Bower v. Harrah's Laughlin
| Decision Date | 10 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 49783.,No. 50298.,49783.,50298. |
| Citation | 215 P.3d 709 |
| Parties | Michael BOWER; Robert Garcia; Noi Lewis; Kathy Pace Fuller; Steven Mark Fuller; Andrea Daniels; and Dean Daniels, Appellants, v. HARRAH'S LAUGHLIN, INC., a Nevada Corporation, d/b/a Harrah's Laughlin Hotel and Casino, Respondent. Michael Bower; Robert Garcia; Noi Lewis; Kathy Pace Fuller; Steven Mark Fuller; Andrea Daniels; and Dean Daniels, Appellants, v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., A Nevada Corporation, d/b/a Harrah's Laughlin Hotel and Casino, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
E. Brent Bryson, Ltd., and E. Brent Bryson and John Thayer Clark, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Olson, Cannon, Gormley & Desruisseaux and James R. Olson, David M. Jones, and Felicia Galati, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
Before the Court En Banc.1
This case arises out of a brawl between two biker gangs, the Hell's Angels and the Mongols. The gangs brawled at Harrah's casino in Laughlin, Nevada, during its annual River Run event in 2002. Several people were killed, and many were injured. As a result, several groups of plaintiffs, who were not directly involved in the brawl, sued Harrah's under various negligence theories. These suits proceeded in California state court, Nevada state court, and Nevada federal court.
Appellant Michael Bower sued in Nevada state court. While his suit was pending, federal and state courts entered judgment on two jury verdicts and several summary judgment motions in favor of Harrah's. In Bower's case, Judge Denton, a state district court judge, denied Harrah's summary judgment motion based on issue preclusion. Bower's case was then consolidated with several other plaintiffs, including Robert Garcia, Noi Lewis, Kathy and Steven Fuller, and Andrea and Dean Daniels (collectively, appellants). The consolidated cases were assigned to a separate state district court judge, Judge Johnson. Judge Johnson then reheard Harrah's summary judgment motion regarding Bower and found in favor of Harrah's based on issue preclusion. The district court also granted Harrah's summary judgment motion regarding issue preclusion as to all plaintiffs and entered final judgment. Then, the district court granted Harrah's summary judgment motion regarding plaintiffs Lewis and Garcia based on the merits of their case. Appellants now appeal.
We first address the district court's rehearing of Harrah's summary judgment motion regarding Bower. We conclude that the district court properly reheard the motion pursuant to NRCP 54(b), and Bower consented to the rehearing, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appeal.
Second, we discuss federal and state issue preclusion. We highlight the difference between the adequate representation exception to federal issue preclusion and the privity requirement of Nevada issue preclusion. Also, we explain that we must analyze federal issue preclusion under Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), which changed federal issue preclusion law after the district court rendered its decision in this case.
Third, we review the district court's decision granting Harrah's summary judgment, which determined that issue preclusion barred appellants' claims based on prior federal decisions. Applying federal issue preclusion law, we conclude that the district court inappropriately granted Harrah's summary judgment based on issue preclusion because the plaintiffs in the prior federal cases did not adequately represent appellants' interests.
Fourth, we review the district court's decision granting Harrah's summary judgment, which determined that issue preclusion barred appellants' claims based on prior state decisions. Applying Nevada issue preclusion law, we conclude that the district court inappropriately granted Harrah's summary judgment based on issue preclusion because the plaintiffs in the prior state cases were not in privity with appellants.
Fifth, we address the district court's decision granting Harrah's summary judgment regarding plaintiffs Garcia and Lewis based on the merits of their case. We conclude that the district court properly granted Harrah's summary judgment because the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) was a superseding intervening cause of Garcia's and Lewis' harm, and therefore, Harrah's is not liable.
Finally, we address the district court's awarding Harrah's attorney fees for defending against appellants' meritless claims and its awarding Harrah's costs as the prevailing party. We hold that the district court erred in granting Harrah's attorney fees because appellants did not unreasonably maintain their claims. Given our decision in this appeal, Harrah's only prevailed against Garcia and Lewis, and therefore, we vacate the costs award against all appellants except Garcia and Lewis.
