Boudreaux v. Coco

• Decision Date: 28 April 2022
• Docket Number: 2021 CA 1009
• Citation: Boudreaux v. Coco, 342 So.3d 354 (La. App. 2022)
• Parties: Brandy BOUDREAUX v. Mary P. COCO and Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

342 So.3d 354

Brandy BOUDREAUX

v.Mary P. COCO and Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company

2021 CA 1009

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: APRIL 28, 2022

Steve Adams, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Brandy Boudreaux

Ian A. MacDonald, Lafayette, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company

William C. Helm, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Mary P. Coco

BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ.

McClendon, J.

In this personal injury suit, the plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissing her claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 2, 2017, Brandy Boudreaux¹ was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her mother, Mary Coco, when Ms. Coco's vehicle collided with the rear end of another vehicle. Ms. Boudreaux filed a petition for damages on April 26, 2018, naming as defendants Ms. Coco and her liability insurer, Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company (Progressive). The petition asserted that Ms. Coco was at fault in causing the collision by rear-ending the other vehicle and that Ms. Boudreaux sustained damages as a result of the collision.

Progressive answered Ms. Boudreaux's petition on June 20, 2018. Progressive generally denied the petition's allegations and its liability and specifically pled as an affirmative defense that the policy of liability insurance Progressive issued to Ms. Coco (the policy) excluded coverage for Ms. Boudreaux's claims, because she was an employee of Ms. Coco at the time of the accident. On December 26, 2018, Ms. Coco also answered the petition with a general denial of the petition's allegations and her liability.

On July 8, 2019, following discovery, Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Ms. Boudreaux's claims.² Progressive maintained that the policy excluded coverage for an employer's liability arising out of or within the course of the employee's employment with the insured, or while performing duties related to the conduct of any insured's business (the employer's liability exclusion). Contending that Ms. Boudreaux was an employee of Ms. Coco and was within the course and scope of her employment with Ms. Coco at the time the accident occurred, Progressive asserted that the employer's liability exclusion applied to Ms. Boudreaux's claims. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Progressive submitted Ms. Boudreaux's responses to requests for admission, a certified copy of Progressive's policy issued to Ms. Coco, Ms. Boudreaux's petition, and the deposition testimony of Ms. Boudreaux and Ms. Coco.

Ms. Boudreaux opposed Progressive's motion for summary judgment. Ms. Boudreaux argued that the employer's liability exclusion did not apply to her claims because she was working with Ms. Coco as an independent contractor, not an employee, at the time of the accident. In support of her opposition, Ms. Boudreaux submitted her deposition transcript and Ms. Coco's deposition transcript.

Progressive's motion for summary judgment was heard on August 22, 2019. Following oral argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court executed a written judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Progressive. Ms. Boudreaux has appealed the trial court's judgment.³

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that governs the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Shoemake v. Scott, 2019-1261 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/3/20), 310 So.3d 191, 194. That is, after an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof rests with the mover. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the mover will bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court in the motion for summary judgment, the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact remains with the mover. When the mover makes a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present factual support, through the use of proper documentary evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) ; June Medical Services, LLC v. Louisiana Department of Health, 2019-0191 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/4/20), 302 So.3d 1161, 1164. If the adverse party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. McCoy v. Manor, 2018-1228 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/19), 277 So.3d 344, 348.

A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Marks v. Schultz, 2020-0197 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/10/20), 316 So.3d 534, 538. Material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So.3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020-00835 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 315. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Galliano v. CB & I, LLC, 2018-0844 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/10/19), 275 So.3d 906, 909.

INSURANCE COVERAGE

Whether an insurance policy, as a matter of law, provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be properly resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. George S. May International Co. v. Arrowpoint Capital Corp., 2011-1865 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/10/12), 97 So.3d 1167, 1171. An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of contractual interpretation. Hinchcliffe v. Siaotong, 2017-1356 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/18/18), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2018 WL 1870159, at *2, writ denied, 2018-1113 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1304. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. LSA-C.C. art. 2045. When the words of an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent and courts must enforce the contract as written. LSA-C.C. art. 2046 ; Sensebe v. Canal Indemnity Co., 2010-0703 (La. 1/28/11), 58 So.3d 441, 446.

When determining whether a policy affords coverage for an incident, the insured bears the burden of proving the incident falls within the policy's terms. Miller v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 2001-2683 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 836 So.2d 200, 203. However, an insurer seeking to avoid coverage through summary judgment bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion, such that application of the exclusion precludes coverage. Savoie v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2020-0584 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/9/21), 322 So.3d 1264, 1266.

Additionally, because the purpose of liability insurance is to afford the insured protection from damage claims, policies should be construed to effect, not to deny, coverage. A provision which seeks to narrow the insurer's obligation is therefore strictly construed against the insurer. Myers v. Welch, 2017-0063 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/25/17), 233 So.3d 49, 55, writ denied, 2017-2165 (La. 3/9/18), 238 So.3d 454. Any ambiguity in the exclusion is construed in favor of the insured. Nonetheless, an insurance policy, including its exclusions, should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Savoie, 322 So.3d at 1266-67.

Subject to the above rules of interpretation, insurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any manner they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy.⁴ Myers, 233 So.3d at 55. A summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may be rendered when there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded. Kirby v. Ashford, 2015-1852 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 208 So.3d 932, 937.

THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY

Progressive's motion for summary judgment contends that the following provisions of its policy, referred to herein as the employer's liability exclusion, clearly and plainly exclude Ms. Boudreaux's claims from coverage:

Coverage under [PART I - LIABILITY TO OTHERS] ... does not apply to:

* * *

5. Employee Indemnification and Employer's Liability Bodily [I]njury to:

a. An employee of any insured arising out of or within the course of:

(i) That employee's employment by any insured; or

(ii) Performing duties related to the conduct of any insured's business; or

b. The spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that employee as a consequence of Paragraph a. above.

In response, Ms. Boudreaux asserts that she was an independent contractor, rather than an employee, and therefore not excluded from coverage for her injuries under the policy. Thus, the central issue in this appeal is the nature of the relationship between Ms. Boudreaux and Ms. Coco.

THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor status is a factual determination to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Tower Credit, Inc. v. Carpenter, 2001-2875, (La. 9/4/02), 825...