Boulware v. Quiktrip Corp., A97A0434

• Decision Date: 09 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. A97A0434,A97A0434
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 1949 BOULWARE v. QUIKTRIP CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 662

486 S.E.2d 662

226 Ga.App. 399, 97 FCDR 1949

BOULWARE v. QUIKTRIP CORPORATION.

No. A97A0434.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 9, 1997.

McKinney & Salo, Jan McKinney, Norcross, for appellant.

Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Roger S. Sumrall, Heather R. Clark, Atlanta, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

Trudee L. Boulware appeals the trial court's grant of Quiktrip Corporation's motion for summary judgment in her action for psychological damages arising from a robbery at the Quiktrip store where she worked.

On November 26, 1992, while Boulware was working alone as an assistant manager at a Quiktrip store, three or four armed robbers entered the store, pointed sawed-off shotguns at Boulware and robbed the store. Boulware contends she has suffered severe emotional injuries after the robbery. Boulware deposed that she received a bruise on her back during the robbery when the robbers pushed her around. In addition to her claims of negligence, Boulware alleges in her complaint, the following: "After the armed robbery, [she] requested that she be moved to another position which would allow her to work without the fear of being the victim of another armed robbery. This request was denied and [Boulware] then requested that she be allowed to work on days so that she could work with less fear. The only solution offered by [Quiktrip] was for [Boulware] to take a cut in pay to a clerk's position, which she could not afford to do and support her minor child. Due to [Quiktrip's] failure to respond to [Boulware's] emotional trauma due to the armed robbery, [Boulware] was forced to resign."

Quiktrip contends that Boulware's action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See OCGA § 34-9-11(a). As this is an issue of law we review it de novo. See Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga.App. 874(1), 392 S.E.2d 535 (1990).

Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. OCGA § 34-9-11. "The words 'arising out of' mean that there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which she received. The causative danger must be incidental to the character of the employment, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. The injuries, however, need not arise from something peculiar to the employment but the injury is compensable if after the event it is apparent to the rational mind that there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the employment was performed and the resulting injury." (Punctuation omitted.) Macy's South v. Clark, 215 Ga.App. 661, 662-663(1), 452 S.E.2d 530 (1994). Furthermore, "[t]he legislature has expressly codified its intent that the Act be liberally construed to bring both employers and employees within the act. [OCGA § 34-9-23.]" Doss v. Food Lion, 267 Ga. 312(1), 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).

In her complaint, Boulware alleges that she has suffered severe emotional injuries proximately resulting from Quiktrip's negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work and in failing to allow her to change positions within the company. By her own allegations, Boulware's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. Boulware alleges a causal connection between the work she was required to perform and her injuries. Furthermore, "In McCormick v. Mark Heard Fuel Co., 183 Ga.App. 488(2), 359 S.E.2d 171 [ (1987) ], this Court applied the well-established rule that 'even if an employer's wilful failure to furnish a safe workplace for his employees results in an injury to those employees, their only recourse is under the Workers' Compensation Act.' There exists no legal basis compelling us to depart from this sage general rule." Zaytzeff v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 222 Ga.App. 48, 51, 473 S.E.2d 565 (1996). Therefore, Boulware's injuries fall within the purview of the Act, and her remedy, if any, lies exclusively under the provision of the Act. See Maxwell v. Hosp. Auth. of Dade, Walker, etc., 202 Ga.App. 92, 95, 413 S.E.2d 205 (1991).

Whether Boulware's injuries are compensable under the Act is not before us, and the answer to that issue is not dispositive of whether this action falls within the Act's exclusivity provision. "That an injury is not compensable under the act does not necessarily mean it is not...