Two biker gangs, the Hell's Angels and the Mongols, brawled at Harrah's Laughlin Hotel and Casino in Laughlin, Nevada, on April 27, 2002. As a result of that brawl, several plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in Nevada federal court and state courts in Nevada and California.
Appellants Michael Bower, Robert Garcia, Noi Lewis, Kathy and Steven Fuller, and Andrea and Dean Daniels were not members of either biker gang and were bystanders when the brawl occurred. Appellants brought various negligence claims in Nevada state district court, arising out of physical and emotional harms suffered as a result of the brawl. Specifically, Bower filed claims for premises liability, negligence, fraud, negligent representation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Garcia, Lewis, the Fullers, and the Danielses all claimed premises liability, negligent training, negligent supervision, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Bower's case was initially assigned to a Nevada state district court judge, Judge Denton. Harrah's filed a summary judgment motion, which the district court denied. Harrah's then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, which we denied. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., Docket No. 47593, 122 Nev. 1682, 178 P.3d 762 (). Subsequently, Bower's case was reassigned to Judge Johnson and consolidated with the other appellants' cases.
While appellants' case was pending in Nevada state district court, Harrah's prevailed in other cases arising out of the same events in both state and federal court. A Nevada federal district court jury and a California superior court jury both returned verdicts for Harrah's. Yvette Barreras v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., No. CV-S-03-0661-RLH-PAL (D.Nev. Mar. 18, 2005); Ramirez v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., No. 1-02 CV810665 (Cal.Super.Ct. Apr. 28, 2005). The United States district court for the district of Nevada granted Harrah's summary judgment in four separate cases. Sweers v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0378-RCJ-RJJ (D.Nev. Dec. 22, 2004); Nolan v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., No. CV-S-02-1611-PMP (LRL) (D.Nev. Jan. 14, 2005); Alcantar v. Harrah's Laughlin. Inc., No. CV-S-03-1195-HDM (RJJ) (D. Nev. June 14, 2005); Schoenleber v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., 423 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Nev.2006). Also, the Nevada state district court granted Harrah's summary judgment in two other cases. Salvador Barreras v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., No. A484654 (Nev. Dist. Ct. June 13, 2005); Collins v. Harrah's Laughlin. Inc., No. A472232 (Nev.Dist.Ct. Nov. 21, 2005).
At a hearing, Bower suggested that Harrah's orally move the court to reconsider Harrah's summary judgment motion against Bower, which Judge Denton had previously denied. Bower suggested this after the district court had granted Harrah's summary judgment against all the other plaintiffs to avoid wasting time preparing for trial if summary judgment against him was inevitable. At the hearing, the district court made three rulings. It granted: (1) Harrah's motion to reconsider summary judgment regarding Bower, (2) Harrah's summary judgment motion against all plaintiffs based on issue preclusion, and (3) Harrah's summary judgment motion regarding Garcia and Lewis on the merits of their case. Later, the district court also granted Harrah's post-judgment motion for attorney fees in the amount of $317,621.98, and awarded it costs in the amount of $30,788.55.
Judge Denton denied Harrah's summary judgment motion, based solely on issue preclusion, against Bower. Although Judge Denton made no specific findings in the order, during the hearing, he indicated that Bower was not in privity with other plaintiffs in separate cases and that Harrah's standard of care might be different for gang members and nongang members. Bower's case was then consolidated with the other appellants' cases and assigned to Judge Johnson, who reheard the motion. Judge Johnson granted Harrah's rehearing because she concluded it was warranted and because additional facts or events had developed since Judge Denton decided the motion. Upon rehearing, Judge Johnson granted Harrah's summary judgment motion.
Appellants argue that the district court did not have a sufficient basis to rehear Harrah's identical summary judgment motion, which Judge Denton previously decided. Harrah's argues that because Bower requested that Harrah's make the rehearing motion, he is barred from challenging the district court's rehearing of the motion. We agree with Harrah's for two reasons. First, we conclude that Judge Johnson was authorized to rehear the motion under NRCP 54(b), and second, we conclude that Bower consented to the rehearing. We now address each of these issues in turn.
The district court had the authority to rehear the motion under NRCP 54(b). Although the district court did not base its decision on NRCP 54(b) and neither party raised it in their briefs, this court can affirm the district...
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