Boston v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.

• Decision Date: 02 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1:19-cv-03279-JRS-MPB,1:19-cv-03279-JRS-MPB
• Parties: CIERA BOSTON, A. T., A. T., R. T., Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, KENDRA GUINAN, LAURA BOWKER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

CIERA BOSTON, A. T., A. T., R. T., Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, KENDRA GUINAN, LAURA BOWKER, Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-03279-JRS-MPB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

March 2, 2021

Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35)

Plaintiff Ciera Boston, on her behalf and as a next friend of her children, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS"), Kendra Guinan, and Laura Bowker (collectively, "Defendants") violated her due process rights by removing her children from her custody. Boston also brings various state-law claims. Defendants move for summary judgment. (ECF No. 35.) Defendants' motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. Having carefully considered the motion, response, reply, evidence, and applicable law, the Court concludes that the motion should be granted for the following reasons.

I. Background

On September 18, 2017, Boston gave birth to R.T. at St. Francis Hospital in Indianapolis, Indiana. (Ex. B, ECF No. 35-2.) On September 22, 2017, Traci Schank, a social worker at St. Francis Hospital, called the DCS Abuse or Neglect Hotline ("Hotline") to report that R.T.'s umbilical cord blood tested positive for cocaine at birth. (Id.; Ex. D, ECF No. 35-4.) Schank reported to the Hotline that the hospital tested R.T.'s umbilical cord blood because Boston had previously tested positive on April 11, 2017, during a urine drug screen. (ECF No. 35-2 at 2.) Additionally, Schank reported to the Hotline that Boston did not have a car seat, crib, or anything else for R.T. (Id.) Boston told Schank that her previous positive drug screen result was due to a false positive, and that she did not have any items for R.T. because she was moving and had bed bugs. (Id.) Boston also denied ever using cocaine. (Id.) Later that day, R.T. was medically cleared and scheduled for discharge, and the hospital provided Boston with a "pack and play, car seat, wipes, and clothing." (Id.)

After Schank's report to the Hotline, her report was recommended for assessment, and DCS assigned Family Case Manager Kendra Guinan to assess the case. (Guinan Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. A, ECF No. 35-1.) Guinan arrived at the hospital that same day and met with Schank. (Id. ¶ 14.) Schank showed Guinan the umbilical cord blood test results and confirmed the information she previously reported to the Hotline. (Id. ¶ 14; Ex. C, ECF No. 35-3.) Additionally, Schank told Guinan that the water at Boston's residence was going to be "turned off in the family home soon," and that Boston had no childcare plan in place, as Boston's other two children were, at that time, staying in the hospital room. (Ex. C., ECF No. 35-3 at 2.)

During her visit, Guinan also met with Boston and informed her that R.T.'s positive umbilical cord blood test result was the reason for the assessment and offeredBoston an oral fluids drug screen, which she denied. (Id.; Guinan Decl. ¶ 18.) Boston informed Guinan that she had a previous DCS case where she tested positive for cocaine, but indicated that the test was either wrong, tampered with, or was a false positive. (Guinan Decl. ¶¶ 17, 22; Ex. C at 2.) On September 17, 2017, Boston had tested negative during a urine drug screen. (ECF No. 35-2 at 2.) Boston also stated that she believed the positive umbilical cord blood test result must be related to the previous false-positive DCS test and that she was "advised in the past [by her attorney] not to sign anything or take any drug screens from DCS." (Ex. C at 2.)

A nurse at the hospital informed Guinan that a positive umbilical cord drug test for drugs could indicate the use of drugs as far as twenty weeks prior to the test.¹ (Guinan Decl. ¶ 20; ECF No. 41 at 4.) Based on the information Guinan gathered during her assessment, she made the decision, after speaking to her DCS advisor, to remove Boston's custody of her children² and temporarily place the children, pending a detention hearing, with Boston's sister. (Guinan Decl. ¶ 31; Ex. C at 2; ECF No. 41 at 5.)

