Bowles v. Case

Decision Date28 May 1945
Docket NumberNo. 10916.,10916.
Citation149 F.2d 777
PartiesBOWLES, Administrator, Office of Price Administration, v. CASE, Commissioner of Public Lands of State of Washington, et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Fleming James, Jr., Director, Litigation Division, OPA, Abraham Glasser, Samuel Mermin, Sp. Appellate Attys., and Albert M. Dreyer, Atty., OPA, all of Washington, D. C. (David London, Acting Regional Litigation Atty., OPA, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellant.

Smith Troy, Atty. Gen., State of Washington, and R. A. Moen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee, Otto A. Case, etc.

W. Z. Kerr, Stephen V. Carey, Evan S. McCord, and S. N. Greenleaf, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellee Soundview Pulp Co.

Before HEALY and BONE, Circuit Judges, and McCOLLOCH, District Judge.

HEALY, Circuit Judge.

Involved here is an appeal by the Administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., from a judgment denying injunctive relief. The principal defendant in the suit is the Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of Washington, to whom we shall refer as the Commissioner.

In September 1943 the War Production Board requested the Commissioner to make available for sale the timber on the south half of a designated section of state-owned school lands. The Commissioner caused the timber to be appraised and gave notice that it would be sold at public auction to the highest bidder.1 At the auction there were two bidders, the Soundview Pulp Company and the Coos Bay Pulp Corporation. The bid of Soundview was $86,336.39. That of Coos Bay was $77,853.25, which was the maximum price of the timber as determined under OPA Regulation 460. The official in charge of the sale accepted Soundview's bid. Soundview was thereupon informed by the Office of Price Administration that its bid was in excess of the price ceiling fixed by the regulation, hence a purchase at that figure would offend against the Act.

There followed a series of suits in the Washington courts, participated in by the Commissioner on the one hand and the Soundview and Coos Bay companies on the other, the several suits being ultimately consolidated for trial. On appeal it was held (by a sharply divided court) that the state owned the timber in its sovereign and governmental capacity and that Congress did not intend the Emergency Price Control Act to apply to a state in respect of the sale of a commodity so owned, it being conceded, however, that the Act affects sales by the state of property held in a proprietary capacity. Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, Commissioner, 21 Wash.2d 261, 150 P. 2d 839, 844. The court pointed to the terms of the Enabling Act providing that all lands granted the state for educational purposes should be disposed of only at public sale for not less than $10 per acre, the proceeds to constitute a permanent school fund; and it quoted a similar provision of the State Constitution requiring such sales to be made at auction to the highest bidder. "It therefore follows," said the court, "that in selling timber grown on state school lands the Commissioner of Public Lands must do so in accordance with the Enabling Act and the Constitution and statutes of the State of Washington irrespective of any order or regulation of the Office of Price Administration."

The Administrator then brought this suit against the Commissioner and Soundview, asking that they be enjoined from consummating the proposed transaction. A temporary restraining order was granted, but at the conclusion of the trial the order was vacated and the complaint dismissed. However, upon stipulation, it was ordered that the status quo be maintained pending an appeal. The views announced by the trial court substantially conformed with those of the Washington Supreme Court heretofore analyzed. While the judge conceded that Regulation 460 in terms applies to the subject matter, it was thought that despite the provisions of § 204(d) of the Act the extraordinary remedy of injunction should not be granted where the court is persuaded that the regulation goes beyond the terms of the statute.

Maximum Price Regulation No. 460 became effective August 31, 1943. It establishes maximum prices for western timber and covers all sales of such timber "if the primary purpose of the purchase is the acquisition of timber for commercial conversion into timber products." States and their political subdivisions are expressly made subject to the terms of the regulation. Section 5 establishes the method for computing the maximum legal prices of publicly-owned timber.2

Normally, it would seem that § 204 (d) does not, in a judicial proceeding other than in the Emergency Court, permit of questioning the validity of a regulation by the process of construing the statute. Two state courts of last resort, in considering the problem as related to the sale of publicly-owned property, have thought otherwise.3 In the circumstances we hesitate to rest decision on the ground that such mode of attack is here foreclosed, persuaded, as we are, that Regulation 460 has ample statutory warrant.

In the Act itself § 302(h) the term "person" is defined as including "the United States or any agency thereof, or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of any of the foregoing: Provided, That no punishment provided by this Act shall apply to the United States, or to any such government, political subdivision, or agency." So comprehensive is the definition that nothing short of an express exclusion of the states and their political subdivisions would serve to exempt sales made by them from the sweep of the statute.4 Nor is there anything in the language of the Act, or in its history or purpose, suggestive of the exemption of commodities owned in a governmental capacity. Cf. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567. The aim of the legislation is the control of commodity prices irrespective of who owns the commodity or in what capacity it is held.4a Certain of the Western states, as Congress well knew, are among the large owners of timber.5 If they were left...

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10 cases
  • Bowles v. Wheeler
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 10, 1945
    ...Court may consider such questions. Nor may we question the validity of a regulation by the process of construing the statute. Bowles v. Case, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 777. Appellee questions the authority of the Price Administrator to delegate the function of instituting treble-damage actions. Sec.......
  • United Air Lines v. Public Utilities Commission of Cal.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • December 3, 1952
    ...If the cause required the resolution of no other federal issue, obviously this court could dissolve itself. See Bowles v. Case, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 777; affirmed 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438, 90 L.Ed. 552; Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 60 S.Ct. 947, 84 L.Ed. 1249; cf. Farmers Gin Co. v. Hayes......
  • Case v. Bowles
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 4, 1946
    ...Price Administrator authority to set maximum prices for school-land timber sold by the State. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 777. Because the Circuit Court's decision conflicted with that of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Twin Falls County v. Hulbert, Idaho, 156 P.2d......
  • Porter v. RUSHLIGHT & CO.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • November 6, 1946
    ...Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court on appeal from it. I consider that I am only construing the Act, as was done in Bowles v. Case, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 777, affirmed 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438; and Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, Idaho, 156 P.2d 319, reversed 327 U.S. 103, 66 S.Ct. 444. See a......
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