Bourgeois v. Franklin

CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtCALOGERO; DIXON; DIXON
CitationBourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358 (La. 1980)
Decision Date06 October 1980
Docket NumberNo. 66034,66034
PartiesJean BOURGEOIS, Individually and on behalf of her son, Johnny Cullins, and Johnny Cullins, Individually v. H. J. FRANKLIN, Catherine C. Franklin, Jack Donnow, Melvin Ockman, National Phosphate Corporation, Link Belt Corporation, A B C Insurance Company, X Y Z Insurance Company and Aetna Casualty Insurance Company.

Herman M. Schroeder, John J. McCann, McCann & Volk, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.

Norman J. Pitre, Luling, Charles W. Dittmer, Jr., Wilson M. Montero, Jr., Martzell & Montero, John J. Weigel, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Esmond Phelps, II, Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, New Orleans, for defendants-respondents.

CALOGERO, Justice.

In a tort suit, where the attorneys for plaintiff and defendant, ostensibly with the assent of their respective clients, recite in open court the fact and amount of a compromise settlement without having reduced it to writing, may one of the parties thereafter enforce the settlement?

We granted writs here to review a Court of Appeal decision which held that defendants could enforce the settlement. 377 So.2d 1037 (La.1980).

We hold that what took place in this case was an attempt at compromise and that it was not effective because not in writing as required by Civil Code Article 3071.

Plaintiff, Johnny Cullins, brought suit against several defendants for injuries he suffered while working for Hooker Chemical Company. It seems that on plaintiff's first day at work, his left arm was caught in an unguarded conveyor belt and because of this injury plaintiff lost his entire arm. After a number of amended pleadings, substitutions of parties defendant and dismissals because of settlement, the case came to trial against National Phosphate Corporation, Beker Industries, certain National and Beker executive officers, Raymond Tilyou and Louis Kepfer, the insurers for the foregoing defendants. Ehrsam Company Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc., the manufacturer-designer of the conveyor belt, and its insurer.

During the second day of trial, plaintiff's counsel 1 recited in open court that he and counsel for National, Beker, the executive officers and their respective insurers had reached a compromise as to these defendants. The transcript of this proceeding is set forth in an appendix to this opinion. Thereafter, trial against these defendants did not proceed further, nor was any judgment oral or written then or thereafter rendered. 2 It is the question of the enforceability of this "settlement" which is presently before the Court.

Plaintiff contends that the compromise is unenforceable because it does not meet the codal requirement of La.Civ.Code art. 3071 that "the contract must be reduced to writing." Plaintiff further contends that the Court of Appeal erred in relying on Martin v. Holzer Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 376 So.2d 500 (La.1979) in granting defendants' motion. Finally, plaintiff contends that while his attorney may have agreed with defense attorneys on a settlement, he was confused as to what was taking place and did not himself acquiesce in the compromise.

La. Civil Code article 3071 provides:

"A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing."

"This contract must be reduced into writing." (Emphasis provided.)

While the statute itself does not provide for the consequences of failure to reduce a compromise agreement to writing, this Court has previously held that a compromise which is not reduced to writing is unenforceable. Jasmin v. Gafney, Inc., 357 So.2d 539 (La.1978).

In support of the contention that the compromise settlement is enforceable even though not in writing, defendants rely upon our recent decision in Martin v. Holzer, supra. Martin is distinguishable in several respects.

Martin was a workmen's compensation case in which, after lengthy discussion and apparent agreement in chambers (between the judge, plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney and defense counsel) the trial judge, in open court, recited an oral judgment into the record, fully and specifically assented to by the parties. 3 That oral judgment was followed by the court's written judgment. We viewed those proceedings as an in-court confession of judgment precluding an appeal under C.Civ.P. art. 2085.

It was argued in Martin that the statements made in open court simply amounted to a compromise and thus under La.Civ.Code art. 3071 must be in writing to be binding. The Court rejected that argument finding that what had transpired in open court was more than simply an agreement of compromise. It was, rather, a confession of judgment. In pointing to the distinctions between C.Civ.P. art. 2085, the confession of judgment provision, and La.Civ.Code art. 3071 concerning the writing requirements for settlements, the Court said, "this article (La.Civ.Code art. 3071) is placed in the code to insure proper proof of extrajudicial agreements and does not apply to a confession of judgment during proceedings in court." Of course the in-court memorialization by counsel of an agreement of settlement is nonetheless extrajudicial in the sense that judgment of the court is not invoked.

Because we find no confession of judgment in this case, but rather simply an agreement of compromise, 4 Martin and its holding are of no help to defendant. Martin is consistent with our findings here although distinguishable on the facts.

