Botsford General Hosp. v. Citizens Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 July 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121337
• Citation: 489 N.W.2d 137,195 Mich.App. 127
• Parties: BOTSFORD GENERAL HOSPITAL, Plaintiff/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee, and Christopher Noel, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant-Appellee, v. CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Mary Bower Noel, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 137

489 N.W.2d 137

195 Mich.App. 127

BOTSFORD GENERAL HOSPITAL, Plaintiff/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee and Christopher Noel, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant-Appellee, v. CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant and Mary Bower Noel, Third-Party Defendant.

Docket No. 121337.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 8, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided July 20, 1992, at 9:35 a.m.

Released for Publication Oct. 5, 1992.

Zweig & Lane, P.C. by Carol L. Fossee, Southfield, for Botsford General Hosp.

John R. Hocking, III, Southfield, for Christopher Noel.

Anselmi & Mierzejewski by Joseph S. Mierzejewski, Pontiac, for defendant.

Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and LESINSKI, ^* JJ.

LESINSKI, Judge.

Defendant, Citizens Insurance Company, appeals as of right a September 18, 1989, judgment of the Oakland Circuit Court involving no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Following an August 1989 jury trial, plaintiffs, Christopher Noel and Botsford General Hospital, were awarded damages in the amount of $83,211.80, payable by Citizens. Citizens claims as error several rulings by the court.

On November 9, 1985, Christopher Noel was involved in an automobile accident while driving a 1977 Mercury Monarch. That vehicle was uninsured, as were the two other vehicles in the Noel household. The license plate on the Monarch was registered to another automobile owned by Mary Noel, plaintiff's wife. As a result of injuries sustained in the accident, plaintiff was taken to Botsford General Hospital, where he subsequently underwent six surgical procedures.

Because Christopher Noel (hereafter plaintiff) had no source of PIP coverage for the claimed losses, he filed an application with the Michigan Department of State assigned claims facility, pursuant to M.C.L. § 500.3171 et seq.; M.S.A. § 24.13171 et seq. On the face of the application, in the space marked "owner of vehicle involved," the application states "just purchase (sic) by Chris Noel."

Under Michigan law, the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle involved in an accident is ineligible for no-fault benefits, including benefits through the assigned claims plan. See M.C.L. § 500.3113(b); M.S.A. § 24.13113(b) and M.C.L. § 500.3173; M.S.A. § 24.13173. During the investigation conducted by Dena Hendon of the assigned claims facility, Mary Noel advised Hendon that the vehicle had been purchased by plaintiff shortly before the accident. Dena Hendon denied the claim, after making a determination that plaintiff owned the vehicle and, therefore, was ineligible for benefits.

On May 9, 1986, plaintiff submitted a second application for benefits to the assigned claims facility. In the space designated "owner of vehicle involved," this application states "Mary Noel." Upon receipt of this second application, Hendon assigned plaintiff's claim to Citizens for further investigation regarding ownership.

Meanwhile, Botsford General Hospital submitted its billings for treatment of plaintiff to the Michigan Department of State for payment. The Department of Social Services paid the hospital a statutory percentage of the $43,992.92 amount submitted. The DSS also began its own investigation into the ownership of the vehicle and applicable insurance coverage for the loss.

After corresponding with Dennis Howder on the subject of the sale and ownership of the Monarch, the DSS in October 1986 concluded that plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle and sought no further reimbursement from Citizens for the bills it had paid on plaintiff's behalf.

Plaintiff filed suit against Citizens on October 6, 1986. Botsford General Hospital subsequently moved to intervene for the purpose of recovering its claimed medical expense losses. Intervention was granted on November 15, 1988. The matter proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $83,211.80, including hospital expenses, wage loss, replacement service costs, and interest. Citizens appeals the jury verdict. We reverse.

I

The first issue is whether the trial court properly left to the jury the question regarding who owned the 1977 Mercury Monarch.

Under Michigan law, a person is not entitled to be paid PIP benefits if that person was the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident and that vehicle was required to be, but was not, insured under Michigan's no-fault act. M.C.L. § 500.3113; M.S.A. § 24.13113 and M.C.L. § 500.3173; M.S.A. § 24.13173. The Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.37(b); M.S.A. § 9.1837(b), defines "owner" as "a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle." This provision has been incorporated into the Michigan no-fault act. Albanys v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 91 Mich.App. 41, 45-46, 282 N.W.2d 11 (1979).

