184 (1941).

The continuing problem under the Act was recognized and stated in Davis v. Department of Labor, etc., 317 U.S. 249, at 253, 63 S.Ct. 225 at 227, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1942):

"Harbor workers and longshoremen employed `in whole or in part upon the navigable waters\' are clearly protected by this Federal Act; but employees such as decedent here, occupy that shadowy area within which, at some undefined and undefinable point, state laws can validly provide compensation. This Court has been unable to give any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in advance of litigation, and has held that the margins of state authority must `be determined in view of surrounding circumstances as cases arise.\' Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 230 50 S.Ct. 306, 307, 74 L.Ed. 819.

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