Bowen v. Entzel
| Decision Date | 27 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No.: 5:19CV202 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | EDWARD O'NEAL BOWEN, Petitioner, v. F. ENTZEL, Respondent. |
(JUDGE BAILEY)
This matter is assigned to the Honorable John Preston Bailey, United States District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned for submission of a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR PL P 2. For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the presiding District Judge DISMISS this civil action.
On June 21, 2019, the Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. On July 19, 2019, the Petitioner paid the five dollar filing fee. ECF No. 10. On October 8, 2019, the undersigned ordered the Respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted. ECF No. 12.
On November 5, 2019, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgement together with a memorandum in support. ECF Nos. 15 & 16. A Roseboro Notice was issued to the Petitioner by the undersigned on November 5, 2019, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F. 2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975), instructing Petitioner of his right to file a response to Respondent's Motion and Memorandum. ECF No. 17. On December 20, 2019, the Respondent resent the Petitioner a copy of his Motion and Memorandum. ECF No. 20. A second Roseboro Notice was issued on December 30, 2019. ECF No. 21. On January 3, 2019, the Petitioner filed his opposition to the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 23], and on January 17, 2020, the Respondent filed a Reply. ECF No. 25.
The Petitioner was arrested by Michigan state authorities in Kalamazoo County for a state parole warrant on August 18, 2014. On February 9, 2015, the Petitioner was borrowed on a federal Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum. ECF No. 16-1 at p. 9. On April 5, 2016, the Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to a 181 month term of confinement for Credit Union Bribery and Brandishing a Firearm during a Credit Union Robbery. ECF No. 16-1 at pp. 15-16. After the federal sentence was imposed, the Petitioner was returned to state custody on April 8, 2016 to complete the State sentence. ECF No. 16-1 at p. 5.The judgment in his federal criminal case was silent regarding any relationship with the State sentence. On November 2, 2016, the Petitioner paroled from his Michigan sentence to the exclusive custody of the United States Marshals Service to commence his federal sentence. Id.
On January 21, 2017, the Petitioner requested a credit for time spent serving the State sentence. In response to this request, in accordance with Program Statement 5160.05, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan was contacted for a position regarding a retroactive designation. The District Court did nottake a position regarding a retroactive designation and advised that the BOP should calculate the Petitioner's federal sentence under the BOP rules and the policies normally applied. On April 24, 2017, the BOP determined that a retroactive concurrent designation was not appropriate. The Petitioner's current release date via good conduct time is December 22, 2029. ECF No. 16-1 at p. 33.
The Petitioner alleges that the BOP has unlawfully computed his sentence by failing to award him any credit towards service of his term of imprisonment for any time spent in official federal detention prior to the date his sentence commenced as prescribed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584(a) and 3583(b). For relief, the Petitioner requests that this Court order/grant credit for time spent in federal custody from February 9, 2015 to May 15, 2016 and from November 2, 2016 to December 19, 2016 for a total of eighty-three days.
In response to Petitioner's claims, the Respondent argues that the BOP has the exclusive authority to compute a federal prison sentence, and this habeas petition lacks merit because the BOP properly calculated the Petitioner's federal sentence. More specifically, the Respondent argues that the Petitioner's federal sentence did not begin when federal authorities borrowed him from state custody pursuant to a federal writ. In addition, the Respondent argues that the Petitioner received credit from November 2, 2016 to December 19, 2016 for the time spent in transit after being paroled from state custody and before he arrived in BOP custody.
The Petitioner argues that in response to a letter from the BOP regarding a nunc pro tunc designation, the sentencing court indicated that it doubted whether the court had any power to affect the designation decision of the BOP. The Petitioner argues that this response is perplexing because the BOP's specifically noted that if the sentencing court indicated that the Petitioner's federal sentence should run concurrently to his state sentence, the BOP would commence his sentence on the date of imposition. The Petitioner concludes that he is entitled to time spent in official federal custody as prescribed by § 3585(b) from February 9, 2015 to May 15, 2016.
The Respondent notes that Petitioner is no longer seeking credit for time served between November 2, 2016 and December 19, 2016, as he has been given credit for this time. The Respondent further alleges that in addressing correspondence from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the Petitioner conveniently overlooks the portion of the March 21, 2017 correspondence which reads as follows: "In any event, I believe the BOP should calculate the time of Defendant's federal sentence in this case, including any potential impact of the state custodial time, under the rules and policies the BOP normally applies." ECF No. 16-1 at p. 28.
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4thCir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require "only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Courts long have cited the "rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [a] claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court noted that a complaint need not assert "detailed factual allegations," but must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Thus, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Id. (citations omitted), to one that is "plausible on its face," Id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable," Id. Therefore, for a complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). In so doing, the complaint must meet a "plausibility" standard, instituted by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,where it held that "a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must offer more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" in order to meet the plausibility standard and survive dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized the appropriateness of summary judgment motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80 (1977); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1991).
Motions for summary judgment impose a difficult standard on the moving party because it must be obvious that no rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990). However, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Where, however, the record taken as awhole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find...
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