Bowles v. Bradley

Decision Date04 May 1995
Docket NumberNo. 24304,24304
Citation319 S.C. 377,461 S.E.2d 811
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesCrandall Close BOWLES, Frances Close Hart, Leroy Springs Close, Patricia Close, Elliott Springs Close, Hugh William Close, Jr., Derick Springsteen Close, and Katherine Anne Close, Respondents, v. James BRADLEY and James H. Hodges as Trustees, et al., Defendants, of whom, Brooks P. Goldsmith, Guardian ad litem, is Appellant. Crandall Close BOWLES, Frances Close Hart, Leroy Springs Close, Patricia Close, Elliott Springs Close, Hugh William Close, Jr. and Derick Springsteen Close, Respondents, v. Anne Springs CLOSE, James Bradley, Frances Close Hart, Leroy Springs Close, Patricia Close, Elliott Springs Close, Hugh William Close, Jr., and Derick Springsteen Close, as Trustees, et al., Defendants, of whom, Brooks P. Goldsmith, Guardian ad litem, is Appellant. Crandall Close BOWLES, Frances Close Hart, Leroy Springs Close, Patricia Close, Elliott Springs Close, Hugh William Close, Jr., Derick Springsteen Close, and Katherine Anne Close, Respondents, v. Anne Springs CLOSE and James Bradley as Trustees, et al., Defendants, of whom Brooks P. Goldsmith, Guardian ad litem, is Appellant. * . Heard

Brooks P. Goldsmith, Lancaster, for appellant.

James C. Hardin, III and Daniel J. Ballou, both of Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, Rock Hill, for respondents.

Robert K. Folks, Lancaster, guardian ad litem for respondents.

TOAL, Justice:

This case concerns the construction of the word "issue" as used in several wills and trusts executed in the 1950s and 1960s. We affirm the circuit court's holding that the term "issue" includes adopted children.

FACTS

On August 1, 1959, Elliott White Springs (Springs) created an irrevocable trust (the 1959 Trust or the trust). The terms of this trust provided that the income from the trust would be paid to an eleemosynary corporation for a certain number of years, after which the trust corpus would be split to form individual trusts for seven of his grandchildren. Each of the grandchildren would receive the income from his or her trust for life. At a grandchild's death, the corpus of his or her trust would be distributed

to such of said grandchild's issue as said grandchild shall by Will have appointed, and, in the absence of appointment, per stirpes, to the surviving issue of said grandchild, and if there be no such issue, then per stirpes, to the surviving issue of Anne Springs Close. (italics added).

On August 30, 1959, Springs executed a will (the Springs Will or the will) creating similar trusts for his grandchildren. The provisions concerning the term "issue" are virtually identical in the special powers of appointment and takers in default provisions.

In the course of preparing the Springs Will and the 1959 Trust, several memoranda were written by Springs's lawyers. One memorandum to Springs proposed that "issue" expressly be defined in the trust to include adopted children. Another memorandum, also addressed to Springs, referred to a conversation between Springs and the lawyer and stated that the term "issue," as used in the proposed trust, did not include adopted children.

Springs died in October 1959 and was survived by his wife Frances Ley Springs (Frances), his daughter Anne Springs Close (Anne), and six grandchildren. Anne was pregnant with Springs's seventh grandchild, for whom Springs had provided in his will as well as in the separate trust he executed. Anne later had an eighth child, Katherine.

In the 1960s both Frances and Anne created several trusts (collectively, the subsequent instruments) similar to the trust Springs himself created: the income from these trusts was to be paid to specified charities for a term of years, after which the trust property was to be split into separate trusts for each of Anne's children. During their lives, Anne's children receive the income from these trusts. Each child is then allowed to appoint by will one or more of his "issue" to receive the trust corpus. In the absence of the exercise of the power of appointment, the trust corpus is to be distributed per stirpes to the child's "surviving issue." The provisions containing the term "issue" are virtually identical with the analogous provisions in Springs's will and trust.

Anne's eight children currently are receiving income from the various trusts. Anne now has seventeen grandchildren. One grandchild, Cara Augusta Close (Cara), is adopted.

Several persons brought actions seeking rulings concerning whether the term "issue" as used in the 1959 Trust, the Springs Will, and the subsequent instruments includes adopted children. 1 The circuit court judge relied on the Probate Code to find "issue," as used in all of the instruments, includes adopted children. One of the defendants, Brooks P. Goldsmith (Goldsmith), the guardian ad litem for several potential beneficiaries under the class gift provisions of the several trusts, appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS
A. The 1959 Trust

Goldsmith contends the use of the word "issue" in the 1959 Trust creates a latent ambiguity requiring the admission of extrinsic evidence of Springs's intent. We disagree.

The primary consideration in construing a trust is to discern the settlor's intent. See, e.g., Chiles v. Chiles, 270 S.C. 379, 242 S.E.2d 426 (1978). If the language of the trust instrument is plain and capable of legal construction, that language determines the force and effect of the instrument. Under such circumstances, extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to alter the plain language of the instrument. Id.; see also Germann v. New York Life Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 34, 331 S.E.2d 385 (Ct.App.1985) (same). Conversely, when there is no defect on the face of a document but an uncertainty appears upon attempting to effectuate the document, then the document contains a latent ambiguity and parol evidence is admissible to determine the settlor's intent. E.g., Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454, 58 S.E. 420 (1907).

