Boutte v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv.

• Decision Date: 11 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-C-2402.,99-C-2402.
• Citation: 759 So.2d 45
• Parties: Daniel J. BOUTTE and his wife, Sandra Boutte, Individually, and on Behalf of their minor child, Sandi Boutte, and his sons, Daniel J. Boutte, Jr. and Ernest Mamolo, III v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1, d/b/a West Jefferson General Hospital, Charity Hospital in New Orleans, Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital, Hotel Dieu Hospital and Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc., d/b/a Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, St. Louis, U.S.A.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

759 So.2d 45

Daniel J. BOUTTE and his wife, Sandra Boutte, Individually, and on Behalf of their minor child, Sandi Boutte, and his sons, Daniel J. Boutte, Jr. and Ernest Mamolo, III v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1, d/b/a West Jefferson General Hospital, Charity Hospital in New Orleans, Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital, Hotel Dieu Hospital and Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc., d/b/a Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, St. Louis, U.S.A.

No. 99-C-2402.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 11, 2000.

Frederick William Bradley, Oreck, Bradley, Crighton, Adams & Chase, New Orleans; Counsel for Applicant.

Chester Arthur Fleming, III, Fleming & Rosamond, Metairie; Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Jude David Bourque, Baton Rouge, Antonio Edward Papale, Jr., Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, Metairie; Michael Charles Luquet, Baton Rouge, Peter J. Butler, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, New Orleans; Steve M. Sikich, Pitre, Halley & Sikich, Lake Charles; Anthony S. Cox, Caron, McCormick, Constants & Wilson; John Elliott Baker, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Respondent.

Erick Yukihiko Miyagi, Baton Rouge, Thomas MacDougall Womack, Counsel for Our Lady of the Lake Hospital Inc. (Amicus Curiae).

Peter T. Dazzio, Chris James LeBlanc, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Louisiana Hospital Association (Amicus Curiae).

Cornell Rushing Flournoy, John Layne Hammons, Shreveport, Counsel for John Hammons (Amicus Curiae).

MARCUS, Justice.¹

Daniel Boutte received blood transfusions at Hotel Dieu Hospital (hereinafter "Hotel Dieu") in December 1981 and January 1982. Fourteen years later Boutte was diagnosed with hepatitis C virus. He was told that his disease might have been caused by blood received during transfusions performed on him while a patient at Hotel Dieu and other hospitals, if the blood used was defective (contaminated with the hepatitis virus). Within a year of diagnosis, Boutte filed suit in July, 1996² against several hospitals where he received blood transfusions over the years, including Hotel Dieu.³

Hotel Dieu filed an exception of prescription, relying on the periods of limitation set forth in La. R.S. 9:5628. This statute precludes recovery for medical malpractice claims filed more than three years after the alleged wrongful act, omission, or neglect. Plaintiffs responded, arguing that this special statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice cases does not apply to strict liability claims and that their claims were timely filed within one year of discovery and diagnosis of hepatitis C pursuant to the general prescription articles for delictual actions and the judicially created exception, contra non valentum.⁴

The trial judge granted defendant's exception of prescription and dismissed plaintiffs' suit. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with plaintiffs that strict liability claims are not governed by La. R.S. 9:5628. It remanded the case for a trial on the merits.⁵ Upon application of defendant, we granted certiorari to consider the correctness of that decision.⁶

The issue before us for review is whether the plaintiffs' strict liability claims arising out of blood transfusions performed at Hotel Dieu in 1981 and 1982 are governed by La. R.S. 9:5628.

The Medical Malpractice Act (hereinafter sometimes "MMA") was enacted by the legislature in 1975.⁷ It dictates the terms and conditions under which patients can pursue actions against private health care providers covered under the Act and limits the recovery available for covered claims. In 1976 the definition of malpractice in the MMA was revised to expressly cover the responsibility of health care providers arising from the use of certain types of defective things in the course of patient care. At the time of the transfusions in question, the Medical Malpractice Act defined malpractice as follows:

"Malpractice" means any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from defects in blood... implanted in ... a patient. [Emphasis added].⁸

In our view, the Act at all relevant times encompassed all legal theories of liability asserted against a private hospital for damage arising from defects in blood provided to patients by transfusion, including claims based on strict liability.⁹ Accordingly, we conclude that at least as of the time of the transfusions at issue here, plaintiffs' claims constituted medical malpractice claims covered by the Act. Indeed, plaintiffs have conceded in oral argument that their strict liability claims are malpractice claims governed by the provisions within the Medical Malpractice Act itself. But having done so, they nevertheless argue that the provisions of La. R.S. 9:5628 do not govern the periods of limitation for this particular species of medical malpractice claim founded on a theory of strict liability. We do not agree.

