Bowen v. Harper
Decision Date | 24 November 1899 |
Citation | 59 P. 179,6 Idaho 654 |
Parties | BOWEN v. HARPER |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
SERVICE OF SUMMONS OUT OF THE STATE-DEFAULT-VOID JUDGMENT.-When after order for publication of summons against an absent defendant has been duly made, the summons is personally served on such absent defendant out of the state, such service does not become complete until the expiration of the time prescribed in the order for publication; and where such order prescribed one month for such publication, as in the case at bar, the defendant served out of the state has one month and forty days in which to answer and a default judgment entered against him during said time is void and will be reversed on appeal.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from District Court, Elmore County.
Reversed and remanded. Costs of appeal awarded to the appellant.
W. C Howie, for Appellant.
The default of John E. Harper in this cause was improperly entered. The service of the summons was not complete until one month after service on John E. Harper on March 21, 1898 and Harper had forty days after that to answer, or all of April 30th. (Rev. Stats., sec. 4146; Abrahams v. Mitchell, 8 Abb. Pr. 123; Fiske v. Anderson, 12 Abb. Pr. 8; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Buhmer, 49 N.Y. 84; Market Nat. Bank v. Pacific Nat. Bank, 89 N.Y. 397; Tomlinson v. Van Vechten, 6 How. Pr. 199; Grewell v. Henderson, 5 Cal. 465.) John E. Harper not being in default, a judgment against him by default is void. (Morton v. Morton, 16 Colo. 358, 27 P. 718; Gibson v. Smith, 1 Colo. 7; Grewell v. Henderson, 5 Cal. 465.)
Wyman & Wyman, for Respondent, cite no authorities on the point not decided by appellant's counsel.
The plaintiff commenced this action in the court below to foreclose a mortgage. Two of the defendants were served with summons in this state; one John E. Harper, the principal defendant, being absent. Order for publication of summons against said absent defendant, Harper, was duly made February 10, 1898. In lieu of publication of the summons, the plaintiff caused the summons and copy of complaint to be served upon said defendant, Harper, personally on the twenty-first day of February, 1898, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois. The default of said defendant, Harper, was entered by the clerk in the action on April 19, 1898. April 25, 1898, said defendant, Harper, filed a motion to set said default aside, upon the ground that the same was entered before the time of said defendant to answer had expired, and thereafter filed a demurrer to the complaint. On May 5, 1898, said motion came on to be heard, and was denied; and on the same day, on evidence heard on behalf of the plaintiff, the court entered its decree of foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff.
The principal question before us is, Was the default of the absent defendant prematurely entered? If so, the court below should have granted said defendant's motion to set the default aside, and its failure so to do was reversible error. The solution of this question depends upon the construction to be given to section 4146 of the Revised Statutes, which section is as follows: ...
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