Bowater Carolina Co., a Div. of Bowater, Inc. v. Rock Hill Local Union No. 1924, 925

• Decision Date: 04 April 1989
• Docket Number: D,No. 88-3879,AFL-CI,No. 925,925,88-3879
• Citation: 871 F.2d 23
• Parties: 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3092, 111 Lab.Cas. P 11,061 BOWATER CAROLINA COMPANY, A DIVISION OF BOWATER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCK HILL LOCAL UNION NO. 1924; Catawba Maintenance Local Union; United Paperworkers International Union,efendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 23

871 F.2d 23

130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3092, 111 Lab.Cas. P 11,061

BOWATER CAROLINA COMPANY, A DIVISION OF BOWATER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCK HILL LOCAL UNION NO. 1924; Catawba Maintenance Local

Union No. 925; United Paperworkers International

Union, AFL-CIO, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-3879.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 11, 1989.

Decided April 4, 1989.

Hamlett Sam Mabry, III, Orville Gilbert Calhoun, Jr. (Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, Greenville, S.C., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Jay Joseph Levit, Richmond, Va. (Michael Hamilton, United Paperworkers Intern. Union, Nashville, Tenn., Tony M. Jones, Rock Hill, S.C., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

Bowater Carolina Company, a division of Bowater, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Rock Hill Local Union No. 1924, Catawba Maintenance Local Union No. 925, and United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO ("the Union") in Bowater's action to vacate a labor arbitration award on the grounds that the award exceeded the scope of the issues submitted to the arbitrator. We reverse.

The underlying arbitration involved John Truesdale, a Bowater millwright and a member of the Union, who suffered an on-the-job injury to his back on August 18, 1986, while working in Bowater's plant in Catawba, South Carolina. After referral to a physician, he was assigned to light duty but then was admitted to a hospital. He returned to work under medical restrictions on November 10, 1986, but again left work on January 2, 1987. Bowater thereafter refused to permit him to return to work, claiming that his physical condition presented an undue risk that he would reinjure himself.

Article VIII of the collective-bargaining agreement between Bowater and the Union outlines a five-step procedure for a resolution of employment grievances--four grievance steps and arbitration. After Bowater refused to permit Truesdale to return to work, the Union submitted a grievance that proceeded through the four steps of grievance without resolution. It was submitted to arbitration. Bowater and the Union jointly framed the arbitration issue: "Did the company violate Article XVIII of the current labor agreement by not allowing Grievant to return to work? If so, what shall the remedy be?"

Article VXIII of the collective-bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part:

An employee who is absent due to nonindustrial sickness and/or injury for twenty-one (21) days or more, or an employee who has been absent because of major surgery, back problems, concussion and the like is expected to provide the Company, at least four (4) days in advance of his/her planned return-to-work date, with a written statement from physician of his/her choice who is licensed to practice medicine. This statement is to be in response to a form letter and partial job description the employee is to obtain from the Industrial Relations Department and furnish to his/her physician. An employee absent less than twenty-one (21) days due to nonindustrial sickness and/or injury is expected to give the Company as much advance notice of their planned return-to-work date as possible, but not less notice than that defined in Article IX--Hours of Work. An employee absent seven (7) to twenty-one (21) days due to nonindustrial sickness and/or injury may be required to provide a physician's statement as provided above. The Company will rely upon the statement from the employee's physician, if required, in deciding whether or not to permit a return to work.

During the grievance steps and in arbitration, Bowater took the position that Truesdale suffered an industrial injury and that Article XVIII did not apply to him because it covers only nonindustrial accidents. Bowater further reasoned that it had the prerogative of requiring additional medical evidence in cases involving on-the-job injuries to determine whether injured employees were sufficiently recovered to return to work. The Union contended that Article XVIII covered Truesdale's back injury and required Bowater to permit Truesdale to return to work when he presented a written statement from a physician as specified in the Article's provisions. ^*

The arbitrator ruled that Bowater did not violate Article XVIII because it "applies only to nonindustrial and not industrial sickness or accident." He then stated: "That would appear to answer the issue framed by the parties but leaves the situation without a solution.... It appears, therefore, that the present dispute can only be finally resolved by determining whether there was cause to deny Grievant the right to return to work as a millwright." After reviewing the medical evidence, the arbitrator decided that Truesdale was able to return to work and ordered Bowater to reinstate Truesdale with seniority and back pay. In reaching that conclusion, he found that Bowater failed "to sustain its burden of proof that Grievant was not capable of performing his job duties as a millwright."

Bowater argues on appeal that the medical evidence relating to Truesdale's ability to return to work was submitted only as a contingent response to a possible arbitral finding that Article XVIII applied to industrial injuries. It urges that it presented the medical evidence to prove that Truesdale failed to establish his right to return to work according to the provisions of Article XVIII. It...