Boston v. Stobbe

• Decision Date: 27 May 2008
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 9:08-cv-819-PMD.
• Citation: 586 F.Supp.2d 574
• Parties: Frank BOSTON, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. STOBBE; James Sligh; and Willie Eagleton, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Page 574

586 F.Supp.2d 574

Frank BOSTON, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. STOBBE; James Sligh; and Willie Eagleton, Defendants.

C.A. No. 9:08-cv-819-PMD.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division.

May 27, 2008.

Frank Boston, Bishopville, SC, pro se.

ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that the case be deemed a "strike" for purposes of the "three strikes" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Record contains a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of a United States Magistrate Judge which was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A dissatisfied party may object, in writing, to an R & R within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff Frank Boston ("Plaintiff" or "Boston") filed timely objections to the R & R.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Lee Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"). On or about March 7, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he contends that SCDC's calculation of his sentence does not include the number of work time credits to which he believes he is statutorily entitled. In his Complaint, he asserts that he has filed numerous grievances concerning the issue, and he also states that he filed a petition for habeas corpus on July 9, 2007, which was denied on January 17, 2008. (See Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiff states that Defendants Michael J. Stobbe, James Sligh, and Willie Eagleton violated his constitutional rights because they refused to correct his "maxout" date. (Id. at 4.) Paragraph 12 of his Complaint states (verbatim),

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Deliberate Indifference. Defendants Michael J. Stobbe, James Sligh Jr., and Willie Eagleton violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.

(Compl.¶ 12.) Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages against all three Defendants. (Id. at 5.)

As the Magistrate Judge noted in the R & R, the instant civil action is the second one Plaintiff has filed based on allegations that his federal constitutional rights are being violated because personnel within the SCDC incorrectly calculated his "maxout" date. (R & R at 1.) Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on or about July 5, 2007. See Boston v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C.A. No. 9:07-1861. In that proceeding, he asserted he was entitled to relief because he "was not given all his earned work credits." (Pet. at 6.) He also asserted that he was entitled to immediate release because his sentence had expired. (Id. at 9-11.) Magistrate Judge Kosko entered a Report and Recommendation in that case on December 20, 2007, in which he recommended granting the respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.¹ Magistrate Judge Kosko determined the petition was barred under the procedural default doctrine and in the alternative concluded the habeas petition should be barred for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. (See R & R in 07-1861 at 12.) The R & R in that case further concluded that even if the petitioner had exhausted his state remedies, he would still not be entitled to habeas relief. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted that while the petitioner claimed he was entitled to one day off his sentence for every two days that he works, "[p]etitioner is mistaken." (Id. at 13.) The R & R states,

[T]he number of earned work credits that an inmate is entitled to depends on the job the inmate holds. At different times during his incarceration, the Petitioner has worked in jobs that have afforded him the opportunity to earn one day of earned work credits for each day worked, working seven days a week. At other times, the Petitioner has held jobs that only earned him one day o[f] earned work credits for every seven days he worked. Furthermore, the Petitioner has not worked consistently through his incarceration. For instance, in late 2005 the Petitioner did not work and thus did not earn credits against his sentence for four months. Likewise, in 2006 the Petitioner did not work for more than eight months. Therefore the Petitioner has not earned nearly the 1209 days of earned work credit that he claims in his Petition.

(Id. at 13.) The R & R in the habeas petition further stated that "reason the Petitioner's projected parole date has been pushed back is because of the forfeiture and loss of good time credits (not work credits) due to disciplinary convictions." (Id.) The petitioner further claimed that he was entitled to have his forfeited good time and work credits restored, but the R & R concluded otherwise:

[T]he Petitioner has been given credit for all of his earned work credits. Therefore, there are not any forfeited work credits that need to be restored. As to the forfeited good time credits, the good time credits that the Petitioner have forfeited has been as a result of his 56 disciplinary infractions of which he has been convicted. Under S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A), an inmate is entitled to earn good credits if his "record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules of the institution where he is confined and has not been subjected to punishment for misbehavior." The Petitioner has clearly not observed the rules of his institution and has been punished for misbehavior since he has been incarcerated. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to those good time credits that he has forfeited.

(Id. at 13-14.) The Magistrate Judge further concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to immediate release because the petitioner's sentence had not expired. (Id. at 14.)

On January 17, 2008, this court entered an order adopting the R & R and granting the respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the time the court issued the order, no objections were in the record, but the record does contain objections that Boston dated January 14, 2008. (See Doc. No. [30] in 07-1861.) He also filed a notice of appeal, and that appeal is still pending.

Returning to the case sub judice, the § 1983 claim, Magistrate, Judge Kosko entered a Report and Recommendation on March 19, 2008, in which he recommended (1) dismissing the Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process, and (2) deeming this case a "strike" pursuant to the "three strikes" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (See R & R in 08-819 at 6.) The R & R states,

Initially, the allegations contained in the Complaint ... are inadequate to state a viable claim for damages against any Defendant. This is true because, to the extent that it contains any factual allegations of wrongdoing against any Defendant, the Complaint filed by Plaintiff basically contains only what some courts have described as "buzzwords" or "gibberish." As stated above, Plaintiff broadly recites the legal terminology "Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Deliberate Indifference" and "violated ... constitutional rights." However, other than Plaintiff's brief allegation about one Defendant's supposed incorrect calculation of his sentence ..., the Complaint is devoid of any other factual allegations against the other two Defendants or of any other alleged wrongdoing by Defendant Stobbe.

(Id. at 3.) Furthermore, the R & R states that "[b]y broadly asserting that the Defendants' `violated [his] constitutional rights' and including unexplained legal terminology without offering any substantial factual allegations underlying the legal conclusions asserted, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet the requirements of either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) or 12(b)(6) and is, in fact, frivolous and subject to summary dismissal." (Id. at 4.) The R & R also states, "[E]ven if the Complaint could somehow be liberally construed as stating potential claims against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their involvement in the calculation of Plaintiff's max-out date, the Complaint should still be summarily dismissed due to the operation of the doctrine of res judicata." (Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's R & R to which a specific objection is registered and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that R & R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After a review of the entire record, the R & R, and Plaintiff's objections, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the court adopts the R & R and fully incorporates it into this Order.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination that the instant action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (Objections at 2.) Plaintiff states,

The Court [in his habeas action] ... ruled that petitioner had procedurally defaulted and was procedurally barred from raising allegations[;] therefore the allegations w[ere] not equally raised and exhausted. Moreover even if the merit determination was adopted[,] the allegations were against the South Carolina Dep[artment] of Corr[ections], and Warden A.J. Padula, not any of the defendants named in this present complaint.

(Id.)

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Plaintiff is objecting to the alternative ground in the R & R. Magistrate Judge Kosko recommended dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint because it failed to meet the requirements of either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) or 12(b)(6) and was frivolous. (See R & R at 4.) In the alternative, he recommended dismissing the Complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (Id.) The court therefore notes that even if the court ruled in Plaintiffs favor regarding his objection, the result would not change, as Plaintiff...