Bovat v. Vermont
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1301,19-1301 |
| Citation | 208 L.Ed.2d 240,141 S.Ct. 22 (Mem) |
| Parties | Clyde S. BOVAT v. VERMONT |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice KAGAN join, respecting the denial of certiorari.
The "knock and talk" is an increasingly popular law enforcement tool, and it's easy to see why. All an officer has to do is approach a home's front door, knock, and win the homeowner's consent to a search. Because everything is done with permission, there's usually no need to bother with a warrant, or worry whether exigent circumstances might forgive one's absence. After all, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, and consensual searches are rarely that.
But with the rise of the knock and talk have come more and more cases testing the boundaries of the consent on which they depend. Sometimes, officers appear with overbearing force or otherwise seek to suggest that a homeowner has no choice but to cooperate. Other times, officers fail to head directly to the front door to speak with the homeowner, choosing to wander the property first to search for whatever they can find.
This Court addressed the second sort of problem in Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). There, the Court recognized that a home's "curtilage," the area immediately surrounding it, is protected by the Fourth Amendment much like the home itself. Id., at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409. So, to comply with the Constitution, law enforcement agents not only need a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent to enter a home, they usually need one of those things to reach the home's front door in the first place. After surveying the Fourth Amendment's original meaning and history, Jardines acknowledged that a doorbell or knocker on the front door often signals a homeowner's consent allowing visitors to "approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave." Id., at 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409. The Court recognized, too, that law enforcement agents, like everyone else, may take up this "implied license" to approach. But, the Court stressed, officers may not abuse the limited scope of this license by snooping around the premises on their way to the front door. Whether done by a private person or a law enforcement agent, that kind of conduct is an unlawful trespass—and, when conducted by the government, it amounts to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On this much, the Court unanimously agreed. See id., at 19, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (); id., at 20, 133 S.Ct. 1409 ().
It's hard to see how the case before us could have been decided without reference to Jardines . Suspecting Clyde Bovat of unlawfully hunting a deer at night (Vermont calls it a "deer jacking"), game wardens decided to pay him a visit to—in their words—"investigate further." But the wardens admit that "pretty soon after arriving " they focused on a window in Mr. Bovat's detached garage. Heading there and peering inside, the wardens spotted what they thought could be deer hair on the tailgate of a parked truck.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.
Nor, apparently, was this detour a brief one. According to Mr. Bovat's wife, the wardens lingered on the property for perhaps fifteen minutes and never even made it to the front door. Instead, after watching from inside, she finally decided to go out to speak with the wardens—and it was only then they finally sought consent for a search. Mrs. Bovat refused the request, but by that point, of course, the whole exercise of seeking consent was pointless—the wardens had all they needed, forget about any knock or talk. They left the property only to return promptly with a search warrant premised on what they had seen through the garage window.
For reasons that remain unclear, the Vermont Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of the wardens’ conduct without mentioning Jardines . Instead, the court held that the officers’ initial visit and search of the property was perfectly...
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State v. Calabrese
...Court in a statement accompanying its denial of the Bovat defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Bovat v. Vermont, 592 U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 22, 208 L.Ed.2d 240 (2020) (mem.); State v. Bovat, 2019 VT 81, ¶ 16, 211 Vt. 301, 224 A.3d 103. Defendant also argues that two factors differe......
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Lozano v. Doe
...("[W]e and other courts have struggled to define the contours of an appropriate knock and announce."); Bovat v. Vermont, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 22, 22, 208 L.Ed.2d 240 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement respecting cert. denial) ("[W]ith the rise of the knock and talk have come more and more ......
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State v. Calabrese
...States Supreme Court in a statement accompanying its denial of the Bovat defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Bovat v. Vermont, 592 U.S., 141 S.Ct. 22 (mem.); State v. Bovat, 2019 VT 81, ¶ 16, Vt. 301, 224 A.3d 103. Defendant also argues that two factors differentiate this case fr......
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State v. Calabrese
...noted that under Jardines, "there exist no 'semiprivate areas' within the curtilage where governmental agents may roam from edge to edge." Id. at___, 141 S.Ct. at 24. The State argues the Justices' statement was predicated on a misunderstanding of the record in Bovat, noting that its descri......
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When Can the Police Lie? The Limits of Law Enforcement Officers' Use of Deception in Obtaining Consent to Search a Home.
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