Bowles v. Goebel
| Decision Date | 06 November 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 13104.,13104. |
| Parties | BOWLES, Adm'r, OPA., v. GOEBEL. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Abraham H. Maller, Sp. Appellate Atty., O.P.A., of Washington, D. C. , for appellant.
Herbert G. Nilles, of Fargo, N. D. (Nilles, Oehlert & Nilles, of Fargo, N. D. and Cyrus N. Lyche, of Grand Forks, N. D., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WOODROUGH, JOHNSEN, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.
The Administrator of the Office of Price Administration sued a used-car dealer of Grand Forks, N. D., under section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 58 Stat. 640, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925(e), for three times the amount of the overcharges under Maximum Price Regulation No. 341, on Used Commercial Motor Vehicles, 8 Fed. Reg. 3971, made in nine separate sales of used automobile trucks. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict for the Administrator in the sum of $2,248.83, the amount of the claimed overcharges, without any multiplication of the damages by way of penalty. The Administrator has appealed, alleging that the court improperly instructed the jury on the question of multiple damages.
The portion of section 205(e) as amended relating to damages provides that a seller who violates a price regulation "shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is the greater: (1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than $25 nor more than $50, as the court in its discretion may determine: Provided, however, That such amount shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or $25, whichever is greater, if the defendant proves that the violation of the regulation, order, or price schedule in question was neither wilfull nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation."
Prior to its amendment, the section had provided, 56 Stat. 34, 50 U.S.C.Appendix Supp. II, § 925(e), that such a seller should be liable "either for $50 or for treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court." This made it mandatory upon the court to award treble damages (or $50, if greater) in case of any violation. Cf. Bowles v. American Stores, Inc., 78 U.S. App.D.C. 238, 139 F.2d 377, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 730, 64 S.Ct. 947, 88 L.Ed. 1565.
The action here is governed by the amended statute. The court instructed the jury in substance on the question of damages that, if it found that overcharges under the regulation had occurred, it should return a verdict for the amount of the overcharges only, if the defendant had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that such violations were neither wilful nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions to avoid them, but that if the defendant had failed to prove that the violations occurred under these conditions, "then you may find for the plaintiff against the defendant for any sum you think proper, not less than the actual amount of the overcharge as you shall have determined it, and not more than three times that amount." In a memorandum opinion on the Administrator's motion for a new trial, 58 F. Supp. 686, the court examined and reapproved the correctness of these instructions.
The Administrator contends that the last part of these instructions was erroneous and should have provided instead that, if the defendant had failed to prove lack of wilfulness, the jury was required to assess treble damages for the violations, and that, even if nonwilfulness was proved, the jury was still required to assess more than single damages (anywhere up to treble damages in amount) and could not return a verdict for the overcharges merely, unless the defendant also had proved that practicable precautions were taken to avoid the violations. The Administrator had tendered an instruction to this effect, which the court refused to give.
It is to be noted that the only positive command which the amended statute contains on the assessment of damages is that, if the defendant proves that the violation was neither wilful nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against its occurrence, he cannot be held liable for more than the amount of the overcharge (or $25, if the overcharge is less than that sum). In all other situations, his liability is permitted to be "such amount * * * as the court in its discretion may determine", not exceeding three times the amount of the overcharge (or from $25 to $50, if the recovery otherwise might be less), except that the prescription for damages equal to the overcharge where nonwilfulness and the taking of practicable precautions are proved necessarily must be treated as implying that in no case can the damages be less than the amount of the overcharge. In relieving against the absoluteness of the original statute and its possible hardships, and perhaps in escaping from the many complaints under it, Congress thus clearly left both the question of the allowance of multiple damages and the extent of their amount (up to treble damages) to the discretion of the court, except that it forbade the assessing of any multiple damages where the violations were shown to be neither wilful nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions.
The Administrator argues that Congress did not intend that the amended statute should operate in any way to benefit a wilful violator (the Administrator does not recognize any possible degrees in wilfulness) and that the expressions made on the floor of the Senate specifically so indicate. Typical of these expressions is that of Senator Chandler, the author of the amendment, that "It is not my intention to protect anyone who willfully violates the law, or does not take reasonable and practical precautions to observe the regulations" (90 Cong.Rec.5473), and that of Senator Radcliff that "In cases where there has been a deliberate and flagrant attempt to flout the law, * * * triple damages should be imposed upon the one who has made the overcharge" (90 Cong.Rec.5469). These expressions, of course, suggest the spirit in which various members of Congress (and probably Congress generally) felt that the Act should be applied, but we do not believe that they can soundly be argued to have changed or limited the unambiguous and legally purposive legislative language used, which expressly makes the...
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