At trial, evidence indicated that not long before the accident the Monarch had been purchased from Dennis Howder. Plaintiff gave $300 cash to Howder and took possession of the car. Although Howder signed the certificate of title, neither he nor Noel filled in the line designated for the new owner. At the time of sale, a license plate registered to Mary Noel was placed on the car.

Over a hearsay objection by Citizens, the trial court admitted an October 15, 1985, handwritten receipt that stated that the $300 paid for the Monarch was "received from Mary Noel." Evidence was also admitted that at the time of the accident no application for a new title had been filed with the Secretary of State. Thus, title was still under the name of Dennis Howder.

Plaintiff claimed that although he actually conducted the purchase transaction with Howder, the purchase money was his wife's and he was merely taking delivery of the car as her agent. Mary Noel testified that she had retained actual possession of the title since the purchase and that the car carried her license plates. Additional evidence of ownership included statements made on plaintiff's multiple applications for insurance benefits.

Section 233 of the Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.233; M.S.A. § 9.1933, which concerns transfers of title, provides:

(4) The owner shall indorse on the back of the certificate of title an assignment of the title with warranty of title in the form printed on the certificate ... and deliver or cause the certificate to be mailed or delivered to the purchaser or transferee at the time of the delivery to the purchaser or transferee of the vehicle....

(5) Upon the delivery of a motor vehicle and the transfer, sale, or assignment of the title or interest in a motor vehicle by a person, including a dealer, the effective date of the transfer of title or interest in the vehicle shall be the date of execution of either the application for title or the certificate of title.

According to Citizens, the parties' failure to comply strictly with the provisions of § 233 precluded the lower court from permitting the question of ownership to reach the jury. Rather, Citizens argues that the undisputed fact that plaintiff actually handed the money to the seller, took possession of the vehicle, and received delivery of the certificate of title conclusively established him as the owner under § 233.

Legal title and ownership of a vehicle are not coextensive terms under the Vehicle Code; more than one person may be liable as "owner," even if no one possesses all the normal incidents of ownership. Messer v. Averill, 28 Mich.App. 62, 65, n. 2, 183 N.W.2d 802 (1970). The question of ownership is one of fact that is to be decided by the factfinder. Albanys v. Mid-Century Ins. Co, 407 Mich. 925, 285 N.W.2d 202 (1979), rev'g, 91 Mich.App. 41, 282 N.W.2d 11 (1979); John v. John, 47 Mich.App. 413, 209 N.W.2d 536 (1973).

Citizens accepts that "ownership" is a question of fact relative to plaintiff, but argues that the same is not true relative to Mary Noel. We disagree. The proper focus of inquiry is whether plaintiff was an "owner" of the vehicle, not whether Howder had effectively transferred its title. Plaintiff would be entitled to PIP benefits under the assigned claims plan, M.C.L. § 500.3171 et seq.; M.S.A. § 24.13171 et seq., regardless of whether Howder or Mary Noel owned the vehicle, so long as plaintiff himself was not an owner.

We conclude that the lower court did not err in permitting the question of Mary Noel's ownership to be decided by the jury rather than granting Citizens' motion for a directed verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that there was a question of fact concerning ownership. See Stoken v. J E T Electronics & Technology, Inc, 174 Mich.App.457, 463, 436 N.W.2d 389 (1988).

II

Citizens next argues that it was error for the trial court to admit the handwritten sales receipt into evidence under the exception to the hearsay rule that allows documents affecting an interest in property to be entered into evidence.

MRE 803(15) excepts from the hearsay rule the following:

A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

Only one Michigan case discusses MRE 803(15), and that case applied the exception to facts contained in a will. See People v. Burton, 177 Mich.App. 358, 441 N.W.2d 87 (1989). Moreover, there is a dearth of federal case law regarding the issue and none that this Court could find concerning documents dealing with personalty rather than real property. On the other hand, 4 Weinstein, Evidence, § 803(15), p 307, indicates that documents concerning personalty, including contracts or bills of sale, are included in the exception as long as other requirements are met:

The rule rests both on necessity--for litigation may arise so many years after a conveyance that declarants and witnesses to the transaction may be unavailable--and on a number of...