Here, Goldsmith's claim of latent ambiguity rests on his assumption that the question of the inclusion of adopted children in class gifts was entirely unsettled when Springs executed the 1959 Trust. Although South Carolina law may have been unsettled about whether adopted children generally were included in class gifts, the specific question this Court must answer here is whether a class gift to "issue" included adopted persons.

A careful reading of the case law and other authorities on trust instruments reveals that when Springs executed the 1959 Trust, the term "issue" encompassed adopted children. Since long before 1959, "issue" has been held to embrace all lineal descendants of a settlor. See, e.g., Corbett v. Laurens, 26 S.C.Eq. (5 Rich.) 301 (1853); see also Bonney v. Granger, 292 S.C. 308, 356 S.E.2d 138 (1987); Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959). "Lineal descendants," in turn, refers to the "whole of the indefinite line of inheritable succession"; i.e., to those who would be eligible to take under the intestacy statutes in effect at the time of the execution of the trust. Woodle, 234 S.C. at 128, 107 S.E.2d at 6; see also GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 182, at 302 (2d ed. 1979) ("A class described as 'issue' normally means the lineal descendants of the testator ... who would inherit his property at his death under the law of intestate succession....") (citing Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959)).

The dispositive question thus becomes whether adopted persons were eligible to inherit under the intestacy statutes in effect in 1959. As the circuit court's order correctly points out, South Carolina statutory law in the late 1950s and early 1960s provided that an adopted person was an heir of the adopting parents for purposes of inheritance. See ROA at 254; see also S.C.Code of Laws § 19-52.11 (1952) ("for all inheritance purposes without exception the adopted child shall be considered a natural child of the adopting parents"). Because the intestacy statutes granted adopted children rights of inheritance, the term "issue" as understood in 1959 included adoptees. Consequently, as Springs's intent can be discerned from the plain language of the trust, we find no ambiguity. Accordingly, resort to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary.

The circuit court judge did not resolve this matter as we do above by construing case law to find "issue" included adopted persons. Instead, he applied the Probate Code's rules of construction to find Springs's class gift included adoptees. Because the Probate Code's rules of construction apply only to wills, 2 Goldsmith contends the circuit court erred in applying them to a trust to find no latent ambiguity.

Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say the circuit court erred in relying on the Probate Code's rules of construction to interpret the trust. In the same month he executed the 1959 Trust, Springs also executed a will that contained the same language concerning "issue" as did the trust. As all parties acknowledge, there is little reason to suppose Springs's intentions in the will were different from those in the trust. The Probate Code's rules of construction indisputably apply to the will. Therefore, when coupled with the clear evidence of a common intent with respect to the will and the trust, the mandatory application of the Probate Code to the will justifies the circuit court judge's reliance on the Probate Code to interpret the 1959 Trust. This reliance was particularly justified in light of the inconclusiveness of the extrinsic evidence concerning Springs's intent with respect to the inclusion of adopted children in the class gifts. See Part B infra (discussing extrinsic evidence of Springs's intent). Accordingly, we find no error.

B. Springs's Will

Goldsmith next argues the circuit court judge erred in construing the class gift provisions in the Springs Will to include adopted persons. We disagree.

The South...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Holcombe-Burdette v. Bank of America
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 27 Noviembre 2006
    ... ... Epworth Children's Home, 365 S.C. at 166, 616 S.E.2d at 715; Bowles v. Bradley, 319 S.C. 377, 380, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1995) ("The primary consideration in construing a trust is to discern the settlor's intent.") ... ...
  • All Saints Parish v. Protestant Episcopal Church
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 2004
    ...lacked affirmative duties. "The primary consideration in construing a trust is to discern the settlor's intent." Bowles v. Bradley, 319 S.C. 377, 380, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1995). When the beneficiary "is described in terms applicable . . . to more than one person or thing, [parol] evidence ......
  • Epworth Children's Home v. Beasley
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 18 Julio 2005
    ...800 (1944). As with a will, the primary consideration in construing a trust is to discern the settlor's intent. Bowles v. Bradley, 319 S.C. 377, 380, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1995). In fact, the law relating to discerning the drafter's intent is identical for wills and trusts. All Saints Parish......
  • Frei v. Goodsell
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 3 Julio 2013
    ...“for the purpose of proving the meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of an admitted will.” Id.;Bowles v. Bradley, 319 S.C. 377, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1995) (“If the language of the trust instrument is plain and capable of legal construction, that language determines the for......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 provisions
  • Act 100, SB 143 – Probate Code
    • United States
    • South Carolina Session Laws
    • 1 Enero 2013
    ...indicates that the measure of capacity for execution of the trust is the same as that for a will. See Bowles v. Bradley, 219 S.C. 377, 461 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. 1995). Section 62-7-602. (a) Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or ame......
  • Act 66, SB 422 – Uniform Trust Code
    • United States
    • South Carolina Session Laws
    • 1 Enero 2005
    ...indicates that the measure of capacity for execution of the trust is the same as that for a will. See Bowles v. Bradley, 219 S.C. 377, 461 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. 1995). See SCTC Section 62-7-401, which requires a writing for a self-trusteed declaration of trust. Section 62-7-602. Revocation or am......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT