Bowers v. Moreno, AFL-CIO
Decision Date | 11 August 1975 |
Docket Number | AFL-CIO,No. 75-1160 |
Citation | 520 F.2d 843 |
Parties | 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2156, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,050 John BOWERS, as Trustee of Local 1575, International Longshoremen's Association,, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Eusebio G. MORENO et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Martin Markson, New York City, Juan F. Doval, Rio Piedras, P. R., Seymour M. Waldman, Waldman & Waldman, New York City, and Francis Doval, Colorado & Carlo, Hato Rey, P. R., on brief for appellants.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
This is an interlocutory appeal, the matter having been certified to us by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issues are still jurisdictional, as they were when we decided Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1968), involving the same litigation.
For a description of the context and major allegations, we cannot improve on the statement of the district court:
Specifically, the acts alleged included the improper conveyance of 383.5 cuerdas of land in Puerto Rico purchased with Fund monies to the Housing Project; the transfer by the Project to defendant Moreno, a union trustee of the Fund, without consideration, of 30.2 cuerdas; an imprudent contract with La Providencia to develop the remaining land; the sale of lots by La Providencia, with no accounting for down payments and no posting of required performance bonds; the unjustified waiver of bonding requirements by the Fund and the Project; the unjustified granting of loans to La Providencia to discharge its obligations; the execution by the Project of an unauthorized mortgage to a banking firm; the knowing acquiescence by defendants in a foreclosure action by the mortgagee; and the receipt, with knowledge of illegality and breach of trust, of Fund monies in payment of La Providencia's obligations by several corporations. We affirmed the dismissal of a bank and five other corporate defendants sued under the latter three claims in Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., supra.
The question was posed as follows by the district judge, who, we add, was the fourth to endeavor to make progress in this litigation:
In light of our later discussion of pendent jurisdiction, we think it useful to describe in some detail the parties and the relief sought. The parties are the following. Plaintiff Bowers is a trustee of Local 1575, whose members are the beneficiaries of the Fund and the supposed principal beneficiaries of the housing development. 1 He also represents intervening persons who have made down payments on houses which were to have been built on the land in question. The Fund is also a plaintiff. The defendants (some of whom fit into more than one of the following categories) are four employer trustees of the Fund, five union trustees of the Fund, the Project, two attorneys for the Fund and Project (one also being attorney for the local union), La Providencia and its officers, stockholders, and directors (including one of the attorneys), and another corporation and its controlling stockholder.
The district court has well summarized the relief sought:
To this we add the requests that certain agreements between the Project and La Providencia, debts from the Fund and Project to certain corporations, and the Project's mortgage notes be cancelled and that certain corporations refund monies to the Fund. The assessment of damages, other relief and attorneys' fees are also prayed for.
The district court held that plaintiff Bowers was a proper party; that under 29 U.S.C. § 501 the court had jurisdiction over the union trustees of the Fund but not the employer trustees; 2 that the court had no jurisdiction over employer trustees under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, since they were not, in this context representatives of the employers and there was no allegation of a breach of the Fund agreement; that, while employer trustees were suable as representatives of the employees under section 302 of LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(e), the alleged misdeeds were not such "structural violations" going to the integrity of the Fund and its conformity to statutory requirements as to give jurisdiction under this section; and, finally, that the court did have jurisdiction over the remaining defendants who were not union trustees, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
The district court twice certified the question of jurisdiction for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), See In re La Providencia Development Corporation, 515 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1975). Although the defendants failed on both occasions to make proper application to this court for permission to take an interlocutory appeal, plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to appeal the denial of section 302 jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction is always a matter of concern, whether raised by the parties or not, and since in any appeal of the final judgment ultimately entered by the district court we will have to confront questions of jurisdiction which we leave unresolved in our decision of the present appeal, we also scrutinize the district court's assertion of jurisdiction under the theory of pendent jurisdiction.
We first consider plaintiffs' appeal from a denial of jurisdiction under section 302. This section states that "It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value (1) to any representative of any of his employees . . . with intent to influence him . . . as a representative of employees." Certain exceptions, here irrelevant, are provided for. The critical section, § 302(e), provides that district courts "have jurisdiction . . . to restrain violations of this section."
Plaintiffs confront our statement in Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., supra, 393 F.2d at 424, which described the violations of § 302 subject to restraint by a district court as those constituting "violations of basic structure, as determined by the Congress, not violations of fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the administration of the trust fund." This is admittedly a severe standard, but one which we concluded was compelled by legislative history and followed by the majority of cases.
We think that the standard adopted in Ulpiano Casal remains the generally accepted standard today, although courts have been understandably tempted to denominate some egregious conduct a "structural violation". In Giordani v. Hoffmann, 295 F.Supp. 463 (E.D.Pa.1969), and in Porter v. Teamsters Health, Welfare and Life Insurance Fund, 321 F.Supp. 101 (E.D.Pa.1970), direct diversions of funds from employers to employee representatives were held to constitute such violations, the court observing in each case that the misuse of funds...
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