Boughton v. Price
Decision Date | 23 February 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 7603,7603 |
Parties | BOUGHTON v. PRICE, Secretary of State. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
W. F. McNaughton and Herbert S. Sanderson, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiff and petitioner.
Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., Boise, Donald A. Purdy, J. N. Leggat, and Don J. McClenahan, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.
E. B. Smith and Robert H. Copple, Boise, for Board of Com'rs of Idaho State Bar, as amicus curiae.
J. F. Martin, Boise, as amicus curiae.
Plaintiff initiated these original proceedings in this court by filing a petition denominated 'Petition for Declaratory Judgment In Mandamus.' By such petition, plaintiff alleges as follows:
'That defendant believes and holds petitioner disqualified for said office under and pursuant to Section 1-2007, I.C., notwithstanding Section 23 of Article 5 of the Idaho Constitution.
'Wherefore petitioner prays judgment that it be determined:
'(1) Whether petitioner will be eligible to serve as judge of the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District of Idaho for the term commencing January 1, 1951.
'(2) Whether petitioner is eligible as a candidate for said office.
'(3) Whether petitioner is entitled to have his candidacy certified upon full compliance with sections 34-702 and 34-703, I.C., and the facts of this case, pursuant to Section 34-704, I.C., notwithstanding he will be above seventy years of age.'
Defendant filed a general demurrer to such petition. The matter was set down for hearing and has been heretofore argued and presented in open court, and is now before us for decision.
Plaintiff seeks to have declared unconstitutional that portion of the judge's Retirement Act contained in Section 1-2007, I.C., Chapter 130, Session Laws of 1949, in so far as it provides that no person shall be eligible for appointment or election to the office of district judge after attaining the age of seventy years. Said Section 1-2007, I.C., now reads as follows:
Plaintiff contends that Section 1-2007, I.C., by adding an additional qualification for the office of district judge, is in conflict with Article V, Section 23, of the Idaho Constitution which reads as follows: 'No person shall be eligible to the office of district judge unless he be learned in the law, thirty years of age, and a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in the state or territory at least two years next preceding his election, nor unless he shall have been at the time of his election, an elector in the judicial district for which he is elected.'
Plaintiff does not contend that said Section 1-2007, I.C., is unconstitutional in so far as it is applicable to justices of the supreme court for whom no special qualifications are prescribed by the constitution.
At the outset, defendant urges, under his demurrer, that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings. An examination of the petition discloses that both in form and essence, these are proceedings in mandamus. The subject matter of the action involves the alleged duty of defendant, Secretary of State, to file plaintiff's declaration of candidacy. Section 7-302, I.C., provides that a writ of mandate may issue 'to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office * * *.'
In determining our jurisdiction to hear and determine this case, we are not concerned with whether the petition states a good cause of action, with whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for, or with whether we have power to render a declaratory judgment in a mandamus proceeding, or at all. We are only concerned with whether the action belong to that class of cases of which we have original jurisdiction.
This question is discussed in 15 C.J., pp. 734-735, par. 35, as follows: See, also, 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 35.
In Richardson v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, at page 494, 98 P. 842, 844, this court approved the following quotation from Brown on Jurisdiction, page 4: 'Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases, not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during the trial.'
The foregoing quotation was repeated and followed in Wayne v. Alspach, 20 Idaho 144, 116 P. 1033. It was likewise followed in Sizemore v....
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