Bowles Lunch v. United States, 43486.

CourtU.S. Claims Court
Writing for the CourtWHALEY, Justice, and LITTLETON, GREEN, and WHITAKER
CitationBowles Lunch v. United States, 33 F.Supp. 235, 91 Ct.Cl. 292 (Fed. Cl. 1940)
Decision Date03 June 1940
Docket NumberNo. 43486.,43486.
PartiesBOWLES LUNCH, Inc., v. UNITED STATES.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John C. Boland, of Syracuse, N. Y., for plaintiff.

John A. Rees, of Washington, D. C., and Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert N. Anderson and Fred K. Dyar, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for defendant.

WHALEY, Chief Justice, and LITTLETON, GREEN, and WHITAKER, Judges.

WHITAKER, Judge.

On March 2, 1928, the plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, sold a piece of real estate and certain other property for a certain consideration, a part of which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Later, in 1931, the plaintiff repossessed the property. The question presented is whether or not it is entitled to a deduction of a loss or of a bad debt arising out of the transaction. The essential facts are as follows:

The plaintiff on the date stated sold to Robert Bersani a piece of real estate known as the Lansing Building and certain lunch room equipment contained therein for a total consideration of $425,000 (upon which transaction it reported a profit in its income tax return for 1928 of $41,161.18). This consideration was paid by the assumption of a first mortgage on the property of $140,000, by the payment of $100,000 in cash, and by the execution of a third mortgage of $185,000. Of the $100,000 paid in cash, $50,000 was secured from the first mortgagee on a second mortgage on the premises.

In its income tax return for 1931 plaintiff claimed no deduction on account of this transaction, but on June 12, 1934, it filed a claim for refund of $10,369.09, plus interest of $45.93, on the ground, among others, that it was entitled to a deduction from gross income of $101,014.32 on account of the repossession of this property. This claim was denied and this suit was brought.

The plaintiff claims the deduction either as a bad debt under section 23(j) of the Revenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 791), or as a loss under section 23(f) of that Act, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 357.

It is stipulated that the market value of the property at the time it was repossessed was $300,000. There was then outstanding against it first and second mortgages, the principal of which aggregated $190,000, accrued interest on the first mortgage of $1,561.65, City, County and State taxes of $10,802.32, and it cost plaintiff $3,050.35 to reacquire the property. By its reacquisition, therefore, plaintiff acquired an equity of $94,585.68. It claims as a bad debt the difference between this equity and the amount of the mortgage, plus accrued interest, $176,558.53, or $81,972.85. In the alternative, it claims a loss of this amount.

The stipulation of facts, which is all the evidence in the case, states that each of the conveyances to the plaintiff was made "subject to mortgages, taxes and all existing leases." It also states that "no consideration was passed for the last two mentioned deeds except that the parties personally liable on plaintiff's mortgage were released from their obligation thereon." Since the parties personally liable were released from liability and the property was reconveyed to the mortgagee, the liability was extinguished, the debt was wiped out. Since there was no longer a debt, the plaintiff is not entitled to a deduction under section 23(j).

The plaintiff claims a deduction for a partial bad debt under that portion of section 23(j) which reads as follows: "And when satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the Commissioner may allow such debt to be charged off in part."

This section, however, has in mind a transaction to be completed in the future, and not one already completed. When the plaintiff accepted the property in satisfaction of the debt, the debt was extinguished and, therefore, there can be no deduction for a bad debt.

None of the cases cited by plaintiff in its brief are in point. In none of them was there involved a reconveyance to the mortgagee of the property in satisfaction of the mortgage debt.

If the plaintiff is entitled to a deduction at all in this case, it is entitled to it as a loss under section 23(f). The plaintiff relies on article 354 of regulations 74. This regulation provides that where property is repossessed in consideration of the cancellation of all or a part of the indebtedness against it, a gain or loss will result— "* * * measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the basis in the hands of the vendor of the obligations of the purchaser (generally, the fair market value thereof which was previously recognized in computing income) which were applied by the vendor to the purchase or bid price of the property."

Under this regulation the plaintiff says that it is entitled to the difference between its mortgage debt and the fair market value of the equity acquired. In computing its profit when it sold the property the plaintiff treated the notes secured by the third mortgage as worth their face value. Under the regulation, in computing its loss on a reacquisition of the property it is entitled to use this same value. If the regulation is valid, the plaintiff is entitled to a deduction of a loss measured by the difference in the face of the unpaid notes and the agreed market value of the equity in the property acquired.

The provisions of the Revenue Acts succeeding the Revenue Act of 1928 with relation to the deduction of losses are substantially the same as the provision of the Revenue Act of 1928, under which the regulation relied upon was promulgated. Provisions similar to that in the above article appear in regulations 77 under the 1932 Act (article 354), in regulations 86 under the 1934 Act (article 44-4), in regulations 94 under the 1936 Act (article 44-4), and regulations 101 under the 1938 Act (article 44-4). See, also, T.D. 4832, 1938-2 C.B. 155. Legislative...

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4 cases
  • Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Spreckels
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 12 June 1941
    ...notes, to some extent at least." See Commissioner v. National Bank of Commerce, etc., 5 Cir., 112 F.2d 946, 947; Bowles Lunch, Inc. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 33 F.Supp. 235, 240. Compare Polin v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 114 F.2d 174; Hale v. Helvering, 66 App.D.C. 242, 85 F.2d 819. Aside from......
  • Henry v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • 3 February 1960
    ...144; Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 54 S.Ct. 644, 78 L.Ed. 1200. Plaintiff asserts that Bowles Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.Supp. 235, 91 Ct.Cl. 292, requires the conclusion that, because she had released the debt, so that there was no longer any debt in existe......
  • Bancroft v. United States, 43816
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • 3 June 1940
  • Andresen v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • 24 January 1969
    ...the factual basis for the contention that assessment of the penalty was illegal remained the same. In Bowles Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.Supp. 235, 91 Ct.Cl. 292, (1940) the taxpayer's refund claim had been improperly characterized as a "loss on partial bad debt," although the claim ......