Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n

Decision Date02 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.97-2600.,CIV.A.97-2600.
Citation118 F.Supp.2d 494
PartiesMichael BOWERS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ACT, Inc., NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse, Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education, University of Iowa, American International College, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Barbara E. Ransom, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, and Richard L. Bazelon, Bazelon & Less, Marlton, NJ, for Michael Bowers.

Charles J. Vinicombe, Princeton, NJ, J. Freedley Hunsicker, Jr., John Schultz, Julianne Peck, Amy E. Pizzutillo, Drinker,

Biddle & Shanley LLP, Princeton, NJ, for National Collegiate Athletic Association.

Robert A. Burgoyne, Karen M. Moran, Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, Washington, DC, Nicholas M. Kouletsis, Pepper, Hamilton, LLP, Cherry Hill, NJ, for ACT, Inc., NCAA Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse.

Mark Schantz, Andrew Ives, Office of the General Counsel of the University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gordon E. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, William O. Perkins, Jr., Jersey City, NJ, Margulies, Wind, Herrington & Knopf, P.C., Jersey City, NJ, for University of Iowa.

John B. Langel, Abigail L. Flitter, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education.

Thomas C. Hart, Ruprecht & Hart, LLP, Millburn, NJ, for American International College.

OPINION

ORLOFSKY, District Judge.

                                                  Table of Contents
                  I. Preliminary Matters .......................................................  500
                     A. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief .....................................  500
                     B. Recoverability of Damages ..............................................  503
                 II. Discussion ................................................................  510
                     A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment ....................................  510
                     B. ADA Claims .............................................................  510
                        1. Title II Claims Against Temple and Iowa .............................  511
                        2. Title III Claims Against the NCAA and AIC ...........................  514
                           a. "By any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
                              place of public accommodation" ...................................  514
                           b. "Discriminated against on the basis of disability" ...............  517
                              i.  Eligibility Criteria .........................................  518
                              ii. Reasonable Modification/Fundamentally Alter ..................  519
                     C. Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act                                       525
                        1. "Receiving Federal financial assistance" ............................  525
                           a. The NCAA .........................................................  525
                           b. ACT/Clearinghouse ................................................  530
                        2. "Otherwise qualified individual"/"Solely by reason of his or
                           her disability" .....................................................  533
                     D. The NJLAD ..............................................................  533
                     E. Breach of Contract Claim ...............................................  535
                III. Conclusion ................................................................  537
                

This hotly contested case presents difficult legal questions in an area of the law that has become fertile ground for civil rights litigation: the applicability of laws prohibiting disability-based discrimination to the practices of the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"). In this case, Plaintiff Michael Bowers ("Bowers") has sued the NCAA under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("ACT"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. Among other claims, Bowers alleges that the NCAA discriminates against the learning disabled through initial eligibility requirements that govern whether a student may participate in intercollegiate college athletics. Many of the legal issues raised in this case are difficult and present no obvious resolution. Some of those challenging issues include: (1) Whether Bowers may seek injunctive relief although he has already enrolled in college; (2) Whether money damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act; (3) Whether the NCAA is a place of public accommodation under the ADA; (4) Whether the NCAA's eligibility requirements are "necessary" under ADA analysis; (5) Whether the NCAA's waiver review process is a reasonable accommodation for Bowers; (6) Whether Bowers is an otherwise qualified individual; (7) Whether the NCAA is a recipient of federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act; and (8) Whether the NJLAD is applicable when an individual seeks access to a public accommodation outside of New Jersey.

Bowers specifically targets the NCAA's regulations that prohibit first-year college students from participating in Division I and Division II athletic programs if they failed as high school students to complete a core academic curriculum specified by the NCAA. The NCAA requires high school students to complete thirteen "core courses" in subject areas including English, mathematics, and the social and physical sciences before they may be declared "qualifiers," student-athletes permitted to practice and compete as members of intercollegiate teams and to receive college athletic scholarships.1 Bowers, who suffers from a learning disability, completed a number of classes in high school that were designated special education classes. The NCAA ruled that these classes did not satisfy its core course requirement and declared Bowers, who was a high school standout in football, a "nonqualifier." Bowers alleges that the NCAA discriminated against him because of his disability in declaring him ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics as a college freshman.

Bowers has also sued Temple University ("Temple"), the University of Iowa ("Iowa"), and American International College ("AIC") for discrimination on the ground that these schools stopped recruiting Bowers to play football when they concluded that his learning disability would likely result in the NCAA declaring him a nonqualifier. Similarly, Bowers has sued ACT, Inc. and the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse ("ACT/Clearinghouse"). The Clearinghouse, which is operated by ACT, is responsible for making eligibility determinations pursuant to the NCAA's regulations. Bowers has also alleged a breach of contract claim against ACT/Clearinghouse, to whom Bowers paid an $18.00 fee for the processing of his eligibility materials. A complete discussion of the factual and procedural background in this case can be found in two prior opinions of this Court. See Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F.Supp. 459 (D.N.J.1997) (Orlofsky, J.) (Bowers I); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F.Supp.2d 460 (D.N.J.1998) (Orlofsky, J.) (Bowers II). The Court exercises jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.

As my discussion below indicates, I have concluded, among other things, that: (1) Bowers is still suffering from the adverse effects of the NCAA's regulations in a way which confers standing to seek injunctive relief; (2) Money damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act if intentional discrimination is alleged; (3) The NCAA is a place of public accommodation under the ADA; (4) There is insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to allow me to determine as a matter of law that the NCAA's eligibility requirements are "necessary" within the meaning of the ADA; (5) The waiver review process undertaken by the NCAA on behalf of Bowers was not a reasonable accommodation; (6) There are still genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Bowers is an otherwise qualified individual; (7) The NCAA is not entitled to summary judgment on its claim that it is not a recipient of federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act; and (8) There is insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record for me to determine whether the NJLAD is applicable when an individual seeks access to a public accommodation outside of New Jersey.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the motions of the NCAA, AIC, Temple and Iowa for summary judgment on Count I(ADA) will be denied; the motions for summary judgment of the NCAA, Temple, Iowa and AIC on Count II (Rehabilitation Act) will be denied; the motion of ACT/Clearinghouse for summary judgment on Count II (Rehabilitation Act) will be granted; the motions for summary judgment of the NCAA and ACT/Clearinghouse on Count IV (NJLAD) will be denied without prejudice; and ACT/Clearinghouse's motion for summary judgment on Count VI (Breach of Contract) will be granted. Additionally, I will deny the motions for summary judgment on the issues of standing and the recoverability of damages, with the exception that I will grant summary judgment on the issue that certain damages sought by Bowers are too speculative. Also, I will defer my decision regarding whether Bowers may recover compensatory damages against Temple and Iowa until Bowers's pending motion to amend his First Amended Complaint is resolved.

I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief

Bowers seeks a wide range of equitable relief.2 If granted, the relief sought would restore Bowers to the position he would have been in had he been declared a "qualifier" in his senior year of high school3 and would also require the NCAA, ACT and the Clearinghouse to make certain programmatic changes to the way in which freshman eligibility is determined.4 First Amended Compl. at 24, 28-29. Iowa, AIC, Temple, and the NCAA...

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