Bowles v. Keating

• Decision Date: 11 September 1979
• Docket Number: D,No. 281,No. 12524,281,12524
• Citation: 606 P.2d 458,100 Idaho 808
• Parties: Donna BOWLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marshal T. KEATING and Moscow Public School Districtefendants- Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 458

606 P.2d 458

100 Idaho 808

Donna BOWLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marshal T. KEATING and Moscow Public School District No. 281, Defendants- Respondents.

No. 12524.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 11, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1980.

Allen V. Bowles, Moscow, for plaintiff-appellant.

Cope R. Gale, Moscow, for defendants-respondents.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant, Donna Bowles (Bowles), brought a claim for relief in district court in which she alleged that the defendants-respondents, Marshal T. Keating, Superintendent, and the Moscow Public School District 281 (school district), refused her employment for a vice principal position as a result of sex discrimination in violation of I.C. § 67-5909. Following trial, the trial court found that the school district did not hire Bowles because of "her apparent lack of administrative ability and her failure to relate well to others," that Bowles was not the most qualified applicant for the job, and that the school district rejected all nine official applicants and instead hired a teacher from the Moscow Junior High School for the vice principal position. From these findings the court concluded that the school district's hiring process was not unreasonable, that the school district discriminated against all nine applicants but that such discrimination was not based on sex and that there were justifiable reasons for the school district to refuse to hire Bowles. Bowles then brought this appeal. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The facts of this case are largely uncontested, and it is only the conclusions which flow from the facts which are in controversy. In the spring of 1973, there was an opening for the position of vice principal at Moscow High School. The school district gave notice of that opening to colleges in the Pacific Northwest, California and to the Idaho State Department of Employment. Nine applicants, including Mrs. Bowles, filed applications in response to that announcement.

Bowles' educational qualifications for the position include a Bachelor's Degree in Business Education with a minor in English and a Master's Degree in School Administration. She also held an Idaho State Certificate for Administration. In terms of experience she had spent seven years as a teacher of business subjects, such as shorthand, typing and business law. She also had taught three years in a high school of 150 students in Pierce, Idaho, then in Benton City, Washington, in a school of 500 to 700 students and after that in a high school of approximately 150 students in Deary, Idaho. For two years in the winters, Bowles had taught adult education classes in shorthand and typing.

The evidence at trial disclosed that there were four administrative positions in Moscow's secondary school system in existence at the time Bowles filed her application for the vice principal position. At the time of trial no women held those positions. Bowles was the first woman to apply for one of the administrative positions; although, at the time of trial, one other woman had applied for a position. Defendant Keating did not recommend either Bowles or the subsequent applicant for a position.

The evidence also indicated that defendant Keating and a John Swartz, then the principal at Moscow High School, screened the nine applications submitted and interviewed four to six of the nine applicants, including Mrs. Bowles. Those interviews were unstructured in nature. Neither interviewer formulated any standardized written questions for the interviews. Nor did either take any formal notes of the interviews. Defendant Keating testified that he and Swartz utilized no objective tests or standards to evaluate those interviewed. In the main, they evaluated the applicants' responses subjectively. ¹ Upon completion of the interview process, Keating and Swartz decided not to hire any of the nine applicants and instead offered the position to a man who had never filed an official application for the position and did not hold an Idaho Administrator's Certificate. ²

As specifically relating to Bowles and the reasons for her rejection for the position, defendant Keating testified that in his opinion she lacked direct experience in the supervising of other teachers. He also expressed concern that because she had previously worked in smaller schools, she would be unfamiliar with computerized scheduling and grading. He also felt that the fact that Bowles' training was primarily in the business field might be a handicap in her supervising others in other academic areas. Finally, Keating, based on information from previous employers, believed that Bowles had difficulty in relating to others in the area of human relation skills. Swartz testified that he formulated his impressions of Bowles primarily from the interview. It was his opinion that she was weak in the area of working with discipline problems, as well as in the area of supervision of the instruction of teachers. A former supervisor of Bowles testified that while she thought Bowles was a good teacher and despite the fact that she had seen Bowles operate in a supervisory capacity only occasionally, she did not think Bowles would make a good administrator.

Based on the above evidence the trial court held for the defendant. On appeal, Bowles asserts that the trial court did not adhere to a correct order and allocation of proof at trial; that the evidence does not support the findings and conclusions of the trial court relating to the justifiable reasons for the rejection of her application: specifically, her lack of administrative ability and her inability to relate to others; and that the school district erroneously judged the applicants on the basis of subjective evaluations rather than using objective standards.

We point out initially that this action does not involve an asserted violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Neither does this action allege the violation of any of Bowles' constitutional rights under either the United States or Idaho Constitution. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).

Idaho Code § 67-5909 provides:

"Acts prohibited. It shall be a prohibited act to discriminate against a person because of, or on a basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in any of the following:

(1) For an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . . ."

This provision clearly indicates the legislative intent to prohibit discrimination in employment practices in Idaho on the basis of sex. Idaho Trailer Coach Association v. Brown, 95 Idaho 910, 523 P.2d 42 (1974). In this respect I.C. § 67-5909 is a parallel state statute to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this Court has not had occasion to determine the necessary quantum of proof and applicable standards for adjudication of claims of statutorily proscribed discrimination on the basis of sex. Many federal courts, on the other hand, have determined proof requirements and standards for adjudication under Title VII. Further, the state courts which have had occasion to construe their discrimination statutes have done so on the basis of the quantum of proof and standards promulgated in the federal cases dealing with alleged Title VII sex discrimination violations. See Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 151 N.J.Super. 15, 376 A.2d 535 (1977); General Electric Corp. v. Commonwealth, 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 (1976); Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wash.App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978). Four states have expressly adopted the federal quantum of proof and standards in sex discrimination cases. See State Fair Employment Practices v. Hohe, 53 Ill.App.3d 724, 11 Ill.Dec. 158, 368 N.E.2d 709 (1977); Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976); Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978); Scarborough v. Arnold, 379 A.2d 790 (N.H.1977).

Federal and state courts dealing with discrimination cases have recognized that "proof of unlawful discrimination rarely can be established by direct evidence and that an employer's seemingly arbitrary or pretextual explanation for a particular hiring judgment should not be permitted to justify conduct which is in fact unlawfully discriminatory." Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, supra 355 N.E.2d at 314. Thus, while we acknowledge that the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the complainant, Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978), we accept the principle that a complainant may prove a prima facie unlawful discrimination case without proving an employer's intent to discriminate, thereby shifting the burden of producing evidence to the employer to give a lawful explanation for its treatment of the complainant. We therefore adhere to and are guided by the quantum of proof and standards promulgated in discrimination cases arising under Title VII.

Under a Title VII analysis, once a plaintiff has carried the burden of producing evidence as to certain facts, certain presumptions arise in that plaintiff's favor. Without proving an employer's intent to discriminate, a discrimination plaintiff may make a claim for relief under either the "disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or the "disparate impact" theory of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). See generally B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12 (1976). Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In this case Bowles...