Guinan provided Boston with a copy of an advisement of rights form, showing Boston's right to a detention hearing within forty-eight hours. (Guinan Decl. ¶¶ 32-33; Ex. G., ECF No. 35-7.) Guinan's DCS supervisor emailed several DCS employees to initiate the children in need of services ("CHINS") proceeding in the JohnsonCounty, Circuit Court, Juvenile and Family Court Division ("Juvenile Court"). (Ex. H, ECF No. 35-8.) That email also asked DCS staff attorney Laura Bowker to obtain a hearing with the Juvenile Court, (id.; see also Ex. J, ECF No. 35-10), which Bowker did shortly thereafter, (Ex. J, ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 10). Bowker subsequently notified the Juvenile Court of the filing of the Report of Preliminary Inquiry. (Id. ¶ 8; see also Ex. I at 1.) The CHINS petition was eventually filed by DCS attorney Grace Chimples, and Boston's detention hearing was set for September 26, 2017, at the Juvenile Court. (Ex. J, ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 35-10; Ex. I, ECF No. 35-9 at 2.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Juvenile Court found that there was insufficient evidence to authorize the finding of a CHINS case because there was "not enough evidence to cement that there [was] recent drug use." (Ex. K at 9:14-19:19, ECF No. 35-11.)

Boston asserts that Defendants violated her substantive due process rights, alleging violations of her right to familial relations. She brings these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). Boston additionally alleges that Defendants are liable for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants move for summary judgment.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "must construe all the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Monroe v. Ind. Dep'tof Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017), but the district court must also view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted in this case because (1) R.T., A.T., and A.T. do not state any claims for relief; (2) Defendant Bowker is absolutely immune from suit; (3) DCS is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and the Indiana Tort Claims Act; (4) the removal of Boston's children was supported by reasonable suspicion of imminent harm; (5) Defendants Guinan and Bowker are entitled to qualified immunity and immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act; (6) and the Defendants' conduct does not support an intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

As a preliminary matter, Boston concedes that R.T., A.T., and A.T. do not state claims for relief. (ECF No. 41 at 6, 10.) Moreover, Boston concedes that Bowker is immune from suit. (Id. at 6.) Therefore, to the extent the Complaint alleges any claims by R.T., A.T., and A.T., those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is also granted as it relates to all claims against Bowker. The Court addresses Boston's remaining claims in turn.

A. DCS is Not a "Person" Subject to Suit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Boston's claims against DCS because DCS has not consented to this Court's jurisdiction or waived its immunity. Boston, however, argues that, even though DCS has not consented to this Court's jurisdiction, DCS availed themselves to this Court's jurisdiction by seeking removal to this Court.

The Eleventh Amendment "grants states immunity from private suits in federal court without their consent." Nuñez v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 817 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016). Indeed, absent a state's consent, a valid Congressional override, or waiver, suits against state agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ind. Prot. & Advoc. Servs. v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Hetherington v. Dep't of Child Servs., No. 2:11-cv-62, 2012 WL 523712, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 14, 2012). However, a state may waive its immunity by removing claims to federal court. Bd. of Regents of U. of Wisc. Sys. v. Phoenix Intern. Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 461 (7th Cir. 2011).

Here, by removing this case to federal court, DCS waived its immunity. Nevertheless, Boston's claims against DCS fail because DCS is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the U. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (stating that even though defendants removed the § 1983 claim to federal court, that claim could not go forward "because a state is not a 'person' for the purposes of § 1983"). "Every person who, under the color of . . . [law] subjects, or causes to besubjected, any citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. States, however, are not "persons" liable for money damages under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Because DCS is considered an arm of the state of Indiana, it is not considered a "person" under § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70; see also Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015); Lamaster v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., No. 4:18-cv-00029, 2019 WL 1282043, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2019) (citing Nuñez, 817 F.3d at 1044)....