Boudreaux v. Rice Palace, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-541. |
| Citation | 491 F.Supp.2d 625 |
| Parties | Anna BOUDREAUX v. RICE PALACE, INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Sue A. Fontenot, Ted Louis Luquette, Abbeville, LA, for Anna Boudreaux.
Christopher Leonard Zaunbrecher, Briney & Foret, Lafayette, LA, for Rice Palace, Inc., et al.
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Rec. Doc. 42] filed by defendants Rice Palace, Inc. and Shop Rite, Inc.; and plaintiff Anna Boudreaux's Opposition thereto [Rec. Doc. 44]. For the following reasons, defendants' Motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendant Rice Palace, Inc. operates a restaurant and gaming facility that employs in excess of fifty employees. (Complaint, ¶ 10). Plaintiff was employed with Rice Palace, Inc. in various capacities from on or about February 5, 2001 until April 12, 2003, when Rice Palace's General Manager fired her. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12). While employed by defendant, Rice Palace, Boudreaux participated in a group health plan providing health benefits to eligible employees. The plan was sponsored through Rice Palace's sister corporation, defendant Shop Rite, Inc.1 (Complaint, ¶ 25). Shop Rite, Inc. serves as the plan administrator and is also a named fiduciary and agent for service of process of Rice Palace. Id. Plan administration is provided through a third party benefit services manager, Gilsbar, Inc. Id.
During the hiring process, Boudreaux indicated in a medical questionnaire that she was taking Lotenson 12.5 for hypertension and high blood pressure and Ultram for firbromalgia. (Defendants' Exhibit 5). She denied being under other medical treatment for any condition, denied having any physical impairment, and checked "no" under the question "do you have or previously have had hyper-insulism." ).
Throughout the course of her employment, while at work plaintiff experienced disorientation, slurring of speech, dizziness and other physical conditions at work, which plaintiff claims were medically related. (Complaint, ¶¶ 22 & 31). Between February 2001 and September 2002, Boudreaux is alleged to have missed work on several occasions for various minor and unrelated medical reasons. (Defendants' Motion, p. 8). On September 1, 2002, Boudreaux reported for work with a discharge slip from the American Legion Hospital, where she reportedly had been taken after she passed out twice while driving. Boudreaux told her employers that the hospital did not know what was wrong with her and that she wanted to take some time off to investigate her condition. (Defendants' Exhibit 10, Deposition of Boudreaux). However, the American Legion Hospital records of August 30, 2002 reflect that Boudreaux was seen for "disorientation secondary to medication side effects, Ultram and Soma mixture (also taking Lotensin)." (Defendants' Exhibit 6). She also returned to the American Legion Hospital emergency room on August 31, 2002 and gave a history of becoming weak, dizzy and disoriented after being started on Prednisone, Ultram and Bextra. (Defendants' Exhibit 7).
On September 2, 2002 plaintiff was permitted to take medical leave to seek medical diagnosis of her problem and instructed not to return until she furnished a physician's statement that she was able to perform her job duties. (Complaint, ¶¶ 22 & 31). On September 10, 2002, with medical clearance from her treating physician, plaintiff returned to work as assistant kitchen manager. However, plaintiff was soon demoted from assistant kitchen manger to dish washer. Defendants allege that Boudreaux was unable to safely and properly perform the duties of her job, was a danger to herself and the people Working with her, and needed to be removed from around stoves, ovens, fryers and grills. Defendants also allege that Boudreaux had missed an excessive amount of time from work, often leaving early before completing her shift, and had told her supervisor that she was unable to perform her job duties because her health condition required her to take certain medication. Plaintiff replies that she had not missed an excessive amount of time at work and that in the course of her two years employment with Rice Palace, Inc, she only experienced three incidents at work. (Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts). After two weeks as a dishwasher, Boudreaux was promoted to line cook, with the understanding that if she ever reported to work in an incoherent condition and was not able to perform her job duties satisfactorily, she would be terminated. (Defendants' Motion, p. 5).
Plaintiff was terminated by Rice Palace's General Manager, Jo Ann Broussard, on April 13, 2003, after Boudreaux reported for work on April 11, 2003 disoriented, with slurred and incoherent speech, and was unable to perform her job duties properly. According to her supervisor, Bert Istre, Boudreaux appeared to be under the influence of medication, that she seemed as if' she was drunk, and overall was unable to work. Boudreaux allegedly was unable to understand instructions, get food orders out correctly, or safely perform her duties. She eventually was taken home by a co-worker, who reported that she had to help Boudreaux walk to the car and to her door once home, that she appeared drunk and was very week and red, and would "pass out and come to" in the car on the way to her home. (Id. at 10). When the incident was reported to Jo Ann Broussard, Boudreaux was terminated for reporting to work in that condition and unable to perform her job duties.
On March 2, 2004, plaintiff filed the instant suit against Rice Palace, Inc. and Shop Rite, Inc. under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),2 29 U.S.C. § 1140, et. seq, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA),3 19 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),4 as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq., seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.
In August 2006, plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the claim that defendants violated COBRA by failing to provide her with the required notice within the statutory time frame upon the qualifying event of her termination from employment [Rec. Doc. 25]. Plaintiff alleged a pre-textual reason for her termination and alleged that Rice Palace acted in bad faith by claiming "gross misconduct" as a reason for her termination. (Plaintiffs Motion ¶ 2-4). Moreover, plaintiff contended that by continuing to refuse to provide notice after learning of the Administrative Appeals Judge decision5 that there was no evidence of gross misconduct on the part of plaintiff as concerned the reasons for her termination of employment, and then failing to appeal such decision, defendants were clearly in bad faith by thereafter continuing to refuse to give Boudreaux COBRA notice. (Id. at ¶ 5).
In denying plaintiffs Motion, the Court notified plaintiff of its intention to enter summary judgment sua sponte in favor of defendants and allowed plaintiff a fair opportunity to come forward with all of her evidence and make a response [Rec. Does. 32 & 33]. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Court's Proposed Grant of Sua Sponte Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants Dismissing Plaintiffs Cobra Claims [Rec. Doc. 36], and a hearing was held on the matter on January 24, 2007 [Rec. Doc. 41]. The Court decided not to enter sua sponte summary judgment for defendants, but directed the defendants to file a Motion for Summary Judgment if they thought it necessary and appropriate and the best use of judicial resources. Defendants' Motion is now before the Court.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Rec. Doc. 42] seeks to dismiss all claims brought by plaintiff, including the claim under COBRA previously considered from plaintiffs perspective, as well as the claims brought pursuant to ERISA and FMLA. Defendants assert that there is no genuine issue of material regarding the liability issue common in all claims — Rice Palace's motive in terminating plaintiffs employment.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Initially, the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When a party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if such evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). As to issues which the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claim. Id. If the moving party fails to carry this burden, his motion must be denied. If he succeeds, however, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.6 Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the burden shifts to the respondent, he must direct the attention of the court to evidence in the record and set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e). The responding party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings as a means of establishing a genuine issue worthy of trial, but must demonstrate by affidavit or other admissible evidence that there are genuine issues of material fact or law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91...
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