Bostron v. Apfel, No. Civ.H-97-3154.
| Decision Date | 19 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.H-97-3154. |
| Citation | 104 F.Supp.2d 548 |
| Parties | Michael H. BOSTRON and Maurice R. DuBois, Plaintiffs, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
E. David Hoskins, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., Baltimore, MD, for plaintiffs.
Allen F. Loucks, Assistant United States Attorney, Larry D. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for defendant.
This Title VII case has had a lengthy and tortuous history, culminating in a recent trial in which the jury was unable to agree upon a final verdict as to all of the issues presented to it. A mistrial was declared by the Court, and a Partial Judgment has been entered.
As a result of numerous pretrial rulings made by the Court, only some of the many claims of plaintiff's Michael H. Bostron and Maurice R. DuBois were presented to the jury.1 Seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., these two employees of the Social Security Administration (the "SSA") alleged in their complaint that the SSA had denied them numerous promotions because they were males. Suit has been brought against Kenneth S. Apfel, the Commissioner of Social Security.
Following extensive pretrial proceedings and the entry of a Pretrial Order and a Supplemental Pretrial Order, the case came on for trial before a jury. Plaintiff Bostron presented to the jury his claims that, because of his sex, he was discriminatorily denied twenty-six promotions during the period from 1988 through 1998, and plaintiff DuBois presented to the jury his claims that, because of his sex, he was discriminatorily denied three promotions in 1997 and 1998.2 The trial lasted for some nine days. After deliberating for more than eleven hours over a period of two days, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Apfel against plaintiff Bostron as to one of the promotional positions sought by him and in favor of defendant Apfel against plaintiff DuBois as to one of the promotional positions sought by him. However, the jury indicated that it was hopelessly deadlocked as to all of the other positions at issue.3 On May 15, 2000, the Court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff suing under Title VII was not entitled to a jury trial. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 247, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Five of the promotional positions sought by plaintiff Bostron were filled before the 1991 Act became effective. Counsel accordingly agreed that the Court should try and decide the issues raised by those five positions with the jury acting in an advisory capacity pursuant to Rule 39(c), F.R.Civ.P.
After declaring a mistrial as to the positions with respect to which the jury could not agree on a verdict, the Court rendered an oral opinion making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Applying the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) burden of proof scheme, the Court first determined that plaintiff Bostron had not as to the five positions at issue established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court further found that, in any event, defendant had proved that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for SSA's refusal to promote plaintiff Bostron to those positions. Finally, the Court, as the factfinder, determined that plaintiff Bostron had not proved that the reasons given by defendant were pretextual. The Court concluded that the statistical and other evidence presented by plaintiffs was not sufficient to show that defendant had intentionally discriminated against plaintiff Bostron insofar as each of these five positions was concerned. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of defendant against plaintiff Bostron as to those particular five positions.
Presently pending before the Court is a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law filed by defendant pursuant to Rule 50(b), F.R.Civ.P. By way of this motion, defendant seeks the entry of judgment in his favor on all of the remaining unresolved claims asserted in this case by both plaintiff Bostron and plaintiff DuBois.4 Memoranda in support of and in opposition to this motion have been filed by the parties and reviewed by the Court. A hearing on the pending motion has been held in open court. For the reasons stated herein defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law will be granted.
The background facts of this litigation have been set forth in some detail in prior opinions of the Court.5 For the purposes of the Court's rulings on the pending motion, those background facts need not be repeated here except insofar as any such additional facts may be relevant to the issues raised by the pending motion. In the complaint, plaintiff Bostron alleged that he had been discriminatorily denied promotions to 154 positions, and plaintiff DuBois alleged that he had been discriminatorily denied promotions to "numerous" positions. As a result of pretrial rulings of the Court, Bostron was permitted to present to the jury his claims that, because of his sex, he was discriminatorily denied twenty-six promotions during the period from 1988 through 1998, and DuBois was permitted to present to the jury his claims that, because of his sex, he was discriminatorily denied three promotions in 1997 and 1998. Discovery revealed that white males had been promoted to many of the other positions sought by plaintiffs, making it inappropriate for plaintiffs to seek recoveries under Title VII as to those claims.
At the trial, both sides called expert and other witnesses, and numerous exhibits were admitted in evidence. Plaintiffs, in seeking to prove that the SSA had intentionally discriminated against them because of their sex, relied almost entirely on agency-wide statistical evidence. Interpreting these statistics, Dr. Frederick Derrick, plaintiff's expert, opined that the SSA, in making the promotional decisions at issue, had discriminated against plaintiffs because they were males.
At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendant orally moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). That motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence, defendant once again moved under Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law, and once again this motion was denied by the Court. The case was then presented to the jury under lengthy instructions from the Court. When the jury could not agree on a verdict as to all of the issues in the case, a mistrial was declared.
It is well established that Rule 50(b) permits the filing by a party of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law in the event that a mistrial has been declared. DeMaine v. Bank One Akron, N.A., 904 F.2d 219, 220-221 (4th Cir.1990). Rule 50(b) specifically provides that if no verdict was returned by a jury, the Court may, in disposing of a renewed motion, "direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law or may order a new trial."
In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court should consider the record as a whole viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F.Supp. 1087, 1088 (D.Md.1986), aff'd without op. sub nom., Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.1987). When the evidence is viewed in such a light, judgment should be entered notwithstanding the jury's failure to reach a verdict if insufficient evidence was presented to support a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 1089. A district court should enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of a defendant if the plaintiff has failed to produce substantial evidence in support of its claim. DeMaine, 904 F.2d at 220; Business Dev. Corp. v. United States, 428 F.2d 451, 453 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957, 91 S.Ct. 355, 27 L.Ed.2d 265 (1970). Speculative or conjectural inferences are not sufficient to support a verdict in favor of a party opposing a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Business Dev. Corp., 428 F.2d at 453. More than a scintilla of evidence is required. Mann v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 300 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir.1962). An issue may be removed from the jury if evidence provides a mere "possibility" yet not a "probability" of proof. Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 510 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 830, 103 S.Ct. 69, 74 L.Ed.2d 69 (1982).
Each plaintiff in this case must first establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote as to each position sought by him. Each plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he applied for the position in question; (3) that he was qualified for the position; and (4) that he was rejected for the position under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir.1994); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir.1991).
After each plaintiff has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence "that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This burden is one of production, not of persuasion, and it involves no credibility assessment. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The "[u]ltimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
Once the defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision,...
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