Boulding v. Slick

• Decision Date: 25 October 1932
• Docket Number: Case Number: 21202
• Citation: Boulding v. Slick, 161 Okla. 189, 17 P.2d 391, 1932 OK 694 (Okla. 1932)
• Parties: BOULDING et al. v. SLICK et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1932 OK 694

17 P.2d 391

161 Okla. 189

BOULDING et al. v. SLICK et al.

Case Number: 21202

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: October 25, 1932

Syllabus

¶0 1. Attorney and Client--Attorney's Lien Not Affected by Compromise Entered into by Client--Statutory Provision.

Under the provisions of section 4205, O. S. 1931 (section 4101, C. O. S. 1921), no compromise or settlement entered into by an attorney's client without the consent of the attorney shall affect or abrogate the attorney's lien provided for by the statutes of Oklahoma.

2. Same--Liability of Adverse Parties to Attorney for Fee Where They Compromise With Client--One of Adverse Parties not Joining in Compromise With Client Held not Liable for Fee.

By the provisions of section 4206, O. S. 1931 (section 4102, C. O. S. 1921), a party to any action or proposed action, whose interest is adverse to the client contracting with an attorney, who settles or compromises the cause of action or claim, becomes liable to such an attorney for the fee due him or to become due him under his contract of employment. The provisions of that section do not apply to a party to an action or proposed action, whose interest is adverse to the client contracting with an attorney, who does not settle or compromise the cause of action or claim, and such a party does not become liable to such an attorney for the fee due him or to become due him because of a settlement or compromise by some other party to the action or proposed action.

3. Same.

The fact that a settlement or compromise by a party to an action or proposed action whose interest is adverse to the client contracting with an attorney inures to the benefit of another party to the action or proposed action who did not settle or compromise the cause of action or claim, does not cause the second party to become liable for the fee due or to become due to the attorney under his contract of employment.

4. Same--Action by Attorney to Enforce Lien Against Adverse Party Compromising With Client Held Equitable Action.

An action by an attorney to enforce an attorney's lien against a party to an action or proposed action whose interest is adverse to the client contracting with the attorney, based on a compromise or settlement of litigation without notice to the attorney, is an equitable action.

5. Appeal and Error--Review--Sufficiency of Evidence in Equitable Action.

A judgment of a trial court in an equitable action on a disputed question of fact will not be set aside unless the judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence.

6. Same--Action by Attorneys to Enforce Lien Against Adverse Parties After Compromise by Client--Judgment in Favor of Certain Defendants not Participating in Compromise Sustained.

Record examined, and held: The judgment of the trial court on a disputed question of fact is not against the clear weight of the evidence.

Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Porter Newman, Assigned Judge.

Action by R. P. Boulding and others against T. B. Slick, J. Read Moore, E. L. Harris, trustee, and others. From judgment in favor of defendants named, the plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

J. J. Bruce and Bruce & Jefferson, for plaintiffs in error.

Grant & Grant, E. L. Harris, W. N. Stokes, and R. J. Roberts, for defendants in error.

ANDREWS, J.

¶1 The record shows that Perryman Cudjo and R. L. M. Blakemore and Robert Jones, his attorneys in fact, by written agreement in which they were the parties of the first part, employed one R. P. Boulding, an attorney, to prosecute a certain suit or action at law in their behalf to quiet title in them to certain real estate situated in Seminole county, Okla., and that they agreed to pay him all legitimate expenses of the suit and "allow" him "a sum equal to an undivided one-half of any and all sums recovered by virtue of the ownership of the parties of the first part in and to said lands," the consideration being elsewhere defined in the written contract as "A contingent fee of fifty (50%) per centum of money, proceeds, profits, royalties, and other equities that may be made for the said parties of the first part, as their interest may appear or be determined, whether by suit, compromise or otherwise. * * *" That contract was duly recorded.

¶2 Thereafter one T. B. Slick commenced an action in the district court of Seminole county against the said Perryman Cudjo, R. L. M. Blakemore, and Robert Jones for the purpose of quieting his title to certain oil rights in the same land, that cause being numbered 11889 on the dockets of the district court of Seminole county. Hereinafter it will be referred to as cause numbered 11889.

