Bower v. D'Onfro
| Decision Date | 28 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 12161,12161 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Amy BOWER et al. v. David D'ONFRO et al. |
Roger J. Frechette, with whom was Matthew E. Frechette, New Haven, for the appellants (defendant Bradley Ausmus et al.).
Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Susan M. Cormier, Hartford, and, on the brief, Anthony Nuzzo, Jr., Cheshire, and Tanya Feliciano, Certified Legal Intern, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Before LAVERY, HENNESSY and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.
The defendants Bradley D. Ausmus and Lin Ausmus appeal 1 from a judgment awarding money damages after a jury trial in an automobile negligence case. They claim that the trial court improperly (1) refused to permit testimony and evidence of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt on the basis of General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(4), (2) applied the collateral sources statute to this case, (3) awarded prejudgment interest under the offer of judgment statute, General Statutes § 52-192a, (4) excluded judicial and evidentiary admissions, (5) permitted evidence of racing, and (6) found that there was sufficient evidence of negligence by the defendant to have proximately caused the accident. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part.
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. The plaintiff Amy Bower was a passenger in a car owned and operated by David V. D'Onfro. They were traveling west on Higgins Road in Cheshire at a high rate of speed when D'Onfro lost control, veered off the road into woods and smashed into a tree. The plaintiff was thrown through the open window on the driver's side of the vehicle onto the middle of the highway. The defendant Bradley Ausmus was driving at a high rate of speed close behind the D'Onfro vehicle. As Ausmus came to the top of a hill, he braked suddenly, skidded into the plaintiff and dragged her sixty-eight feet.
At trial, the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(4), excluded any evidence that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt. Additional facts peculiar to each claim will be set forth in the discussion of each claim.
The defendants argue that the trial court's failure to permit evidence that the plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt deprived them of their constitutional rights. The defendants claim that because General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(4) bars the testimony and evidence of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt and because that failure impacts on the cause of the accident, on the plaintiff's negligence and on the defendant's negligence, the defendants were deprived of their constitutional rights to due process, to access to courts, to equal protection, against impermissible discrimination, and to a jury trial. We will address the constitutionality of § 14-100a(c)(4) both on its face and as applied in this case.
General Statutes § 14-100a(c)(4) provides: "Failure to wear a seat safety belt shall not be considered as contributory negligence nor shall such failure be admissible in any civil action."
We are bound by the principle that "[a] party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute 'bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality.' " State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn.App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 (1995). Also the defendant must show that § 14-100a(c)(4) adversely affects a constitutionality protected right. Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 569, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979). Courts exercise their power to declare a statute unconstitutional " 'with caution and in no doubtful cases.' " Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, 229 Conn. 312, 316, 640 A.2d 101 (1994). We uphold this statute as constitutional.
The defendants' first claim is one of substantive due process. They argue that it was the plaintiff's failure to wear her seat belt that caused her injuries and not Bradley Ausmus' reckless driving. The defendants claim, therefore, that they cannot constitutionally be liable for the plaintiff's injuries because Ausmus did not cause her to be thrown from D'Onfro's vehicle.
The defendants' due process argument is based on their assertion that a defendant cannot be held liable for an injury when his conduct does not directly cause the injury. This argument ignores the fact that the legislature can assign statutory responsibility for certain injuries. Starr v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 358, 627 A.2d 1296 (1993), for example, held that the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the legislature intended that the public treasury, rather than the landowner, be required to bear the cost of the cleanup of the contaminated property; the legislature could legitimately have determined that an owner's lack of culpability for the existence of a contaminated condition was outweighed by the state's interest in protecting public resources. Therefore, the fact that the defendants claim that the statute would punish people who did not directly cause an injury does not make the statute irrational.
Even if we were to adopt the defendants' premise that a party must have caused an injury in order to be liable for damages, the defendants' definition of causation is unworkable. The plaintiffs alleged and presented evidence at trial to show that Bower's injuries were caused by the joint negligence of D'Onfro and Bradley Ausmus, which began before Bower was thrown from the D'Onfro vehicle. The plaintiffs showed that the conduct of Ausmus and D'Onfro was concurrently negligent, and that the defendants would be liable for Bower's injuries even had she not been thrown from the car. See Tetro v. Stratford, 189 Conn. 601, 605, 458 A.2d 5 (1983). In Tetro, our Supreme Court stated: " " Id.
Despite the fact that the jury could reasonably have found that Ausmus was speeding, was driving recklessly, did not apply his brakes quickly enough, followed D'Onfro's vehicle too closely and failed to maintain a proper lookout, the defendants' position appears to be that it is irrational for the legislature to have abolished the seat belt defense, especially where the plaintiff is thrown from the vehicle. This issue was addressed in legislative debate. 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1985 Sess., pp. 8352, 8354, remarks of Representative Robert Farr.
Cases such as the present case were anticipated and addressed by the legislature. During the legislative debates, the possibility was discussed that a passenger could suffer an injury that he would not have suffered but for the failure to wear a seat belt. Id., 8354. It was made clear that the seat belt defense could not be raised in such a case. Id. Representative Farr stated that "[t]his amendment says ... you can never raise that defense." Id. Clearly the legislature has decided not to allow arguments such as the defendants' to prevent redress for injured plaintiffs.
The legislature focused on the action of the driver, not on the use of a seat belt. The legislature in its debate went so far as to consider that a passenger or driver might have an accident, remove a seat belt, and lose consciousness. Such persons might be barred from seeking redress for damages sustained, a result that the legislature did not want. 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1985 Sess., pp. 8343, 8348.
As the statute is not irrational, and the defendants were afforded a full and fair trial as to their liability, the defendants were not denied due process of law. Due process is denied when the legislature enacts a law that prescribes new or alters existing rules of evidence or prescribes methods of proof that altogether deny a party his or her constitutional rights. 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 6. Eliminating the seat belt defense on the issue of causation did not preclude the defendants from making other defenses as to causation.
The defendants' second claim is that § 14-100a(c)(4) deprived them of access to the courts in violation of article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. 2 They claim that § 10 preserved the right to defend against liability by showing contributory negligence and that § 14-100a(c)(4) closed the courts to the defendants by not allowing them to present the seat belt defense.
The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976), to prove that they were deprived of access to the courts. Gentile holds that Id., at 286, 363 A.2d 1. There are three flaws in the defendants' argument.
First, there has never been an established common law duty to wear a seat belt in Connecticut. Prior to the enactment of § 14-100a(c)(4), Superior Court decisions were split as to the duty to wear a seat belt. As there is no common law duty, the defendants cannot claim that they have been deprived of a common law right.
Second, because § 10 preserved only those rights that existed in 1818, the defendants have to prove that contributory negligence existed as an established defense in 1818. Although...
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