Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 12 February 1981
• Citation: 382 Mass. 553,416 N.E.2d 1363
• Parties: BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66 et al. 1 v. CITY OF BOSTON et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1363

416 N.E.2d 1363

382 Mass. 553

BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66 et al. ¹ v. CITY OF BOSTON et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 6, 1980.

Decided Feb. 12, 1981.

James T. Grady, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Paul F. Kelly, Boston, for Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors, intervener.

Matthew E. Dwyer, Boston, for Boston Public School Buildings Custodian Association, intervener.

Daniel G. Harrington, Boston, for Lunch Hour Monitors Association, intervener, submitted a brief.

Harold J. Carroll, Corporation Counsel, Boston (Marcia Drake Seeler, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, with him), for City of Boston and others.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This case involves a dispute over the funding of various collective bargaining agreements and arose from the refusal of the mayor of the city of Boston to submit to the city council a request by the school committee for a supplemental appropriation needed to fund the agreements. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A in the Superior Court, and a judge of that court issued an injunction requiring the mayor to submit the request and enjoining the setting of the city's tax rate until the request was acted upon by the city council. The defendants sought review of the court's orders by a single justice of the Appeals Court, who in essence affirmed the lower court's rulings. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk and the parties submitted the case on a stipulation of facts. A single justice reserved and reported the case without decision for determination by the full court upon the pleadings and stipulation of facts.

We are asked to decide whether the mayor may refuse to submit to the city council a request for a supplemental appropriation needed to fund an executed collective bargaining agreement; whether the mayor must submit requests for appropriations for collective bargaining agreements which are anticipated but not yet executed, or where the thirty-day period for submission under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), has not expired; whether the mayor may veto the city council's appropriation of funds to meet collective bargaining obligations; and whether the Superior Court judge erred in enjoining the setting of the city's tax rate until the appropriation requests were submitted to the city council and acted upon. ³ We agree generally with the plaintiffs' position.

We summarize the relevant facts. On August 29, 1980, the school committee wrote to the mayor asking that he submit to the city council a request for a supplemental appropriation of 15.1 million dollars needed to fund collective bargaining agreements. The supplemental appropriation was required because the school committee had already appropriated the amount of money available to it for direct appropriation under St.1936, c. 224, for fiscal year 1980-1981. ⁴ Of the 15.1 million dollars, an appropriation of 12.1 million was requested to fund collective bargaining agreements executed with the Boston Teachers Union on August 29, 1980. The remaining 3 million dollars were needed to fund anticipated but unexecuted contracts with other municipal unions.

When the mayor failed to submit the request to the city council, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court on September 10, 1980, for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs sought an order compelling the mayor to submit the 15.1 million dollar request to the city council, as well as an injunction restraining various officials from fixing Boston's tax rate for fiscal year 1980-1981.

After a hearing, the Superior Court entered an order on September 30, 1980, enjoining the setting of the city's tax rate "until further order of this Court" and compelling the mayor to submit the appropriation request to the city council by 1 P.M. that day.

The mayor requested relief from the Superior Court's order in the Appeals Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118. A single justice of the Appeals Court modified the injunction to permit the mayor to transmit the request to the city council by October 1, 1980, and declined all other relief. The mayor submitted the request for 15.1 million dollars to the city council on October 1, 1980, where it was passed that day by a vote of 8 to 1. On October 3, 1980, the mayor vetoed the city council's appropriation, and on October 6, 1980, the plaintiffs moved to remand the matter to the Superior Court for further injunctive relief. On October 6, 1980, a single justice of the Appeals Court (a) determined that the mayor lacked the authority to veto the 12.1 million dollar appropriation necessary to fund the collective bargaining agreements executed by the union and the school committee, and (b) remanded the question of the appropriation of the 3 million dollars earmarked for the unexecuted contracts to the Superior Court for further hearings.

After the remand, the Superior Court allowed the Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors, the Lunch Hour Monitors Association, and the Boston Public School Buildings Custodian Association to intervene as parties plaintiff. The interveners all alleged that amounts necessary to finance their collective bargaining agreements were contained in the disputed 3 million dollar appropriation, and urged the Superior Court to issue an order requiring the inclusion of the 3 million in the computation of the city's tax rate. ⁵

The Superior Court entered an order on October 9, 1980, declaring that the mayor's veto relating to the 3 million dollars was a nullity and requiring the defendants to include the total 15.1 million dollar supplemental appropriation in the city's tax rate. The defendants moved, pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 4A, to transfer the case to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk and moved to stay the orders of the Superior Court and the Appeals Court pending appeal. On October 17, 1980, a single justice of this court ordered that the 15.1 million dollar supplemental appropriation be held in escrow pending appeal, left the other lower court orders undisturbed, and reserved and reported the case without decision for determination by the full court.

1. Submission of the request to the city council. The plaintiffs' contention, which was accepted by the trial judge and the single justice of the Appeals Court, is that the mayor must submit supplemental appropriation requests to the city council where the appropriations are needed to fund collective bargaining agreements executed pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 7, and where the requested amount exceeds the amount the school committee is itself authorized to appropriate. St.1936, c. 224, §§ 2 and 3. The city argues that the mayor need submit such requests only where he has determined that the amount is necessary to fund collective bargaining agreements and where he has ascertained that the monies cannot be found within the funds which the school committee may appropriate on its own. We agree with the plaintiffs' position.

Our decision is based on an analysis of the public school financing system in the city of Boston and on G.L. c. 150E, which governs public sector collective bargaining. The school committee of the city of Boston, in contrast to the school committees in other municipalities, is expressLy authorized by the city charter to make direct appropriations within certain limits to finance the school system, without the participation of the mayor or city council. St. 1936, c. 224, §§ 2 and 3. If the school committee requires additional funds, it must ask the city council to appropriate any amounts in excess of the statutory maximum. Pirrone v. Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 406-410, 305 N.E.2d 96 (1973). The parties in this case stipulated that by April, 1980, the school committee had expended or committed all of the amount available to it under St.1936, c. 224 for direct appropriation. Accordingly, in August, 1980, when the school committee recognized that it would need additional funds for anticipated and executed collective bargaining agreements, it asked the mayor to submit these requests to the city council. The instant controversy arose when the mayor refused to transmit the requests.

The roles and obligations of the school committee, the mayor, and the city council regarding the funding of public employee collective bargaining contracts are established in G.L. c. 150E. General Laws c. 150E is a comprehensive scheme which governs the collective bargaining rights of public employees. Keane v. Auditor of Boston, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 402 N.E.2d 495 (1980). Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 472-473, 350 N.E.2d 707 (1976). Section 7 (b) of G.L. c. 150E, as appearing in St.1977, c. 937, § 3, provides that "(t)he employer ... shall submit to the appropriate legislative body within thirty days after the date on which the agreement is executed by the parties, a request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost items contained therein." The "employer" referred to in § 7 is the city itself, acting through its chief executive officer, whereas the "appropriate legislative body" is the city council. ⁶ G.L. c. 150E, § 1. Therefore, in Boston it is the mayor who must submit the appropriation request to the city council. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, supra at 473, 350 N.E.2d 707.

There is nothing in the case law or in G.L. c. 150E which supports the city's contention that the mayor need submit only those appropriation requests which he determines to be necessary and which he decides cannot be funded by the school committee's direct appropriations. Under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), the city council, not the mayor, is the "appropriate legislative body." Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, supra at 474, 350 N.E.2d 707. The mayor has no bargaining...