Rules governing the applicable periods of limitation for actions resulting in injury to persons or property are usually found in the Civil Code or ancillaries to the Civil Code, rather than within the statutes providing the substantive circumstances and conditions under which recovery may be granted. These rules govern the categories of actions addressed, even though the substantive law describing and defining particular claims for relief may be altered from time to time by legislative action or judicial interpretation. It is axiomatic that a determination of the proper prescriptive period to be applied in a case depends on the nature of the cause of action asserted. Roger v. Dufrene, 613 So.2d 947 (La.1993); Starns v. Emmons, 538 So.2d 275 (La. 1989). As previously noted, plaintiffs' claim is in the nature of a medical malpractice claim, regardless of the underlying legal theory (strict liability) used to support the claim. Thus, we look to the particular prescriptive period governing that type of action.¹⁰

At all times relevant to this litigation La. R.S. 9:5628 provided:

§ 5628 Actions for medical malpractice

No action for damages for injury or death against any ... hospital ... whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of the discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect.¹¹ [Emphasis added].

While the word "malpractice" is not found within the text of the Act, we have held on numerous occasions that La. R.S. 9:5628 is a special provision designed to cover medical malpractice claims. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305 (La.1986); Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So.2d 717 (La.1986). It was enacted in 1975 in the same session of the legislature that enacted the Medical Malpractice Act. The preamble to La. R.S. 9:5628 as originally enacted stipulates that it was added to provide for a maximum prescriptive period and abandonment with respect to "medical malpractice claims."¹² The statute has been amended from time to time to expand the class of defendants and claimants governed by the limitation periods. Preambles to amendments have continued to recite that the prescriptive period is relative to actions for "medical malpractice."¹³ It is clear that La R.S. 9:5628 was intended by the legislature to govern "medical malpractice claims." The title and preamble to La. R.S. 9:5628 may properly be consulted to confirm that intent. Matter of American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 93-3163 (La.9/15/94), 642 So.2d 1258; Green v. Louisiana Underwriters Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 610 (La.1990).

La. R.S. 9:5628 is a prescription statute with one qualification, that is, that the contra non valentum type of exception to prescription embodied in the discovery rule is expressly made inapplicable after three years from the alleged injury causing act, omission or neglect. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305 (La.1986); Hebert v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 486 So.2d 717 (La. 1986). If plaintiffs' claims are governed by La. R.S. 9:5628, they are time barred because filed more than three years after the transfusions at issue.

It is undisputed that the gravamen of plaintiffs' claims is that Daniel Boutte suffered injury as a consequence of implantation of defective blood during transfusions performed while he was a patient at Hotel Dieu. Those transfusions were performed after the 1976 amendments to the Medical Malpractice Act. It is also clear that Hotel Dieu is a private hospital covered under the Act.¹⁴ As a consequence, plaintiffs must bring their claims, if at all, as medical malpractice claims. They do not have the option of disregarding the Act where it appears beneficial to do so. They are likewise bound by the special periods of limitation that govern the particular type of cause of action they have asserted. Since plaintiffs' claims were filed more than three years after the transfusions at issue, they are prescribed. La. R.S. 9:5628.

Plaintiffs argue that our decisions in Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found. Hosp. & Clinic, 470 So.2d 878 (La.1985) and Branch v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 92-3086 (La.4/28/94), 636 So.2d 211, dictate a contrary result. That is not the case. In Faucheaux, we held that once a plaintiff acquires a vested strict liability action arising out of receipt of allegedly tainted blood, he cannot be deprived of that right by subsequently enacted legislation. Our decision in Faucheaux did not address the issues presented here, i.e., whether the plaintiffs' strict liability...