While the foregoing reasons alone prompt the result here, we deem worth noting certain other factors. In Martin the trial judge had a conversation with the interested parties, carefully recited the agreed upon statements in court and twice stopped to question the parties as to the accuracy of the agreement and the recited judgment. The trial judge in Martin was fully convinced that the parties understood what was taking place and acquiesced in the compromise and the agreed upon judgment and thereupon rendered the oral judgment followed by a written one. Here, the trial judge never conversed directly with the parties regarding this settlement, nor did he ever obtain a direct assent to the compromise from the plaintiff himself. The trial judge did not render an oral judgment based on the statements made by the attorneys and, rather than being convinced that the parties understood what was taking place and acquiesced in the compromise, to the contrary, he believed and so found upon ruling on the motion to enforce settlement, that the plaintiff did not understand the effect of his attorney's actions and was generally confused about the proceedings.

La.Civ.Code art. 3071 is placed in the code to insure proper proof of extrajudicial agreements. Martin v. Holzer, supra. Planiol also suggests that the writing is required as a means of proof. See Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, Volume 2, Part 2, § 2291. Inasmuch as there is no judgment on the merits outlining the obligations each party has to the other when a case is settled by the parties, the law has seen fit to require the compromise agreement, which sets out those obligations, to be reduced to writing to serve as proof of the agreement and the acquiescence therein. 5 The need for such a reduction to writing is nowhere more clearly seen than in the case at bar.

Plaintiff contends that he was confused as to what was transpiring between his attorney and the attorneys for the other parties. As stated above, these contentions are supported by the findings of the trial judge. Plaintiff further contends that he did not agree with his attorney to dismiss his claims against these defendants for the loss of his arm for only $10,000.00. The trial judge was unimpressed with these contentions stating that he thought there was a difference of opinion between plaintiff and his attorney as to the value of his claim. It is this very confusion over the compromise, its terms and the parties' acquiescence therein that La.Civ.Code art. 3071 sought to eliminate by requiring that a compromise be reduced to writing.

Decree

Because we find what transpired in this case to have been an agreement of compromise and not a confession of judgment, and because that agreement was not in writing, the Court of Appeal writ grant with an order compelling enforcement of the settlement is reversed, the motion dismissed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED; MOTION DISMISSED; REMANDED.

DIXON, C. J., dissents with reasons.

APPENDIX

"MR. PHELPS: Mr. Dittmer and I have reached an agreement among our parties that my client will pay $10,000.00 to Mr. Cullins in settlement of any claims he has against National Phosphate Corporation, Beker Industries, Hooker and any related companies and any of their employees and, particularly, Raymond Tilyou and Louis Kupfer, and Aetna Insurance Company. Now, in connection with any policy they have insuring those individuals ...

(REMARKS OFF RECORD)

The point of this settlement is that we do not want to have any additional lawsuits brought against one of our employees the same way that this amended petition was filed against Beker, Kupfer and Tilyou after dismissal of their employer, National Phosphate.

"MR. DITTMER: We agree that we will accept the sum of $10,000.00 in full settlement of anything against Beker Industries, Mr. Kupfer, Mr. Tilyou, their underwriters, and no further action will be taken against the aforementioned parties or against any employees of Beker Industries.

"MR. PHELPS: Well, Beker Industries did not own this plant at the time. It has to be National Phosphate Corporation and their employees. That's what we just agreed to in the hall ...

"MR. DITTMER: All right.

"MR. PHELPS: ... and that all those people are being released....

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34 cases
  • Parich v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 19, 1990
    ...requirement is to ensure proper proof of extra-judicial agreements; specifically, proof of acquiescence in the agreement. Bourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358 (La.1980). We acknowledge that this statutory requirement generally implies that the agreement be signed by both parties. Felder v. ......
  • 93-1644 La.App. 3 Cir. 11/16/94, Faulk v. Morvant
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana
    • November 16, 1994
    ...to be valid under LSA-C.C. art. 3071, each of the parties to the agreement must expressly indicate its intentions, Bourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358 (La.1980), personally or through an agent, Felder v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 405 So.2d 521, 524 (La.1981), whether at the same time and in t......
  • 94-1336 La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/95, Braun Welding Supply, Inc. v. Praxair, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana
    • April 5, 1995
    ...agreement to writing, this Court has previously held that a compromise which is not reduced to writing is unenforceable. Bourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358 (La.1980); Jasmin v. Gafney, Inc., 357 So.2d 539 (La.1978). Furthermore, we agree with plaintiff that the requirement that the agreem......
  • Breland v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., LOUISIANA-PACIFIC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • February 24, 1983
    ...and that application of state law might hamper the congressional scheme and policy involving Title VII).6 See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358 (La.1980); Jasmin v. Gafney, Inc., 357 So.2d 539 (La.1978); Martin v. Holzer Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 376 So.2d 500 (La.1979); Salling Wi......
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