Bourgeois v. Parish of St. Tammany, La.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-1364.
• Citation: 628 F. Supp. 159
• Parties: Marguerite Petz, wife of/and John G. BOURGEOIS, the Louisiana Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., a Louisiana Corporation v. PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, LOUISIANA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

628 F. Supp. 159

Marguerite Petz, wife of/and John G. BOURGEOIS, the Louisiana Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., a Louisiana Corporation v. PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, LOUISIANA.

Civ. A. No. 84-1364.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

February 18, 1986.

Thomas F. Daley, Law Offices of Thomas Daley, Metairie, La., for plaintiff.

Steven M. Lozes, Lozes, Cooper & Lozes, New Orleans, La., for defendant.

ORDER AND REASONS

CHARLES SCHWARTZ, Jr., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant, Parish of St. Tammany, for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims regarding violation of federal antitrust laws and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither party has addressed the plaintiffs' claims regarding federal preemption of the Parish's ordinance.

Upon a review of the memoranda, the depositions and the record in this matter, the Court finds that there exists an issue of material fact as to plaintiffs' claims for relief based on anti-trust violations. Accordingly, summary judgment as to these claims is DENIED.¹ However, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs' claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons which follow, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to their § 1983 claim is GRANTED; and the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims is DENIED.

Plaintiffs, John and Marguerite Bourgeois, bought a doublewide mobile home² from U.S. Mobile Homes in Slidell, Louisiana. This mobile home was towed to the Bourgeois' property on Berry Todd Road near Lacombe, Louisiana, and placed on a cement slab. The slab, although purchased separately, was also purchased from U.S. Mobile Homes. See Deposition of Marguerite Bourgeois, at pps. 7-8. The two halves of the home were joined together at that time. See Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts No. 2. Subsequent to the installation of the home, St. Tammany Parish denied Mr. and Mrs. Bourgeois a building permit to erect a garage as an attachment to the property in question. See Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts No. 6. Additionally, St. Tammany Parish filed suit No. 77687 in the 22nd Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana in an effort to enforce the zoning ordinance, excluding structures like that erected by the plaintiffs.³

The parties agree that the Bourgeois property is zoned "A-2" pursuant to the St. Tammany Parish Land Use Ordinance. See Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts No. 3; Plaintiffs' Statement of Uncontested Facts No. 4. St. Tammany Parish classifies "mobile homes" (homes towed to a site on their axles) as "trailers," which are not permitted in an "A-2" zone. However, the Parish does allow modular housing in "A-2" zones. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Uncontested Facts No. 5.

The parties have provided the Court with a copy of the Comprehensive Land Use Regulations, Zoning Ordinance No. 523 of St. Tammany Parish, as revised in November, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance"). Section 2.401 of the St. Tammany Parish Zoning Ordinance states that an "A-2 suburban district allows only the following uses of property ...; single family dwelling, municipal and non-profit recreational use; schools offering general education courses; churches; household agriculture; signs not exceeding twelve square feet in area pertaining to the rental, lease, or sale of the above shall be permitted on any lot; golf courses. All buildings shall be erected with a main floor level in compliance with the requirements set forth in Flood Ordinance No. 791. citation omitted." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Sections 2.401 and 2.402, provides that all uses not permitted by Section 2.4 are prohibited. St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance Section 2.402.

Part 9 of the St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance is entitled "Definitions." In Section 9.26, "Building" is defined as "a structure which is designated and suitable for the habitation or shelter of human beings or animals, or the shelter or storage of property, or for use in occupation for some purpose of trade or manufacture." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.26. Section 9.63 defines a single family dwelling as a "building designed for or occupied exclusively by one family." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.63. A "mobile home" is defined as "any vehicle or similar portable structure mounted or designed for mounting on wheels, used or intended for use for dwelling purposes, including structural additions, except parked and unoccupied camping-type trailers. Any such vehicle or structure shall be deemed to be a mobile home whether or not the wheels have been removed therefrom and whether or not resting upon a temporary or permanent foundation." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.147 emphasis added. Similarly, a "trailer" is defined as a "vehicle equipped for use as a dwelling and designed to be hauled along a highway. A trailer is not to be classified as a dwelling in this ordinance. A vehicle standing on wheels or rigid supports which is used for living or sleeping purposes." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.222 emphasis added.

In this case, we are confronted with the overlap of the above ordinance sections. The home in question, because it was moved to the property on wheels to which it was, at that time, attached, falls under the zoning ordinance definition of mobile home and trailer. See St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Sections 9.147 and 9.222; Deposition of Allen Cartier at pp. 12-14 (discussing the distinction between a "modular" and a "mobile" home).

The plaintiffs particularly focus their attack on the Ordinance on the distinction between modular homes, which the Parish considers permissible in an "A-2" zone, and mobile homes, which the Parish does not permit in an "A-2" zone. They also point out that St. Tammany Parish has no building ordinance. Accordingly, as the defendants readily admit, a tar shack and many other buildings of inferior construction to the home in question could be constructed on the instant property. See Deposition of Allen Cartier at page 29.

A local zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of police power unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare," Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1929). Cf. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.1975); Folsom Road Civic Assn. v. Parish of St. Tammany, 407 So.2d 1219 (La.1981). Proper state purposes under the police power may encompass the goals not only of abating undesireable conditions, i.e., nuisances, but also of fostering the ends which a community deems worthy. Maher v. City of New Orleans, supra, 516 F.2d at 1060. It is also clear that the police power covers aesthetic as well as safety and health concerns. See Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.1971); Mayer, supra; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 at 32-33, 75 S.Ct. 98 at 102, 79 L.Ed. 27. Accordingly, the courts are to give extreme deference to legislative determinations of community needs and solutions, Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d at 1060, and a plaintiff is to bear a heavy burden to show that an ordinance is invalid. Id. Additionally, where the legislative determination is "fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Euclid, supra, 272 U.S. at 388, 47 S.Ct. at 118; Stone, supra; Maher, supra.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, even though a zoning ordinance is presumptively valid, if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, it can be invalidated as violative of the fourteenth amendment. See Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 489 A.2d 600 (N.H. 1985); Luczynski v. Temple, 203 N.J.Super. 377, 497 A.2d 211 (N.J.1985); Tyrone v. Crouch 129 Mich.App. 388, 341 N.W.2d 218 (1983). The equal protection clause requires that "the classifications drawn in a statute be reasonable in light of its purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964); E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1153 (5th Cir.1970).

The instant ordinance declares its purposes to be "promoting the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the Parish...." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance at p. 1. It also declares that considerations underlying the ordinance are "among other things ... the character of the districts and their peculiar suitability for particular uses, with a view toward conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the Parish". Id.

We are confronted here with a very narrow legislative distinction. The zoning ordinance in question distinguishes a "structure mounted or designed for mounting on wheels, used or intended for use for dwelling purposes ... whether or not the wheels have been removed therefrom and whether or not resting upon a temporary or permanent foundation" (see St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.147) from any other structure to be used as a dwelling. Sitebuilt and pre-fabricated modular housing transported to a site on a truck or other conveyance other than its own axles or wheels are defined as a dwelling, and are distinguished from a "trailer." St. Tammany Zoning Ordinance, Section 9.222 ("A trailer is not to be classified as a dwelling in this ordinance."). The question, therefore, is whether or not this classification or distinction is reasonable in light of the purpose of the ordinance.

Apparently, the Parish concedes that this ordinance does not serve any health or safety purpose. This is evidenced not only by the failure of St. Tammany Parish Director of the Department of Development, Mr. Allen Cartier, to articulate a health or safety reason for the ordinance, see Deposition of...