Bourque v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 78-3350
| Decision Date | 06 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-3350,78-3350 |
| Citation | 623 F.2d 351 |
| Parties | 6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 530 Danny BOURQUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIAMOND M. DRILLING COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar. * |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Jarrell E. Godfrey, Jr., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Christopher B. Siegrist, Houma, La., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before HILL, GARZA and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Appellant brought this suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, and the general maritime law, seeking to recover damages from his former employer, Diamond M. Drilling Co., for injuries to his ankle, knee and leg. The injuries are alleged to have occurred while appellant was working as a roughneck on a drilling rig owned and operated by Diamond M. While attempting to connect two drilling pipes, appellant was struck on the right ankle by a slip, a mechanism used to hold one pipe in place while another is being attached. Appellant was treated at a local hospital for a bruised ankle and released. A few weeks later, appellant left Diamond M and went to work for J & L Engineering Co. Shortly thereafter, while working for J & L, appellant stooped down and felt his right knee pop. The next day, while at home, appellant got up from his chair to adjust his television and the knee locked in place. Surgery revealed three problems in the knee area: chondromalacia, a tear of the medial meniscus, and osteoarthritic changes.
At trial, appellant attempted to prove that when he was struck on the ankle by the slip the force of the blow caused his knee to twist. Some of his knee problems were alleged to be a direct result of the blow. It also was alleged that the accident aggravated a condition in the knee that had begun to develop after appellant was struck by a two-by-four 7 years earlier. Diamond M's defense was that appellant's knee problems all were attributable to the stooping incident at J & L and the incident involving the two-by-four.
At the close of the evidence the case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). The verdict was as follows:
1. Was there any negligence on the part of Diamond M Drilling Co. which played any part in bringing about plaintiff's injuries?
Yes _X_ No ___
2. Was there any unseaworthiness of Diamond M Drilling Rig 29 which was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?
Yes _X_ No ___
If your answers to both of the above questions are "No" immediately date and sign this form without answering further questions and return to the courtroom. If your answer to either or both of the above questions is "Yes" continue on to the next question.
3. Was there any negligence of the plaintiff which was a proximate cause of his injuries?
Yes _X_ No ___
If your answer to question three is "No" go on to question five, skipping question four. If your answer to question three is "Yes" go on to question four.
4. By what percentage did the plaintiff's negligence contribute to his injury?
_80%_
5. What amount of damages, if any, expressed in dollars and including interest if any, did the plaintiff sustain?
$_000____none
Appealing from the denial of his motion for a new trial, appellant's primary contention is that the jury's answers to the special interrogatories are so inconsistent that a new trial is required. We agree.
The right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment requires us "to reconcile apparently conflicting answers if at all possible and thus validate the verdict." Guidry v. Kem, 598 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1979). If, after careful consideration, the answers cannot be reconciled, a new trial must be ordered. Willard v. The John Hayward, 577 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1978).
Here, the jury found that Diamond M's negligence and the unseaworthiness of the rig both contributed to appellant's injuries. Although appellant's own negligence contributed only 80% to his injuries, no damages were found to have been sustained and none were awarded. Diamond M contends that the jury must have found no connection between the accident and appellant's knee problems, and that appellant suffered no damages as a result of the ankle injury. Even if we were to accept the first part of Diamond M's explanation and, in effect, rewrite interrogatories 1 and 2 to read "plaintiff's ankle injuries" instead of "plaintiff's injuries," the verdict could not stand. Appellant was treated at the local hospital for a bruised ankle and was on crutches for 1 week after the accident. It would strain logic to assume that this injury caused him no pain and suffering. Even Diamond M's counsel apparently conceded that much in his closing argument to the jury:
But, if you find that we were at fault and that's your decision, then the man should be given something for the injury to his foot.
Record, Tr., Vol. I, at 65-66.
Nor can we assume that the jury believed that the ankle injury was the result of a prior accident. There was no dispute at the trial as to whether appellant was struck on the ankle while working on Diamond M's rig. Diamond M made no attempt to prove that the ankle injury was attributable to any accident other than the one upon which appellant based this suit.
Finding no explanation for the inconsistencies in the jury's answers, we hold that the district court erred in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
We address one further issue raised by appellant, likely to arise on retrial. Diamond M was permitted to introduce evidence tending to show that appellant received workman's compensation benefits while employed at J & L. The evidence was provided by Judy Centenio, an employee of J & L's...
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