Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. INSURANCE AGENTS'INT. UN., 5362.
Decision Date | 24 July 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 5362.,5362. |
Citation | 258 F.2d 516 |
Parties | BOSTON MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. INSURANCE AGENTS' INTERNATIONAL UNION (AFL-CIO), Defendant, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Richard J. Walsh, Boston, Mass., with whom Francis E. Silva, Jr., and Warner, Stackpole, Stetson & Bradlee, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.
Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges.
This is another appeal involving § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, as applied to provisions of a collective bargaining agreement relating to arbitration.
The subject matter bristles with difficulties, some of which we indicated in our opinion in Local No. 149, etc. v. General Electric Co., 1957, 250 F.2d 922. An application for a writ of certiorari was denied in that case. 1958, 356 U.S. 938, 78 S.Ct. 780, 2 L.Ed.2d 813. Consequently, our decision there has become the law of the First Circuit. We referred to the view held in responsible quarters that the interests of effective arbitration would best be served by leaving to the arbitrator, in the first instance, the question of arbitrability. We thought that considerations of this sort might properly persuade the parties to draw the terms of submission in broad language. But we further pointed out that when one of the parties needs the aid of a court of equity, under § 301, and asks the court for a decree of specific performance of a contract to arbitrate, the court, before rendering such a decree, has an inescapable obligation to determine as a preliminary matter whether the defendant did contract to refer the issue to arbitration. We have no disposition to whittle away our holding in Local No. 149, etc. v. General Electric Co. Of course, practical considerations as to what would best promote effective labor arbitration might lead the court, in construing ambiguous language, to adopt an interpretation giving a broad scope to the arbitrator's function. In such a case, however, it is the court which would be determining as a preliminary matter whether the parties had contracted to refer the particular issue to arbitration.
It seems to us that in the case at bar the district court did not sufficiently adhere to the teaching of Local No. 149, etc. v. General Electric Co.
The complaint in this case was filed by Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co., an employer, seeking a declaratory judgment under § 301 to the effect that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the grievance of one Herbert Jacobson arising out of his discharge by the Company, and seeking an injunction permanently enjoining the Union defendant from proceeding further in any such arbitration. As part of its answer, the Union filed a counter-claim under § 301 alleging that it had complied with each and every term of the contract with respect to the arbitration of the "Jacobson termination grievance" and asking a declaration that enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement requires "that the American Arbitration Association proceed with its administration and processing of the arbitration of the Jacobson termination grievance * * * and that said arbitration case be heard in accordance with the applicable Association Rules and proceed to an award", and asking further for a decree requiring the Employer to comply promptly and faithfully with the award which shall be entered in said arbitration case, and to take any other action required by the contract for the processing and completion of this arbitration case in accordance with said contract.
The Employer is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Boston. The defendant named in the complaint is the Insurance Agents' International Union (AFL-CIO), a labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce, as defined in the Act. The Union's principal office is located in Washington, D. C., though its Local 243, which is involved here, has its offices in Cambridge, Mass.
On January 31, 1956, the Employer and the Union executed a collective bargaining agreement effective May 20, 1955, to May 20, 1957, which was subsequently extended to June 20, 1957. This agreement contains a typical grievance procedure (Art. XVIII) which, if unsuccessfully pursued, may be followed by arbitration (Art. XIX). The pertinent provisions of the agreement read as follows:
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