Boulden v. Wood
| Decision Date | 16 January 1903 |
| Citation | 53 A. 911,96 Md. 332 |
| Parties | BOULDEN et ux. v. WOOD et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore city; Henry Stockbridge Judge.
Suit by Charles N. Boulden and wife against Laura J. Wood and others. Bill dismissed, and complainants appeal. Reversed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PAGE PEARCE, and JONES, JJ.
A Bernard Chancellor and Charles F. Stein, for appellants.
Taylor & Keech and J.P. Bruns, for appellees.
The bill in this case is filed by Charles N. Boulden and Emma V Boulden, his wife, against Laura J. Wood, widow of Samuel Wood, and her two infant children. The bill alleges that the plaintiffs, being the owners of a farm in Accomac county, Va., entered into a written contract with Samuel Wood, through his agent, Charles Morton, to exchange their farm in Virginia for certain leasehold property in Baltimore city. The agreement was made on the 19th of July, 1897, between Charles Morton, agent of Samuel Wood, of the city of Baltimore, on the one side, and Charles N. Boulden, of said city and state, on the other. Without reciting the agreement literally, it is sufficient to say that Boulden, the plaintiff, agrees to pay to Wood $1,800 in cash and convey to him his farm in Virginia in exchange for certain leasehold property owned by Wood in Baltimore city. In the agreement, after referring to the Virginia farm as being the same property that was conveyed to Boulden by St. George W. Teakle by deed dated April, 1895, and recorded, etc., this language is used: "Together with all the rights, & c., but subject nevertheless to the operation of a mortgage of one thousand dollars thereon." The properties which Wood agreed to convey to Boulden in exchange for the Virginia farm and $1,800 cash are described in the agreement as "all that property situated in the city of Baltimore known as Nos. 2610, 2612, 2614, 2616, 2618, West North avenue, subject to ground rents of $90 each, and also No. 1536 Riverside avenue, subject to a ground rent of $35." Subsequently Boulden and his wife executed and delivered to Wood a deed for the Virginia farm, and paid to him the stipulated amount of cash, less the proper allowances, and Wood on his part executed and delivered to Boulden and wife a deed for his leasehold property described in the written agreement. In the fifth paragraph of the bill the plaintiffs allege that, except for the understanding set forth in the written agreement with said Wood that he was to take the Virginia farm subject to the $1,000 mortgage, and without the plaintiffs being in any way liable to him to pay said mortgage or to indemnify and warrant him against any loss he might sustain by reason thereof, they would not have entered into the agreement aforesaid, for any other agreement would have been a very disadvantageous contract for them, and would have made them pay to Wood for his Baltimore properties a price far in excess of their value at the time of said transaction or since. In the sixth paragraph the plaintiffs allege that they were not aware at the time of the transfer that their deed omitted any reference to said mortgage, and only became aware of such omission recently, when threatened with suit by these defendants and the administrator of said Wood. It is alleged in the seventh paragraph of the bill that Wood never recorded the deed of the plaintiffs to him in his lifetime and it has not been recorded since his death, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs had no access to said deed and were unable to procure a copy thereof until the last few months, and that by reason of said deed not having been drawn in conformity with said agreement the plaintiffs are threatened with suit at law by these defendants, who claim large damages by reason of the general warranty contained in said deed, in spite of the fact that these defendants and said Wood's administrator are fully aware that the Virginia farm was sold to said Wood subject to said mortgage, as set forth in said written agreement of exchange and sale. Finally, it is alleged in the bill that Wood died intestate April 9, 1898, about eight months after the execution and delivery to him of said deed, leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin his widow, Laura J. Wood, and two infant children above named. The prayer is (1) that the defendants answer under oath, and bring the original deed from these plaintiffs to said Wood into court; (2) that the said deed may be reformed so as to be in conformity to the said written agreement; and (3) for general relief. Plaintiffs filed with their bill copies of their deed to Wood, of the mortgage of $1,000 referred to in the agreement, and of the deed from Wood to them of the Baltimore city property.
The defendants answered as required, under oath, and set up the deed of the Virginia land as a good and sufficient deed under the law of Virginia to convey the same in fee simple, with a covenant of general warranty; they aver that the written contract relied on by the plaintiffs is not the contract of the said Wood; that one Teakle, being the owner of the Virginia farm, conveyed it October 19, 1893, to one Susan Rogers by way of mortgage to secure the payment of $1,000, and that on the 19th of June, 1895, said Teakle and wife conveyed said Virginia land to the plaintiffs in fee simple, with covenant of general warranty, in consideration of $4,000; that the plaintiffs conveyed said land to Wood, with general warranty, in consideration of $3,500; that on the same day said Wood assigned to the plaintiffs his said leasehold property in Baltimore city in consideration of $6,800; that said Susan Rogers, the mortgagee named in said mortgage, on the 18th of August, 1897, instituted a chancery suit in the circuit court for Accomac county, Va., to foreclose said mortgage, and that a decree was subsequently passed, in accordance with which decree the said land was sold on the 28th of September, 1898, to one Charles E. Nicolls, which said sale was finally ratified and confirmed. The defendants deny all knowledge of the written contract and facts surrounding the exchange of properties made by the plaintiffs and said Wood, and aver that the deed from the plaintiffs represents the true intention of the parties. There are other allegations in the answer which we do not deem it necessary now to mention. The answer concludes with a motion to dismiss the bill for want of proper parties, and praying that it may be taken as a cross-bill, etc. The learned court below dismissed the bill, but, as no opinion was filed, we are not informed of the grounds of his conclusion.
We have thus fully set forth the allegations of the bill and answer because it appears to us there is nothing remaining to be done but to examine the testimony to ascertain whether the evidence sustains the allegations of the one or the other. The bill alleges clearly and fully that a mistake was made by the omission from the deed of the provision in regard to the mortgage. That this omission was a mutual mistake necessarily follows from the conceded facts. If the written contract is the contract of both parties, and this is clear beyond doubt from the testimony, then both parties intended that the Virginia land was to be conveyed to Wood subject to the mortgage. It is true that in their answer the defendants deny that this contract is the contract of Wood; but by the testimony of the witnesses Geissendaffer, ...
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