Boudreaux v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 78284-3-I

• Citation: 448 P.3d 121
• Decision Date: 26 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 78284-3-I,78284-3-I
• Parties: Ethan BOUDREAUX, Stanley Burton, Brad Guilbeau, Jimmy Oglesby, Jr., Dalton Toms, and Justin Worthington, Appellants, v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington

448 P.3d 121

Ethan BOUDREAUX, Stanley Burton, Brad Guilbeau, Jimmy Oglesby, Jr., Dalton Toms, and Justin Worthington, Appellants,

v.WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 78284-3-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED: August 26, 2019

Beth Ellen Terrell, Adrienne McEntee, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, 936 N 34th St. Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98103-8869, Peter Schneider, Attorney at Law, Ryan R Hicks, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.

Kathleen M. O'Sullivan, Steve Y. Koh, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3099, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Dwyer, J.

¶1 Ethan Boudreaux and five of his former co-workers (collectively Boudreaux) were exposed to formaldehyde in Weyerhaeuser’s Gen-4 Flak Jacket joist coating while working for a contractor performing services for Weyerhaeuser Company in Louisiana. Boudreaux brought claims against Weyerhaeuser under the Washington product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW, alleging injury caused by exposure to formaldehyde as a result of the defective design, formulation, and fabrication of Weyerhaeuser’s Gen-4 Flak Jacket joist coating. In response to the suit, Weyerhaeuser filed a CR 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, asserting that it was Boudreaux’s statutory employer under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032, that Boudreaux’s claims could only be brought before Louisiana’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, and that the King County Superior Court accordingly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Boudreaux’s claims. The superior court agreed and dismissed Boudreaux’s suit.

¶2 We hold that Weyerhaeuser’s statutory employer defense pertains to whether a civil cause of action exists, rather than to whether a Washington superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court’s ruling conflicts with our constitution’s grant of general subject matter jurisdiction to our superior courts, we reverse.

I

¶3 Boudreaux sued Weyerhaeuser, a Washington company with its headquarters in Seattle, under the WPLA, alleging "harm caused by the fabrication, design, formula, preparation, testing, failures to warn or instruct, marketing, and labeling of Flak Jacket," and "injuries as a result of being exposed to toxic levels of formaldehyde contained in Gen 4 Flak Jacket."¹ Boudreaux was exposed to Gen-4 Flak Jacket in Louisiana as an employee of Simsboro Coating Services, LLC, a Louisiana company hired by Weyerhaeuser to provide coating services, specifically coating joists with Weyerhaeuser’s Gen-4 Flak Jacket. Boudreaux alleged that he was injured by exposure to formaldehyde in Gen-4 Flak Jacket from December 2016 through June 2017.

¶4 Weyerhaeuser responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to CR 12(b)(1).² Therein, Weyerhaeuser asserted that it was Boudreaux’s statutory employer under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032, that Boudreaux’s claims could only be brought before Louisiana’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, and that the superior court accordingly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Boudreaux’s claims.³

¶5 Following a hearing, the trial court granted Weyerhaeuser’s motion to dismiss. In its brief memorandum opinion supporting the dismissal order, the trial court engaged in fact finding, determined that Weyerhaeuser was Boudreaux’s statutory employer, and ruled that Washington superior courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Boudreaux’s claims. Boudreaux appeals.

II

¶6 This case presents us with the question of whether Weyerhaeuser’s asserted defense of statutory immunity pertains to the original subject matter jurisdiction of Washington’s superior courts. To resolve this question, we first look to how Washington courts consider assertions of employer immunity under the substantive workers’ compensation laws of Washington, as set forth in the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW. Next, we look to the workers’ compensation laws of Louisiana to determine whether any differences between Louisiana’s and Washington’s substantive law would prevent the application of Washington procedural law to Weyerhaeuser’s assertion of employer immunity. This analysis results in a clear answer: the superior court erred by treating Weyerhaeuser’s statutory employer immunity defense as pertaining to the subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court.

A

¶7 Our Supreme Court has noted that Washington’s courts, itself included, have been "inconsistent in their understanding and application of jurisdiction." In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wash.2d 438, 447, 316 P.3d 999 (2013) ; see also O’Keefe v. Dep’t of Revenue, 79 Wash.2d 633, 634, 488 P.2d 754 (1971) ("Perhaps no word is more deserving of characterization as a ‘weasel word of the law’ than the much used and often abused word ‘jurisdiction.’ "); In re Marriage of Major, 71 Wash. App. 531, 534, 859 P.2d 1262 (1993) ("The term ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ is often confused with a court’s ‘authority’ to rule in a particular manner. This has led to improvident and inconsistent use of the term." (footnote omitted)). The United States Supreme Court has also observed that in circumstances in which the question of jurisdiction was "not central to the case" and therefore did "not require close analysis," courts have often "mischaracterized claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 176 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2010). According to the Court, such mischaracterizations lead to " ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can miss the ‘critical difference[s]’ between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action." Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S. Ct. 906, 157 L. Ed. 2d 867 (2004) ).

¶8 To counter this inconsistency, Washington’s Supreme Court has recently "narrowed the types of errors that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction." Buecking, 179 Wash.2d at 448, 316 P.3d 999. " ‘Subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to a court’s ability to entertain a type of case, not to its authority to enter an order in a particular case." Buecking, 179 Wash.2d at 448, 316 P.3d 999. Thus, "[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction where it has authority ‘to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action.’ " In re Marriage of McDermott, 175 Wash. App. 467, 480-81, 307 P.3d 717 (2013) (quoting Shoop v. Kittitas County, 108 Wash. App. 388, 393, 30 P.3d 529 (2001), aff’d on other grounds, 149 Wash.2d 29, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003) ). "If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction." Cole v. Harveyland, LLC, 163 Wash. App. 199, 209, 258 P.3d 70 (2011).

¶9 The original subject matter jurisdiction of Washington’s superior courts is set forth in the Washington Constitution:

The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to three thousand dollars or as otherwise determined by law, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and other inferior courts, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; of actions of forcible entry and detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; of all matters of probate, of divorce, and for annulment of marriage; and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; and said court shall have the power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor.

CONST . art. IV, § 6.

¶10 Our Supreme Court has explained that the original subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court is comprised of both enumerated subject matter jurisdiction and residual subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Posey, 174 Wash.2d 131, 135-36, 272 P.3d 840 (2012). The enumerated original subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court includes

all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to three thousand dollars or as otherwise determined by law, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and other inferior courts, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; of actions of forcible entry and detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; of all matters of probate, of divorce, and for annulment of marriage; and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.

CONST . art. IV, § 6 ; see also Posey, 174 Wash.2d at 135, 272 P.3d 840.

¶11 In contrast to the specified categories of enumerated jurisdiction, the residual jurisdiction of the superior court broadly includes " ‘all cases and ... all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court.’ " Posey, 174 Wash.2d at 136, 272 P.3d 840 (quoting CONST . art. IV, § 6 ).

¶12 Enumerated and residual subject matter jurisdiction differ in both scope and in the manner in which that scope may be altered. As explained in Posey, enumerated original subject matter jurisdiction...