Bowie v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16-5808-BRM-LHG
• Parties: JEFFREY BOWIE, Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, BRUCE DZENEORF, and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

JEFFREY BOWIE, Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, BRUCE DZENEORF,and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-5808-BRM-LHG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

July 26, 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco") and Bruce Dezendorf's ("Dezendorf")¹ (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff Jeffrey Bowie ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion. (ECF No. 12.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(a), the Court heard oral argument on April 11, 2017. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purpose of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, considers any document "integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. In re Burlington Coat FactorySec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); see Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff, who at all times relevant had a son with disabilities, began working at Costco in October 1994 and eventually became a General Manager. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 3 ¶¶ 2, 4.) At all times relevant, Dezendorf was Plaintiff's supervisor and an employee of Costco. (Id. at 2 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff made Defendants aware that his son was disabled each time "plaintiff made a formal request for intermittent family leave or an accommodation." (Id. at 3 ¶ 4.) Defendants authorized Plaintiff's request for an accommodation and allowed him to leave work early "to attend to his son's disability." (Id. at 3 ¶ 5.) Accordingly, Plaintiff "occasionally" rearranged his schedule to leave early to care for his son. (Id. at 3 ¶ 6.)

However, on October 21, 2014, Plaintiff contends he was terminated for leaving work early "[o]n one occasion in October 2014 . . . to take care of his disabled child after he had obtained proper coverage." (Id. at 3 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants terminated him because "they were unhappy that he had left work early and it would no longer be tolerated." (Id. at 3-4 ¶ 8.) He further alleges he "performed to a level that met the Defendants [sic] legitimate expectations." (Id. at 3 ¶ 3.)

On September 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint, alleging: (1) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (Count One); (2) a violation of the ADA based on associational discrimination (Count Two); (3) a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") (Count Three); (4) that Dezendorf aided and abetted unlawful discrimination under the NJLAD (Count Four); (5) claims for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Five); (6) a claim for intentional interference with Plaintiff's employment relationship (Count Six); and (7) violations of the Family Medical Leave Act("FMLA") and the New Jersey Family Leave Act ("NJFLA") (Count Seven). (ECF No. 1.) On December 20, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts Three through Seven of Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 7)² and filed a partial answer to the Complaint (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff opposed the Motion on January 23, 2017. (ECF No. 12.) On April 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument. (ECF No. 16.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. "[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged." Id. This "plausibility standard" requires the complaint allege "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but it "is not akin to a 'probability requirement.'" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but "more than 'an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation" must be pled; it must include "factual enhancements" and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

While as a general rule, a court many not consider anything beyond the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held "a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to one for summary judgment pursuant under Rule 56]." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426.

III. DECISION

A. Associational Discrimination under the NJLAD (Count Three)

Plaintiff alleges he "is a protected class member as defined by the NJLAD . . . due to his disabled son" and was "unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of [that] disability" when he was terminated. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6 ¶¶ 4-6.) Although Plaintiff liberally uses the term "Defendants" when alleging this Count and states the Defendants "individually" and "jointly" took his son's disability into consideration, he also only specifically pleads:

3. Defendant, Costco [] is an "employer" as defined by the NJLAD.

4. Plaintiff . . . is a protected class member as defined by the NJLAD, being at all pertinent times, due to his disabled son.

(Id. at 5-6.) Because Plaintiff refers only specifically to Costco in this Count, the Court construes this Count to be construed only against Costco.³

Defendants construe this as a claim for associational discrimination and argue "Plaintiff's associational disability discrimination claim [under the NJLAD] should be dismissed because the [NJLAD] does not recognize such a claim." (ECF No. 7-1 at 6.) In response, Plaintiff argues

while the [NJLAD] does not expressly identify associational discrimination it is to be construed in accordance with the principals set forth in the ADA and is in fact to be construed more broadly and more liberally as it affords greater protections than the Federal Act. More importantly, the Federal Courts applying these principals have acknowledged the existence of association disability claims under the [NJLAD].

(ECF No. 12 at 6.) Accordingly, the Court construes Count Three as a claim for associational discrimination under the NJLAD.

The NJLAD prohibits "any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment." N.J.S.A. § 10:5-4.1. The elements of an NJLAD claim vary based on the cause of action alleged. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 408 (2010) (listing the different prima facie elements for various NJLAD causes of action based on failure to hire, discriminatory discharge, retaliation, and hostile environment).

The NJLAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a disability. Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 609 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd as modified, 203 N.J. 383 (2010). In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) plaintiff was handicapped or disabled within the meaning of the statue; (2) plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the position of employment, with or without accommodation; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap or disability; and (4) the employer sought another to perform the same work after plaintiff had been removed from the position.

Id. Courts have also "uniformly held that the [NJLAD] . . . requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's handicap." Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Court, 351 N.J. Super. 385, 396 (App. Div. 2002).

Defendants take issue with Plaintiff's ability to satisfy the first element of this claim and argue the NJLAD does not protect employees from discrimination due to an employee's association with a disabled person, while Plaintiff contends such a cause of action can be prosecuted and D...