¶3 The plaintiffs in error herein appeared in cause numbered 11889 as attorneys for the defendants in that action and filed therein an answer to the allegations of the petition of the plaintiff therein. They also filed therein a cross-petition praying for the possession of the land and the quieting of the title thereto. The court in that cause, at the request of the cross-petitioners, by order made T. B. Slick, C. M. Beckett, E. L. Harris, trustee, A. E. Raiford, R. J. Koch, and J. Read Moore parties defendant to that cross-petition. The cross-petition was indorsed "Attorneys' Lien Claimed."

¶4 While that action was pending, the original defendants and cross-petitioners therein filed therein a dismissal of their cross-petition therein with prejudice and without notice thereof to, and without the consent of their attorneys. Thereafter judgment was rendered in that action in favor of T. B. Slick, the plaintiff therein, against the original defendants in that action.

¶5 Thereafter the plaintiffs in error herein, who were the attorneys of record for the original defendants in that action, instituted an action in the district court of Seminole county against T. B. Slick, C. M. Beckett, E. L. Harris, trustee, A. E. Raiford, R. J. Koch, and J. Read Moore for the recovery of the attorneys' fee provided by the contract between Perryman Cudjo and R. P. Boulding.

¶6 The cause was tried to the court and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in error herein and against the defendants C. M. Beckett, A. E. Raiford, and R. J. Koch, and against the plaintiffs in error herein and in favor of the defendants in error herein, T. B. Slick, J. Read Moore, and E. L. Harris, trustee. From that judgment, the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

¶7 The claim of the plaintiffs in error herein is based upon the provisions of section 4206, O. S. 1931 (section 4102, C. O. S. 1921), which is as follows:

"Should the party to any action or proposed action, whose interest is adverse to the client contracting with an attorney settle or compromise the cause of action or claim wherein is involved any lien, as mentioned in the preceding section thereof, such adverse party shall thereupon become liable to such attorney for the fee due him or to become due him under his contract of employment. * * *"

¶8 They contend that the trial court erred in refusing to render judgment in their favor against the defendants in error herein. In support of their contention they cite the decision of this court in Simpson v. Baker, 123 Okla. 118, 252 P. 834. The cited case is not controlling in the present case. The rule therein stated is applicable where a compromise and settlement is made between the parties, but it is not applicable in the absence of such a compromise and settlement between the parties. Neither is the decision of this court in Western States Oil & Land Co. v. Helms, 143 Okla. 206, 288 P. 964, controlling herein. In this case the decision of this court in Chowning v. Ledbetter, 86 Okla. 269, 208 P. 829, is applicable. Therein this court held:

"In a suit seeking to recover reasonable compensation for his services in a former suit by an attorney against several parties who were defendants in the former suit in which said attorney was employed, for the reason that said defendants had compromised and procured a dismissal of said suit with the attorney's client without notice to said attorney and without his consent, and, upon a trial of said cause, the undisputed evidence developed that three of the defendants had nothing to do with the settlement of said former suit, and the suit by said attorney was dismissed as to them, but judgment in favor of said plaintiff, attorney, for full compensation was procured against the defendant who negotiated the settlement and secured the dismissal of the suit, such dismissal of said defendants gave no ground for complaint or plea of error by such compromising defendant because of such dismissal nor by reason of the attorney securing judgment against the said compromising defendant for the full amount of the reasonable compensation for his services in the original suit; since, under section 249, Rev. Laws 1910, the party settling or compromising is the one who is liable to the attorney for the reasonable compensation for services performed in connection with said former action."

¶9 The facts in that case are similar to the facts in this case and should govern. Therein the facts show that a former suit had been brought by Ledbetter for Hickman against Chowning, the owner of the fee in the land, and Crosby, Little, and Harrison, who owned oil royalty and leases. The suit sought the cancellation of the deed from Hickman to Chowning and the lease claimed by Crosby, Little, and Harrison. The suit by Ledbetter against Chowning was based upon the claim that Hickman, who made a contract with Ledbetter, had made a compromise and settlement of the case with Chowning without consulting Ledbetter. The suit was dismissed as to Crosby and a verdict returned in favor of Little and Harrison, but judgment was entered against Chowning in favor of Ledbetter on the ground that Chowning was the only party who participated in the settlement which resulted in the dismissal...