Bottoson v. Moore

Decision Date29 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-2886,98-2886
Citation234 F.3d 526
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) Linroy BOTTOSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael W. MOORE, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent- Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.(No. 97-00457-CV-ORL-19A), Patricia C. Fawsett, Judge.

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Chief Judge:

Linroy Bottoson was convicted of murder in the state courts of Florida and received a death sentence. The district court denied Bottoson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C 2254. We granted a certificate of appealability to review: (1) whether Bottoson's right to a reliable sentencing hearing was violated by the trial judge's instruction that the jury could consider only statutory mitigating evidence, the Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), issue; and (2) whether Bottoson was denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.1 We now affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On Friday October 26, 1979, the Eatonville, Florida, post office was robbed, and money orders were taken. Catherine Alexander, the postmistress of Eatonville, was last seen leaving the post office on that day at around noon led by a tall African-American man. As she left, she whispered to bystanders to call the police and to tell them that the man was stealing. Later that day, Bottoson's wife attempted to cash one of the missing money orders, and Bottoson and his wife came under suspicion. Postal inspectors entered Bottoson's home on Monday October 29 and arrested him and his wife. Upon searching Bottoson's home the next day, postal inspectors found the missing money orders and Mrs. Alexander's shoes. Mrs. Alexander's body was found on the side of a dirt road on the same night that the Bottosons were arrested. The victim had been stabbed fourteen times in the back and once in the abdomen. The medical examiner testified that she died from crushing injuries to the chest and abdomen which were consistent with having been run over by an automobile. The undercarriage of Bottoson's car, a brown Chevelle, contained hair samples and clothing impressions linked to the victim's hair and clothing. Expert evidence indicated that clothing fibers similar to those in the victim's clothes and a tip of the victim's fingernail were found in the trunk of Bottoson's car.

At trial, witnesses could not identify Bottoson as the man seen leaving the post office with the victim but identified from a photograph a car, a red LTD automobile, that was rented to Bottoson at the time as the car in which the victim was taken away. A postal inspector identified the money orders found in Bottoson's home and traced them to the machine at the Eatonville post office. In addition, there was evidence that Bottoson deposited some of the stolen money orders in his bank account. Evidence was also presented that hair samples and clothing impressions found on Bottoson's car, a brown Chevelle, were consistent with having come from the victim's body. Expert evidence indicated that clothing fibers similar to those in the victim's clothes and a tip of the victim's fingernail were found inside Bottoson's car.

Bottoson's former wife, who was married to him at the time of the murder, testified that Bottoson was away from home around noon on Friday, October 26 and that he gave her a postal money order upon returning home. She testified that on the following Monday, she did not see him from 1:30 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. and that he had the brown Chevelle at the time. A jailhouse informant testified that Bottoson confessed to the murder and indicated that the best witness is a dead witness. He also testified that Bottoson said that "the old bitch had a lot of fight in her." Bottoson also gave a written confession to a minister in an effort to obtain leniency. In the confession, Bottoson wrote that "demon spirits" had "got on me."

Bottoson testified at trial. He testified that on October 26, he loaned the rental car to a man named Ernest and that Ernest returned with the money orders. He further testified that he loaned the brown Chevelle to Ernest on October 29, and that, when Ernest returned, he admitted killing the victim. Ernest then drove Bottoson to the site of the murder and Bottoson got out of the car to look at the body. Bottoson denied making any confessions. A jury found Bottoson guilty of first-degree murder.

At the sentencing hearing, the state presented an FBI agent who testified that Bottoson was convicted of bank robbery in 1971. Bottoson's counsel presented the testimony of a minister, the minister's wife, and Bottoson's mother, who described Bottoson as kind, honest, respectable, caring, and unselfishly devoted to his church.

The jury recommended that Bottoson be sentenced to death, and the trial judge imposed a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. See Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 966 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, Bottoson v. Florida, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 223, 83 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984).

In 1991, a postconviction hearing was held pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The bulk of that hearing focused on Bottoson's claim that his lawyer was ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial. The court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. See Bottoson v. State, 674 So.2d 621, 625 (Fla.1996).

Bottoson then applied for a federal writ of habeas corpus on April 22, 1997. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, denied relief on June 2, 1998. We subsequently granted a Certificate of Appealability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Bottoson filed his petition in April 1997, almost one year after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254 as amended by the AEDPA. Section 2254 provides:

(d)An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). A factual finding by a state court is presumed to be correct, and a petitioner must rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e).

A state-court decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent (1) if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth in Supreme Court case law, or (2) if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from those in a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1520. In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Hitchcock Claim

Bottoson argues that the jury instructions at his sentencing hearing violated Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). In Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that instructions to an advisory jury and a sentencing judge not to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors rendered the resulting death sentence invalid. See id. at 398-99, 107 S.Ct. at 1824-25. The sentencing judge in that case refused to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence, and there was no showing that the error was harmless. See id. at 398-99, 107 S.Ct. at 1824. In this case, the sentencing judge instructed the jury as follows:

The mitigating circumstances which you may consider, if established by the evidence, are these: A, that the Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. B, that the crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was committed while the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. C, that the victim was a participant in the Defendant's conduct or consented to the act. D, that the [Defendant] was an accomplice in the offense for which he is to be sentenced but the offense was committed by another person and the Defendant's participation was relatively minor. E, that the Defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. F, the capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. G, the age of the Defendant at the time of the crime.

Both the 3.850 hearing court and the Florida Supreme Court held that any such error in this case was harmless. See Bottoson v. State, 674 So.2d at 622-23. We cannot say that that determination was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, or resulted in a...

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