Bottos v. Beamer
| Decision Date | 16 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73 H 193.,73 H 193. |
| Citation | 399 F. Supp. 999 |
| Parties | Alex J. BOTTOS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. George N. BEAMER and J. Frank Kimbrough, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Alex J. Bottos, Jr., pro se.
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for defendants.
In this pro se civil action, Plaintiff Bottos seeks $1,000,000 in damages from United States District Judge George N. Beamer and Assistant United States Attorney J. Frank Kimbrough, both of the Northern District of Indiana. In broad outline, Bottos alleges that Beamer and Kimbrough tortiously interfered with his rights by harassing and imprisoning him without authority or jurisdiction.
This suit was initiated on July 20, 1973 in the Lake County, Indiana, Superior Court. On August 6, 1973, Defendants successfully removed to the Northern District of Indiana.1 Because of the nature of the allegations and the offices of the named parties, the Judges of the Northern District of Indiana disqualified themselves from service as to this case. By order of Chief Judge Swygert of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, I was designated and assigned as presiding judge. See 28 U. S.C. § 292(b).
Throughout these proceedings, Bottos has demanded that this action be transferred from the Seventh Circuit because of judicial prejudice against him here. No persuasive arguments or facts have been presented to support this broad allegation. Indeed, Plaintiff cites no statutory or case precedent in which such an unusual transfer was granted. Bottos exercised his rights by bringing this lawsuit in the Lake County Court. Beamer and Kimbrough properly removed to federal court. To avoid any appearance of impropriety, a Judge unassociated with the District and the parties was assigned to hear the matter and to determine the merits. On these facts, Plaintiff's conclusory and unsupported allegations must be rejected.
According to the pleadings, Bottos, a management consultant, is compiling data which, he claims, illustrates a pattern of official corruption in the State of Indiana. He alleges that he has uncovered serious criminal violations on the part of various State and Federal officials. Armed with this material, Plaintiff seeks to conclusively establish that Northeast Indiana is the national headquarters of the "crime syndicate."
In an attempt to thwart these activities, certain individuals, not named herein as defendants, allegedly conspired to lodge fraudulent and baseless charges against Plaintiff. Although the complaint does not so state, a three-count indictment was returned on June 29, 1973 charging Bottos with impersonating a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912. See United States v. Bottos, 72 H Cr 83.
In the process of trial preparation in that case, Plaintiff and his attorney developed a serious disagreement and parted ways. Apparently, Bottos has filed a malpractice action against the attorney for certain improprieties involved in defending the criminal case. In any event, although he was offered court-appointed counsel, Plaintiff refused and represented himself at all times thereafter.
On March 5, 1973, Plaintiff appeared pro se before Defendant Beamer on two motions pertinent to the criminal charges. First, Plaintiff sought to transfer the proceedings out of the Seventh Circuit because of alleged judicial bias against him in this area. For the same reasons articulated in this opinion, that motion was denied. Second, United States Assistant Attorney Andrew Baker presented a Motion for Psychiatric Examination of Bottos pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244.2 Plaintiff was served with copy on March 1, 1973 and responded both orally and in writing. In the motion, Assistant Baker listed ten grounds supporting his brief that Bottos "may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent to properly assist in his own defense." Baker further verified his belief that Plaintiff "may be suffering from extreme paranoia, delusions, and unable to separate truth from fiction." After oral argument, Defendant Beamer granted the Government's request and ordered Plaintiff to the custody of the United States Marshal for transfer to the Federal Medical Center for evaluation and report.
Plaintiff states that he was humiliated and disgraced by being placed in chains and treated as a criminal. He alleges that he was committed to the Porter County Jail for 5 days, transferred to an unidentified county jail in down-state Illinois, and confined at the Federal Medical Center for 40 days. Throughout this period of time, Bottos claims that he was subjected to various indignities and treated improperly.
Defendant Kimbrough's relationship to the case is based on two theories. First, Plaintiff states that he supplied Kimbrough with information concerning illegal activities in Northern Indiana. Rather than acting positively upon this evidence, Kimbrough is said to have attempted to pressure individuals to discredit Bottos. After the impersonation charges were brought against Plaintiff, Kimbrough allegedly ordered Assistant Baker to bring the § 4244 motion as part of the alleged continuing scheme of harassment. Second, Plaintiff charges that Kimbrough attempted to influence officials at the Medical Center to keep Bottos confined indefinitely.
Defendant Beamer's relationship to the case is also based upon his irreconcilable bias against Plaintiff. This allegation is supported by two specific statements by Plaintiff. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Beamer assisted Defendant Kimbrough in pressuring individuals in order to discredit Bottos. Second, he charges Beamer with stating, in private, that he would sentence Bottos to three years in jail with or without a trial.
On these facts, Plaintiff contends that Defendants, without authority and with full knowledge of the fraudulent and baseless nature of the criminal charges, confined him unlawfully, maliciously, and without probable cause. He further asserts that Defendants caused and acquiesced in the wrongs allegedly committed in route to and at the Federal Medical Center.
Defendants now move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants maintain that the judicial and prosecutorial immunities inherent in their offices constitute absolute defenses to these charges. I agree.
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be denied. Defendants apparently misconstrue the concepts underlying the immunization of these officials. The applicability of the immunity is decided on a case-by-case basis. See, e. g., Luttrell v. Douglas, 220 F.Supp. 278 (N.D. Ill.1963); Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D.Ill.1962). In each case, the court must evaluate the questioned activities and ascertain whether they fall within the ambit of protection. In short, while the liability of the individual defendant is constantly scrutinized, the power and jurisdiction of the courts to hear these claims is not affected by the immunity grant. To hold otherwise would deny plaintiffs their right to a threshold determination of the propriety of their complaints. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350.
A substantial number of Plaintiff's allegations represent claims upon which no relief can be granted against these Defendants. The untenable complaints refer to official misconduct and mistreatment that occurred after Bottos was transferred to the custody of the United States Marshal on March 5, 1973. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that he was chained, disgraced, deprived of food and water, illegally incarcerated in county jails, and abused at the Federal Medical Center. Even assuming that these allegations are true, 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 12.08, and even construing them as liberally as possible, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), these facts simply do not state grounds for relief and must be stricken from the complaint. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1957).
These charges relate to a series of intention torts. In addition to the facts recited above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants "caused to be done, permitted, allowed, and condoned, and acquiesced in" these wrongs. Without alleging an active and direct role in these violations, Plaintiff's mere statement of Defendants' liability does not state an actionable claim. Cf. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277 (N.D.Ill.1969); Patrum v. Martin, 292 F.Supp. 370 (W. D.Ky.1968); Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D.Mo.1963). There is no contention that Defendants personally participated in or directed the infliction of injury. There is no allegation that the United States Marshals and medical officers involved acted in a "master-servant" relationship with the Defendants.
While the concept of vicarious liability may apply to intentional torts, see Note, 45 Harv.L.Rev. 348 (1932), it is limited to those situations in which a master-servant relationship exists and the tort was committed in the course of employment. Prosser, Handbook on Torts § 70 (4th ed. 1971). No facts alleged here can be construed to represent that situation. Plaintiff's claim, if it be meritorious, is properly against the specific individuals who abused him and not against these Defendants.
Because it fails to present any conceivable relationship between these Defendants and the wrongs sustained, these allegations must be dismissed.
The actionable portions of the complaint concern...
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