Bowie v. Hodge
| Decision Date | 05 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-1218 SECTION: "E" (1) |
| Parties | TRINA BOWIE, Plaintiff v. DARNELY HODGE, SR., ET AL., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand and For Costs filed by Plaintiff Trina Bowie.1 For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, Darnley R. Hodge, Sr., Jerry Martin, Michael Laughlin, Sheriff Marlin N. Gusman, and AB Insurance Company, in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana,2 expressly alleging a claim of "sex discrimination."3 In addition, Plaintiff appears to bring a "whistle blower" type claim for "violations of local, state, and federal law."4 Further, Plaintiff alleges she is currently "awaiting a letter from [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")] formally authorizing her to file a lawsuit."5 In her signed Charge of Discrimination,6 attached to her state court petition, Plaintiff alleges she has been "discriminated against, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."7
The events precipitating the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuit began on or about March 7, 2018 when Plaintiff was hired as the Director of Human Resources for the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office ("OPSO").8 Plaintiff alleges she began experiencing sexual harassment from the inception of her employment at OPSO. On or about March 7, 2018, as she was walking up the steps to the entrance office building, Defendant Martin, a unit manager employed at the prison, "made derogatory sexual remarks" to Plaintiff which she describes as a "cat call."9 Plaintiff was "later told defendant Martin was protected by Chief of Investigations defendant Michael Laughlin, and not to mess with him if she wanted continued employment at OPSO."10 Further, Defendant Hodge allegedly told Plaintiff "not to get involved with employees reporting sexual harassment incidents at OPSO after she briefed him about the complaints."11 According to Plaintiff, during her employment at OPSO, she and Defendant Hodge had "two heated discussions" over Hodge's refusal to let her make an investigative report after an employee alleged a sexual harassment incident.12
After Plaintiff informed Defendant Hodge that she is required to document reported sexual harassment incidents, Defendant Hodge allegedly went out of his way to physically bump into Plaintiff "if he had an occasion to stand next to [her]," which embarrassed and humiliated Plaintiff.13 Plaintiff alleges the physical contact escalated and, at various times between June 4, 2018 and December 8, 2018, Defendant Hodge would "touch or rub plaintiff's leg, without her consent," when he sat next to her duringmeetings.14 Further, Defendant Hodge allegedly would say "explicit things to her" and, on several occasions, "rub[bed] her shoulders" and "brush[ed] against [her] breasts with his body."15 On one incident, after Plaintiff and Defendant Hodge went to dinner, Defendant Hodge allegedly "tried to kiss her" and "tried to insert his fingers into plaintiff's vagina, without her consent."16
In a separate series of events occurring around January 2019, Plaintiff alleges she was informed by an Internal Auditor, Jane Dimitry, that the state of the OPSO's Civil Financial Records were a "mess" and, as a result, OPSO employees were being deprived of the full benefit of their pension contributions.17 Plaintiff alleges she "reported what Ms. Dimitry told her to both defendant Hodge, and his supervisor," and Defendant Hodge "instructed plaintiff not to get involved with the old pension plan."18 Plaintiff appears to allege she also informed Defendant Hodge's supervisor her concerns regarding sexual harassment incidents at OPSO.
During a meeting held in March 2019, with several attendants present, Defendant Hodge allegedly, "in an intimidating tone," repeated all the violations Plaintiff had reported to Defendant Hodge's supervisor concerning "abuse of pension money benefits, sexual harassment, treatment of women and his falling in line with defendant Laughlin's corruption" and, referring to Plaintiff, Defendant Hodge stated: "there is a snake at the table and I know who you are."19 Several days later, Plaintiff "made a formal response to Defendant Hodge's previous remark there was a 'snake at the table.'"20 According toPlaintiff, "[s]hortly thereafter she was summoned to defendant Hodge's office and wrongfully fired."21
On April 17, 2020, Defendants Hodge, Martin, Laughlin, and Gusman removed this lawsuit to federal court.22 Defendants contend that, "[a]lthough the Petition is unclear as to exactly what charges Plaintiff is bringing against the Defendants . . . this is a civil action over which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has original jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as it arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"23 explaining:
[I]n Paragraph D of Plaintiff's Prayer for Relief, she asks that she be given 'whistle blower protection for reporting violations of local, state and federal law.' Additionally, Plaintiff states in Paragraph 72 that she is 'awaiting a letter from the EEOC formally authorizing her to file a lawsuit.' In the Plaintiff's signed Charge of Discrimination which she filed with the EEOC, Plaintiff alleged that she believed she had been discriminated against and retaliated against in violated [sic] of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, and in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended.24
On April 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand,25 acknowledging she has alleged federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,26 but arguing the Court nevertheless lacks removal jurisdiction over this action because "[t]he Supreme Court generally applies a presumption of concurrency to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions" and "28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (3) [sic] provides for original, but not exclusive, federal jurisdiction [over such actions]."27 Plaintiff further argues that, even though she has brought a § 1983 claim,"the rest of her claims are otherwise not removable" because they "are based on violations of Louisiana statutes or rights guaranteed under the Louisiana Constitution."28
In their opposition to the Motion to Remand, Defendants argue, among other things, that the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction because, in addition to alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and asking for whistleblower protection for violations of federal law, Plaintiff has brought a § 1983 claim and, further, [t]he Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining allegations in Plaintiff's Petition."29
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the authority conferred upon them by the United States Constitution or by Congress.30 Federal law allows for state civil suits to be removed to federal courts in certain instances. Generally, removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by [an] Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.31
"The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper."32 When removal is based on federal question jurisdiction, the removing party must demonstrate the case "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."33 "[T]his type of jurisdiction 'is invoked by and large byplaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law (e.g., claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).'"34 "A single claim over which federal-question jurisdiction exists is sufficient to allow removal."35
If a court has original jurisdiction over a federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 if the state law claims are "so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."36 If the state law claims "substantially predominate[]" over the federal claim, the Court "may" decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, severing and remanding these claims to state court.37
Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, a federal court has original or removal jurisdiction if a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint; generally, there is no federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action.38 "However, a case pleading only state law claims may arise under federal law 'where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.'"39 "The federal courts have jurisdiction over a state lawclaim that 'necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.'"40 In analyzing the jurisdictional issue before the Court, the Court also refers to the "artful pleading" doctrine, which is an "independent corollary" to the well-pleaded complaint rule.41 "Under this principle, even though the plaintiff has artfully avoided any suggestion of a federal issue, removal is not defeated by the plaintiff's pleading skills in hiding the federal question."42
Although Plaintiff does not expressly mention § 1983 in her petition, it is clear from her allegations, as well as her Motion to Remand, that she does, in fact,...
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